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Introduction
Throughout the last couple of decades the world has experienced a strong and steady
increase in the economic interdependence among national economies. Accordingly, because
national monetary and fiscal policies do have an important impact on national macroe-
conomic activities, they are also subject to a steady increase in mutual interdependence.
As a consequence, because conflicting national policy interests might lead to international
disagreements, the necessity of the international coordination of macroeconomic policies
has become a central postulation within both the public as well as the academic debate:
Countries should coordinate macroeconomic policies in order to incorporate externalities
of national policies on other countries and they should do so as to overcome inefficiencies
arising from strategic considerations to exploit the international transmission of national
macroeconomic policies in one country’s own favor.
The idea that countries should consult about their economic policy conduct is by far not
merely a thought experiment. There are in fact many important examples of international
institutions whose sole purposes are to form the basis for policy coordination. The Bretton
Woods System (1944-1973) that regulated international monetary and financial relations
among the participating countries is the first example of an international institution
designed to facilitate macroeconomic and in particular monetary policy coordination. The
principal feature of the Bretton Woods system were the pegged exchange rates of its
members and the control of temporary imbalances of payments. Influential institutions
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) find their roots in Bretton Woods. Another most impor-
tant because present in Europeans’ everyday life example is the European Union (EU)
and the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) within the European Union.
Against this background, it appears natural that a large fraction of the international
macroeconomics literature deals with the international transmission of national macroe-
conomic policies and the question of the desirability of institutional arrangements to
coordinate national policy conduct. The academic literature evolved along two major
strands following the natural separation of national macroeconomic policymaking into
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monetary and fiscal policy. Reviewing the literature on international policy coordination,
however, reveals two striking observations: First, the paradigm in the literature on
monetary policy coordination is that gains from coordination are fairly small. Monetary
policy is considered to be concerned with the stabilization of macroeconomic fluctuations
only. Gains from policy coordination arise then from the inability of certain exchange rate
systems to react appropriately to asymmetric shocks or from preventing countries from
the use of stabilization policies to strategically manipulate the terms of trade. The second
striking observation is that the analysis of international monetary policy coordination and
the analysis of fiscal policy coordination in strategic setups were effectively uncoupled. Even
though the profession understood well that both monetary and fiscal policy instruments
have similar effects on the terms of trade1, a crucial question has not been addressed
yet: How does the international coordination of only a part of national macroeconomic
policies, say monetary policy within a monetary union, change the strategic behavior of
the independently conducted remaining part of national policies, ie. the still independently
conducted fiscal policy?
The following three chapters of this thesis seek to contribute to these observations. Chapter
1 addresses the first observation and questions the professions’ concentration on stabilization
issues only. It is demonstrated that the gains from stabilizing macroeconomic fluctuations
are generically quite limited because they are of second-order. Instead, it is argued that
gains from international monetary policy cooperation can be substantial when policymakers
jointly prevent structural inefficiencies in the supply of labor and hence production directly
rooting in strategic considerations rather than coordinate on the stabilization of exogenously
driven fluctuations.
Chapter 2 deals with the second observation: It is argued that international policy coordi-
nation requires to include both monetary as well as fiscal policy because both sides dispose
of effective policy instruments that enable the strategic manipulation of the country’s terms
of trade. Hence, the coordination of one part of national macroeconomic policies through an
international agreement still leaves room for national authorities to still unilaterally manip-
ulate the terms of trade by means of different policy instruments. It is demonstrated that
potential gains from international policy coordination are squandered if policymakers only
cooperate, for instance, on monetary policy alone. Moreover, by letting the fiscal policy
instruments be chosen non-cooperatively, monetary policy coordination might even create
welfare losses as compared to no macroeconomic policy coordination at all.
The first two chapters have a clear proposition: Gains from policy coordination can be
1The idea that a system of import tariffs and export subsidies form a substitute to a currency devaluation
can already be traced back to Keynes (in Addendum I to the Macmillan Committee Report (Committee on
Finance and Industry: Report, London, Government Printing Office, 1931; cited by Haberler (1969))) and
to Hicks (1951).
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substantial as they are of first-order, but policy coordination must in principle include all
instruments that can be used by national authorities to unilaterally manipulate the coun-
try’s terms of trade. A particular way to coordinate monetary policy is the formation of a
monetary union where all member countries lose their independent monetary policy instru-
ments completely. By giving up the exchange rate flexibility, the member countries sacrifice
an effective policy instrument that can be used to switch expenditures between member
countries in order to offset economic shocks that have adverse impacts on these countries.
From the second chapter follows that there is a definite role for fiscal policy to overcome
this loss because fiscal policy can similarly offset adverse shocks. In Chapter 3, this issue
is further elaborated. In particular, a specific form of fiscal policy coordination is analyzed
which was put forth by Peter Kenen (1969): Because monetary unions cannot use mon-
etary policy instruments to effectively handle with adverse shocks to the member states,
the monetary union should be furnished with a built-in fiscal transfer system that collects
taxes from some member countries and pays transfers to other member countries in order
to alleviate the economic consequences of adverse shocks. In Chapter 3, the properties of
different federal fiscal transfer schemes are explored with regard to their capability to sta-
bilize national consumption, production, and employment in detail. Two transfer schemes
are considered: direct transfers among private sectors and indirect transfers among national
fiscal authorities. It is shown that federal fiscal transfers schemes indeed provide perfect
insurance against asymmetric shocks.
I.1 A Brief Review of International Policy Coordination
In this section, I review the academic literature of international policy coordination in order
to better illustrate how the present thesis relates to the literature. It will be brief, though,
because every single chapter is written so as to be self-contained.
I.1.1 International Monetary Policy Coordination
Early contributions focus on the international transmission of monetary policy and ask
with regard to the Bretton Woods system whether exchange rates should be flexible rather
than pegged. Building on the seminal work by James Meade (1951), the criterion of the
optimality of exchange rate regimes was determined by the concept of internal balance (ie.
full employment and price level stability) and external balance (balance of international
payments). Milton Friedman argued that in the Keynesian environment with rigid wages
and prices a system of flexible exchange rates would provide the terms of trade with the
flexibility to fulfill the adjustment process to achieve external balance. This implicitly
absorbs macroeconomic shocks coming from abroad and insulates the domestic economy
from foreign disturbances which maintains internal balance. In contrast, a system of fixed
exchange rates would lead to an inherently unstable international financial system with
4 Introduction
perseverative balance-of-payments crises (Friedman (1953)). In his ”Theory of Optimum
Currency Area”, Robert Mundell acknowledged the line of economic reasoning behind
Friedman’s argument. He pointed out, however, that the argument supporting flexible
exchange rates is not in general valid for nations and national currencies per se. Instead, he
argued that the stabilization properties of a flexible exchange rate can only be fully seized
in a world where production factors are perfectly mobile within a region but immobile
across regions. Then each region should have its own currency that is flexible relative to all
other currencies. His central proposition was that if national countries are heterogenous in
structure and factors are immobile within countries, exchange rate flexibility is no means
by which internal imbalances can be stabilized (Mundell (1961)). These arguments formed
the basis for the discussion of international monetary policy coordination as evidenced,
for instance, in the prearrangement to the European monetary unification (compare for
example the McDougall Report (1977) and the Delors Report (1989)).
Accepting that national central banks do have (monopoly) power to alter the terms of trades
- and even though the issue of strategic considerations of policymakers to manipulate the
terms of trade has been raised much earlier by John Hicks (1951) for instance - it took until
the 1970ies before economists began to formally theorize the strategic interaction of mone-
tary policy conduct in open economies. Beginning with the seminal contribution by Hamada
(1974), the first generation of game-theoretic models - represented most prominently by
Hamada (1976), Oudiz and Sachs (1984), and Canzoneri and Gray (1985) - are based on
Keynesian frameworks where policymakers are assumed to minimize an ad hoc motivated
quadratic loss function that punishes deviations from given desired levels or blisspoints of
the inflation rate, the increase in international reserves, or the output level. These models
provide the theoretical rationale for international monetary policy coordination so as to
overcome global inefficiencies induced by strategic considerations of independent monetary
authorities. With the advent of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)2 that
brought optimizing agents, monopolistic competition, and nominal rigidities into dynamic
general equilibrium models, international economists were retooled with model frameworks
that allowed first the derivation of their arguments from first principles and second a rigorous
welfare foundation of the propositions they made. This New-Keynesian framework forms
the basis of the second generation of monetary policy coordination models as in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2002a), Clarida et al. (2002), Devereux and Engel (2003), Benigno and Benigno
(2006), and Pappa (2004). All these contributions found that there indeed exist gains to
international monetary policy coordination as policymakers overcome inefficiencies arising
from strategic considerations. In quantitative assessments, however, almost all authors find
2Seminal contributions to this literature are Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995, 1996).
I.1. A Brief Review of International Policy Coordination 5
that theses gains are fairly small and rather negligible.
I.1.2 International Fiscal Policy Coordination
In the 1950ies and 1960ies, the focus of international fiscal policy coordination was on trade
theory and the analysis of optimal tariff policy and protectionism. Nevertheless, the role of
trade policy instruments such as import tariffs and export subsidies for correcting internal
distortions was well taken as the highly influential contributions by Haberler (1950), Hagen
(1958), and Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) document. In international macroeconomics,
the potential role of national fiscal policies as stabilization instruments to external and inter-
nal imbalances in the sense of Meade was highlighted by Robert Mundell (1962) and Marcus
Fleming (1962) and taken up among others by Anne Krueger (1965) and Richard Cooper
(1969). The main conclusion that Mundell drew was that monetary policy should be used
for attaining external balance whereas fiscal policy is the more appropriate instrument for
achieving internal balance and hence full employment. Consequently, by the implicit isola-
tion of the domestic economic activity from foreign fluctuations through monetary policy,
the necessity for international fiscal policy coordination was not explicitly given. This is no
longer true, however, for a currency union that does not suffice Mundell’s optimum criteria.
As Kenen (1969) pointed out, because monetary policy does not dispose of the sufficient
instruments to achieve both internal as well as external stability, there is a definite role for
fiscal policy coordination among the member countries of a currency union. In particular,
Kenen argued that a fiscal systems that spans all member regions or countries can be used
to scrutinize fiscal budgetary policy instruments, ie. collecting payments from some regions
and make compensating payments to other regions, in order to offset economic shocks that
affect the member countries adversely.
Elaborated game-theoretic arguments as in case of international monetary policy coordina-
tion were not provided until the 1980ies as for example by Hamada (1986), Kehoe (1987),
and Chari and Kehoe (1990). The main theme again is that international coordination of
policy conduct is desirable as it helps to overcome global inefficiencies induced by strategic
considerations of independent fiscal policies. In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and
the Stability and Growth Pact (1997), however, the attention of the profession was drawn to
the analysis of deficit rules and appropriate institutional arrangements of fiscal policy coor-
dination within monetary unions.3 Surprisingly, in contrast to the wave of contributions to
optimal international monetary policy conduct initiated by the developments of the NOEM
framework, a new wave of a more general analysis of optimal international fiscal policy has
not yet occurred. Instead, the profession has almost entirely concentrated on fiscal policy
coordination within monetary unions.
3See, for example, Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003), and Chari and Kehoe
(1998).
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I.2 Outline of the Chapters
In the first chapter, I develop a simple dynamic stochastic two-country model with sticky
wages and a cash-in-advance restriction which is in the spirit of the New Open Economy
Macroeconomics framework and similar in structure to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a) and
Devereux and Engel (2003). In this environment, monetary authorities can manipulate the
terms of trade by conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the inflation
target and the actual money supply. The money supply affects the terms of trade by
altering the nominal exchange rate ex-post and it is used in the traditional way so as to
stabilize macroeconomic fluctuations. The inflation target affects the terms of trade by
changing expected inflation ex-ante. Within this framework, two important results emerge:
First, the equilibrium and hence welfare effects of inflation targeting policy are of first
order whereas those of the money supply management and hence stabilization policies are
of second order. Second, regarding the inflation targeting policy, self-interested national
policymakers indeed have an incentive to deviate from the globally optimal inflation. From
a global perspective, it is optimal to follow the Friedman principle since it minimizes the
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation
in all instances when wages are flexible and at least on average when wages are sticky.
Independent and self-oriented national policymakers, however, strive for an appreciation of
the terms of trade in order to improve the domestic labor-leisure trade-off in all instances
when wages are flexible and at least on average when wages are sticky. A simple numerical
example demonstrates that international coordination of inflation targeting policy can
amount to welfare gains four orders of magnitude larger than gains from coordinating
stabilization policies through money supplies.
In Chapter 2, I augment the model presented in Chapter 1 by two national fiscal authorities.
Both dispose of two different policy instruments: distortionary taxes on labor income
and distortionary taxes on consumption expenditures. The key property of the different
monetary and fiscal policy instruments is that the labor income tax and the inflation
target on the one hand and the consumption tax and money supply on the other hand are
perfectly substitutable national policy instruments. The important consequence is that
only the joint interventions of labor income tax and the inflation target on the one hand
and the consumption tax and money supply on the other hand are decisive for the national
impact on the terms of trade and therefore the national influence on the equilibrium
allocation. Hence, taking up the arguments developed in favor of policy coordination and
seeking an international cooperation of either monetary or fiscal policy alone will only leave
room for policymakers to still follow national interests by exploiting their monopolistic
power on the terms of trade via the respective other policy instruments. As a consequence,
potential gains from, say, international monetary policy coordination are squandered or
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may even turn negative by letting the fiscal policy instruments be chosen non-cooperatively.
A numerical example supports these findings.
In Chapter 3, I develop a model of a monetary union which is also set up in the tradition of
the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) but follows this time closely Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1995, 1996). It is a dynamic general equilibrium model that depicts a monetary
union consisting of two member states. The focus of this chapter lies on the analysis of
federal fiscal transfer arrangements as already indicated by Peter Kenen (1969). As the
underlying economic environment of Kenen’s proposition stems from Mundell (1961), the
Obstfeld and Rogoff framework has been modified along two lines in order to better capture
the main features of Mundell’s world within a modern macroeconomic framework: First,
households provide different types of labor monopolistically. Final goods are produced
by an aggregation technology over all different domestic types of labor. In this sense,
technology shocks alter the aggregate labor productivity and subsequently shift marginal
costs of producing market goods. As a consequence, since goods markets are assumed to
be competitive and prices are flexible, temporary productivity shocks affect prices even
though wages are rigid. Second, I introduce tradable and non-tradable goods. Therefore,
I can describe demand shocks in addition to productivity shocks. This also allows to
take into account the degree of economic integration as measured by the fraction of
tradable consumption goods. I consider direct transfers among private sectors and indirect
transfers among national fiscal authorities. I explore the properties of federal fiscal transfer
schemes with regard to their capability to stabilize national consumption, production, and
employment. The important result of this chapter, however, is that appropriately chosen
federal fiscal arrangements provide perfect insurance against shocks affecting the member
states of a monetary union adversely.
Each of the next three chapters presents its analysis as a self-contained unit. The Appendix
to this thesis contains the derivation of the three models and the derivation of the results.
All three sub-appendices are kept rather detailed in order to ease the reading.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Monetary Policy in an
Interdependent World
In the literature on the international dimension of monetary policy, the consensus is that
gains from policy coordination are fairly small. Monetary policy is considered to be con-
cerned with the stabilization of macroeconomic fluctuations only. Gains from policy co-
ordination arise then from preventing strategic considerations regarding the use of these
stabilization policies from unilaterally manipulating the terms of trade. However, as it has
been emphasized by Lucas (2003), the gains from stabilizing macroeconomic fluctuations
per se are generically quite limited. Instead, he argues that
”...there remain important gains in welfare ... from providing people with
better incentives to work and to save, not from better fine tuning of spending
flows.”
In this paper, I take up his proposition and translate it into the context of an open economy.
I demonstrate that gains from international monetary policy cooperation can be substantial
when policymakers coordinate on the stimulation of labor and hence production rather
than on the stabilization of exogenously driven fluctuations. To this end, I develop a simple
dynamic stochastic two-country model with preset wages and cash-in-advance restrictions.
National monetary authorities can affect the equilibrium allocation in this environment by
conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the inflation target as well as the
actual money supply. On the one hand, the money supply policy affects the allocation by
altering the nominal spending and thereby the nominal exchange rate ex post. A contraction
of money supply then leads to an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate and the terms
of trade. This equips monetary authorities with an effective policy instrument to stabilize
economic fluctuations. On the other hand, the inflation target affects the allocation by
changing the inflation expectations. Because inflation works as a tax on labor income,
higher expected inflation leads households to claim higher nominal wages. This results in
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an increase in the prices of goods and thereby causes an appreciation of the terms of trade.1
Within this framework which allows the joint analysis of the inflation target and the actual
money supply as combined tools of monetary policy, two important results emerge: First,
the equilibrium and hence welfare effects of the inflation target policy are of first order
whereas those of the money supply management are of second order. The intuition for
this is simple: The money supply is effective only because of sticky wages through ex
post deviations of the actual money supply from the expected one. Thus, money supply
management only affects the variability of the equilibrium allocation. As a result, the ex
ante equilibrium effects of money supply policies are thus of second order. By contrast,
the inflation target changes the average labor supply and hence strikes a wedge between
the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation. This inefficient
wedge is present irrespective of whether wages are flexible or not and irrespective of
whether the state of the world is uncertain. Consequently, the equilibrium implications
are of first order. Second, regarding the inflation target policy, self-interested national
policymakers indeed have an incentive to deviate from the globally optimal inflation target.
From a global perspective, the optimal inflation target follows the Friedman principle
and implements zero net nominal interest rates. It is optimal because it minimizes the
wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation
in all instances when wages are flexible and at least on average when wages are sticky.
Independent and self-oriented national policymakers, however, strive for an appreciation of
the terms of trade in order to improve the domestic labor-leisure trade-off in all instances
when wages are flexible and at least on average when wages are sticky. As it is true for
the money supply policy, deviations of inflation target from the globally optimal ones
are always ”beggar-thy-neighbor”. The important conclusion to be drawn then is that
as long as monetary authorities face the incentive to depart from the optimal monetary
policy, gains from international arrangements or institutions that effectively prevent these
strategic interactions are of first order. A simple numerical example demonstrates that
international coordination of inflation target policy can amount to welfare gains four
orders of magnitude larger than gains from coordinating stabilization policies through
money supply management. Consequently, potential gains from policy coordination are not
negligible.
1Within a closed economy model, Ireland (1996) already argues that monetary policy can be conducted
in a more general way by using the expected money growth rate (corresponds to the inflation target) and
deviations from the expected money growth (corresponds to the actual money supply) rate as two distinct
instruments. More recently, Adao et al. (2003) take up his approach and analyze optimal short-run monetary
policy in a closed economy real business cycle model with monopolistic firms, a cash-in-advance restriction
and preset prices.
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The reason why it has become widely accepted that potential gains from policy coordina-
tions must be quite limited might be best understood when looking at the literature from
an historical perspective: Beginning with the seminal contributions by Hamada (1974),
the first generation of game-theoretic models - represented most prominently by Hamada
(1976), Oudiz and Sachs (1984), and Canzoneri and Gray (1985)2 - are based on traditional
Keynesian models where policymakers are assumed to minimize an ad hoc motivated
quadratic loss function that punishes deviations from given desired levels or blisspoints of
the inflation rate, the increase in international reserves, or the output level. These models
provide the theoretical rationale for international monetary policy coordination so as to
overcome global inefficiencies induced by strategic considerations of independent monetary
authorities. While there is no question about the merits of the aforementioned class of
models for the purpose of studying international policy coordination, the assumptions of the
policy objectives lead immediately to the result of limited gains for two reasons: First, the
quadratic loss function itself directly reduces the problem to the minimization of deviations
around the blisspoints. The consequence is that gains from coordinating monetary policy
must be of second order. Second, these studies neglected the possibility that the blisspoints
themselves are subject to strategic considerations. As it is demonstrated in this paper,
the non-cooperatively set expected inflation rates and hence the non-cooperatively set
nominal interest rates differ from the globally optimal ones and they hinge crucially on
the macroeconomic interdependencies among the different countries. A proper notion of
the desired levels of inflation or output conditioning on the international macroeconomic
environment, however, requires a rigorous welfare foundation.
Such welfare foundations were provided with the advent of the ”New Open Economy
Macroeconomics” (NOEM) that brought optimizing agents, monopolistic competition
and nominal rigidities into dynamic general equilibrium models.3 This New Keynesian
framework forms the basis of the second generation of policy coordination models as in
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a), and Devereux and Engel (2003).4
Nevertheless, even though the second generation models provide new important insights
to the question of the needs of international policy coordination, the welfare gains are
2Cooper (1985), Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), and Persson and Tabellini (1995) present excellent
overviews of the first generation literature.
3Seminal contributions to this literature are Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995, 1996). For an excellent survey see Lane (2001).
4Other contributions include Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2005, 2006), Clarida et al. (2002), Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005), Corsetti et al. (2000), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) Kollmann (2003), Liu and Pappa (2005),
Pappa (2004), and Tchakarov (2004). Canzoneri et al. (2005), who introduces the above distinction between
first and second generation models of international policy coordination, survey the literature and discuss the
properties of the second generation models in general.
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similarly limited as in the first generation models. In contrast to the first generation
models, however, the answer to this problem is now inherent to the specification of the
conduct of policy itself. In one prominent class of models, as for example in Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2002a) and Devereux and Engel (2003), it is assumed that monetary authorities
follow policy rules that condition money supply deviations from any given initial stock of
money on the realization of shocks. The average inflation rate induced by the mean growth
rate of the money supply is implicitly assumed to be zero. In the other prominent class of
models, as for example in Clarida et al. (2002) and Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), it is assumed
that policymakers follow interest rate rules that condition on deviations of inflation rates
and output from some given reference levels. Equivalent to the problem of exogenous
blisspoints discussed above, both the average interest rate as well as the reference value for
the inflation and output deviations are not further analyzed but implicitly fixed via the
(log)linear approximation of the model about a zero inflation and nonstrategic steady state.
Hence, in both classes of models, monetary policy solely focuses on stabilization issues and
consequently the welfare gains of policy coordination are of second order.
Surprisingly, there are only very few contributions that consider non-stabilizing monetary
policy interaction within a strategic setting. One exception is Cooley and Quadrini (2003)
who study optimal interest rate policy in a two-country open economy model that is not a
variation of the NOEM framework. Instead, they use a limited participation version where
purchases of production intermediaries - partly imported - must be financed in advance.
Consequently, the nominal interest rate has a distorting effect as it increases the cost of
production. In this environment, self-interested monetary authorities face the incentive to
increase the nominal interest rate in order to appreciate the terms of trade and thereby
to expand domestic production. The policy competition leads to inflationary biases with
inefficiencies that have sizable adverse welfare consequences. Another exception is Arseneau
(2007) who studies the importance of the distortion caused by monopolistic competition for
the optimal nominal interest rate policy. Similarly to the model here, he motivates money
demand within a version of Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) by a cash-in-advance restriction. He
also demonstrates that non-cooperative monetary authorities use the nominal interest rate
to induce a domestic appreciation of the terms of trade that leads in equilibrium to sizable
welfare losses as compared to the cooperative solution. Arseneau, however, concentrates on
the interaction between optimal interest rates and the friction of monopolistic competition
and thereby seeks to complement Cooley and Quadrini (2003) where production takes place
in a perfectly competitive environment.
In contrast, in the present paper, the generalization of monetary policy conduct in an
environment with nominal inertia facilitates the joint analysis of both the inflation target
(or equivalently the average money growth rate) and the money supply management (or
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equivalently state-dependent deviations from the expected average money growth rate).
Consequently, the model proposed below which is kept close to Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a)
and which is hence in the tradition of the NOEM literature provides a unifying framework
that allows the derivation of more general principles of optimal monetary policy conduct in
open economies.
The model is presented in the next Section. In Section 1.2, the equilibrium allocation is
derived for both flexible wage and sticky wage environments. In Section 1.3, I discuss the
monetary policy instruments and explain why the inflation target and the actual money sup-
ply are in fact two distinct policy instruments. I also explore the national equilibrium welfare
as the policymakers’ objectives in detail and demonstrate that the welfare consequences of
nominal interest rate policy are indeed of first order whereas the welfare consequences of sta-
bilizing money supply management are of second order. The analysis of optimal monetary
policy when set cooperatively and independently follow in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, respectively.
A numerical example in Section 1.6 provides an assessment of the quantitative relevance of
the findings. Section 1.7 concludes. Most of the derivations of the equations and the results
are delegated to the Appendix.
1.1 The Model
The model economy consists of two identical countries which are denoted Home (H) and
Foreign (F). Each country is populated by a continuum of households and both countries
are of equal size one. Firms within a country produce two different consumption goods, one
traded good that is demanded across borders, and one non-traded good that is demanded
only within borders. In all there are thus four different goods. The goods markets are
assumed to be perfectly competitive and goods price are fully flexible. The only productive
factor is differentiated labor. Each household is a monopolistic supplier of a specific type of
labor and it is identified by superscript i.5
1.1.1 Firms and Technologies
Technologies to produce the Home tradable (HT ) and the Home non-tradable (HN) goods
are identical:
Yj,s = AsLj,s with Lj,s =
(∫ 1
0
Lij,s
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
, (1.1)
5The notation I stick to throughout this paper is as follows: Superscripts denote where a variable belongs
to, Foreign variables are distinguished by an asterisk ∗. Subscripts identify the characteristics of that variable,
e.g. whether it’s a non-tradable or the Home tradable good.
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where θ > 1 and j ∈ {HT,HN}. The coefficient As denotes the labor productivity and
is subject to shocks. The associated wage level to employ a unit of aggregate labor is
Ws =
(∫ 1
0 W
i
s
(1−θ)di
) 1
1−θ , where W is denotes the monopolistic money wage claimed by
household i. Accordingly, the demand for specific type of labor provided by Home household
i is
Lis =
(
W is
Ws
)−θ
Ls, (1.2)
where Ls is Home aggregate demand for labor. The foreigners share an identical aggregation
technology and therefore the corresponding equations apply.
1.1.2 The Households
A Home household i has preferences over consumption and labor effort as described by
U it = Et
∑∞
s=t β
s−tU is, where (1.3)
U is =
(
Cis
1−ρ−1
1−ρ − 1νLis
ν
)
with Cis =
CiT,s
γ
CiHN,s
1−γ
γγ(1−γ)(1−γ) , (1.4)
0 < β < 1, ρ > 0, ν ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The consumption index Cis aggregates the Home
non-tradable good CiHN,s and tradable goods C
i
T,s with unit elasticity of substitution. C
i
T,s
aggregates the Home tradable good CiHT,s and the Foreign tradable good C
i
FT,s with unit
elasticity of substitution and equal shares, i.e. CiT,s = 2C
i
HT,s
1
2CiFT,s
1
2 . Foreign households
have the same preferences over tradable goods but differ with respect to their own non-
tradable good. Hence, the corresponding equations apply.
Individual Wealth and Cash Constraints
Households can trade a nominal bond with other households within a country. They cannot,
however, trade any assets with households from abroad.6 The timing protocol when asset
and goods markets open within a period follows Lucas (1982). At the beginning of a period
s, household i holds nominal wealth Wis. In the asset markets, household i receives money
transfers Xis, decides about the holding of domestic nominal bonds B
i
s that repay in next
6This assumption is one of two possible stark assumptions that are sufficient for shutting down the current
account which allows the derivation of a closed-form solution. In contrast to the other possible assumption
where international financial markets are complete (compare eg. Devereux and Engel (2003)), the lack
of international risk sharing preserves an important role for international monetary policy management:
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a) point out, optimal international monetary policy conduct requires to also
take into account the need for international consumption risk sharing. In order to also capture the role
of monetary policy for international consumption risk sharing, the extreme assumption of no international
financial markets at all seems to be the more revealing one.
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period RsBis at a gross nominal return Rs, and about cash holdings M
i
s.
7 The asset market
constraint reads
M is +B
i
s ≤ Wis +Xis. (1.5a)
Thereafter, the goods markets open where purchases of consumption goods must not exceed
initial cash holdings, ie.
PsC
i
s ≤ M is. (1.5b)
At the end of period s, household i receives wage earnings W isL
i
s. Thus, the nominal wealth
at the beginning of the next period (s+ 1) is
Wis+1 = M
i
s +RsB
i
s − PsCis +W isLis. (1.5c)
Optimal Decisions
Households optimize their expected lifetime utility (1.4) by deciding on bond and cash
holdings, consumption, and their monopolistic wages subject to the constraints (1.5a-1.5c),
the demand for their specific type of labor (1.2), and subject to the constraint that they have
to set wages one period in advance. In order to smooth consumption over time, household
i demands domestic nominal bonds according to the intertemporal Euler equation
1
Rs
= βEs
((
Cs+1
Cs
)−ρ
Π−1s+1
)
, (1.6)
where Πs+1 denotes the inflation in period s + 1. Individual optimization also yields the
standard composition of consumption between the tradable goods basket and the non-
tradable good and between Home and Foreign tradable goods. The corresponding Home
consumption-based price indices are given by Ps = P
γ
T,sP
(1−γ)
HN,s and PT,s = P
1
2
HT,sP
1
2
FT,s.
Overall consumption will be determined by the household’s cash holding. In particular,
we will assume that the net nominal interest rate will be strictly positive and reaches zero
only in the limit. Consequently, the cash constraint is binding and optimality implies that
households use all their initial cash for consumption goods purchases.8
7Note that following Lucas (1982) directly would also imply households to purchase foreign cash within
the asset markets. This, however, is completely equivalent to imposing only a single cash constraint since
information is complete at the asset markets. I stick to the single cash constraint because it is assumed that
households go to domestic retailers only who sell both Home and Foreign goods in domestic currency. This
also facilitates the comparison to the standard NOEM approach using money-in-the-utility.
8As it is well known, the cash-in-advance constraint with the Lucas timing convention of markets is
binding if the net nominal interest rate is positive. In the sticky wage set up, a zero net nominal interest
rate implies real indeterminacy as Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) show in a comment to Ireland (1996) for a
closed economy. Nevertheless, we follow Adao et al. (2003) and assume that the interest rate is positive but
arbitrarily close to zero.
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(Flexible Wages) When the household can set wages instantly, it will equate the real
wage to a mark-up over the marginal rate of substituting consumption and labor (MRS) as
implied by the condition
W is
Ps
=
θ
θ − 1Rs
Lis
ν−1
Cs
−ρ . (1.7)
The case when wages are flexible will serve as useful benchmark. Equation (1.7) reveals
that households face two different incentives to claim real wages higher than the MRS
would dictate: first, wage setters impose a monopolistic mark-up, and second, the cash-in-
advance restriction leads the household to take into account that labor income is available
for consumption only the period thereafter. This is to be evaluated by the nominal interest
rate because the nominal interest rate reflects the opportunity cost of holding money as
wealth. Consequently, higher nominal interest rates causes the households to claim higher
money wages.
(Sticky Wages) When wages have to be posted one period in advance, optimal wage
setting requires households to equate the expected marginal loss in utility implied by labor
and the expected marginal gain in utility from the additional consumption purchases the
period thereafter. Again, by making use of the Euler equation one gets
W is =
θ
θ − 1
Es−1
(
Lis
ν)
Es−1
(
1
Rs
Lis
PsCsρ
) . (1.8)
as the optimal wage claim. Similar to the case of flexible wages, households impose a
monopolistic mark-up and also take into account the effect of expected nominal interest
rates. With preset wages, however, households cannot adjust their money wage claim to
the realization of shocks. In contrast to the case of flexible wages where households can
effectively control labor effort ex post, ie. after shocks are realized, households are assumed
to fully supply the amount of labor the firms demand at the posted money wage. By the
identical structure of the Foreign households’ problem, they obtain equivalent optimality
conditions.
1.1.3 Governments’ Budget Constraints
National monetary authorities change money supply by making direct money transfers to
the households at the asset markets. The associated constraint for the Home authority reads∫ 1
0
M isdi =
∫ 1
0
M is−1di+
∫ 1
0
Xisdi. (1.9)
The money supply will be set according to policy rules that are specified later in the dis-
cussion of monetary policy conduct. For the Foreign authority the corresponding equation
applies.
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1.2 Equilibrium Allocation
All households within a country are assumed to be identical except for the specific types
of labor. This also includes that they start out with identical wealth and that they receive
identical money transfers. Thus, by the symmetry of labor demand, all households take
identical optimal decisions. We therefore drop superscript i.
1.2.1 Goods Prices and the Terms of Trade
Goods markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Since goods prices are flexible,
they are set equal to the marginal costs. Consequently, prices of national tradable and non-
tradable goods coincide and the identification of whether it is the tradable or non-tradable
good can be saved. Goods prices are then
PH,s =
Ws
As
and P ∗F,s =
W ∗s
A∗s
, (1.10)
respectively. The terms of trade are defined as the price of Home exports over the price of
Home imports, ie. ToTs =
(
PH,s
EsP ∗F,s
)
, where Es denotes the nominal exchange rate. In terms
of relative wage levels, we can restate the terms of trade as
ToTs =
A∗s
As
(
Ws
EsW ∗s
)
. (1.11)
By the consumption-based price indices follows for the real exchange rate that RERs =
ToT
(1−γ)
s .
1.2.2 Ex Post Equilibrium Allocation
As all households within a country take identical decisions and as they start out with
identical initial wealth, they will ask and bid identical amounts of nominal bonds. Thus,
there is no net trade in bonds and asset market clearing conditions require that households’
bond holding is zero in all states. Consequently, households hold only cash as wealth, ie.
Ws = Ms−1 and W∗s = M∗s−1. Next, goods markets clearing of tradable goods necessitates
nominal imports to equal nominal exports because nominal trade must be balanced as there
are no payments through international financial markets. Moreover, since Home and Foreign
households share the same preferences over tradable goods with unit demand elasticity, the
law of one price holds for the composite of tradable goods. As a consequence, Home and
Foreign consumption of tradable goods must be the same, ie. CT,s = C∗T,s. Making use of the
optimal composition of tradable and non-tradable goods within households’ consumption
baskets, ie. CT,s = γ PsPT,sCs and C
∗
T,s = γ
P ∗s
P ∗T,s
C∗s , respectively, reveals that - in terms of
tradable goods - Home and Foreign consumption expenditures must be the same. Following
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a), overall consumption expenditures are expressed in terms of
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tradable goods consumption as
Zs =
Ps
PT,s
Cs and Z∗s =
P ∗s
P ∗T,s
C∗s . (1.12)
The immediate equilibrium consequence then is Zs = Z∗s . Furthermore, money market
clearing and the binding cash-in-advance constraints determine households’ nominal ex-
penditures. Taking ratios of the nominal consumption expenditures and using the goods
market clearing implication of Zs = Z∗s , one obtains the equilibrium nominal exchange rate
to be solely determined by the ratio of Home and Foreign money supplies. In summary,
independent of whether wages are flexible or preset a period before, the equilibrium entails
Zs = Z∗s and Es =
Ms
M∗s
. (1.13)
It turns out to be very insightful to express the national variables in terms of their common
and their different components as proposed by Aoki (1981). In particular, let subscript ”w”
denote the ”world” average component which is the geometric mean of Home and Foreign
variables and let subscript ”d” denote the ”difference” component which is the ratio of Home
over Foreign variables.9 The decomposition of Home and Foreign equilibrium consumption
levels yields
Cw,s = Zs and Cd,s = ToT
− 1
2
(1−γ)
s . (1.14)
The world average consumption which is common to both Home and Foreign is clearly Zs.
As a consequence, in equilibrium, the difference between Home and Foreign consumption
solely stems from the consumption of non-tradable goods. This is entirely captured by the
real exchange rate and hence by the terms of trade. Consequently, the ex post equilibrium
allocation is uniquely determined for given common consumption level Zs and the terms of
trade ToTs. Table 1.1 summarizes equilibrium consumption, output and labor.
Flexible Wages
When wages are flexible, it is straight forward to obtain
Zs =
(
(θ−1)
θ
Aw,sν
Rw,s
) 1
X and ToTs =
(
Rd,sAd,s
−ν) 2Y , (1.15)
where X = ν − (1 − ρ) > 0 and Y = ν − (1 − ρ)(1 − γ) > 0. From (1.15) follows that
the higher the world average nominal interest rates, the lower the common consumption
Cw,s. Higher nominal interest rates reflect the opportunity cost of keeping wealth as cash.
9As a reminder, for Home and Foreign variables X and X∗ the decomposition in levels is X = XwXd and
X∗ = Xw
Xd
where Xw = (XX
∗)
1
2 and Xd = (
X
X∗ )
1
2 . The exponents are relative country sizes which in our
case is { 1
2
, 1
2
}.
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Common World Components Difference Components
Consumption Cw = Z Cd = ToT−
(1−γ)
2
Output Yw = Z Yd = ToT−
1
2
Labor Lw = A−1w Z Ld = A
−1
d ToT
− 1
2
Table 1.1: Ex Post period equilibrium allocation for given Z and ToT .
Since the labor income cannot be spent in the period earned and households must keep it
as cash, they take this into account and demand higher nominal wages. This effectively
increases the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labor and the real wage claim. The consequence is an inefficiently low labor supply that
results in a reduction of equilibrium output and consumption. The terms of trade, in turn,
depend on relative nominal interest rates as these determine relative nominal wage levels
and thereby relative goods prices. Because higher domestic nominal interest rates cause
households to increase their wage claims, goods prices increase and alter the terms of trade.
It is important to observe that it is the relative nominal interest rates that affect relative
prices and the allocation. National money supplies determine only the national price levels
and the nominal exchange rate according to equation (1.13). When wages are flexible, the
nominal exchange rate does not matter for determining the real allocation. The role of the
money supply changes, however, when wages are sticky.
Sticky Wages
Preset wages imply that goods prices are fully determined by the realization of productivity
levels. The important implication is that the nominal exchange rate uniquely determines
the terms of trade as by equation (1.11). Thus Home and Foreign consumption-based price
levels are determined. Home and Foreign consumption levels are therefore determined by
the respective money supplies through the cash-in-advance constraint. As a result, and in
contrast to flexible wages, the ex post real allocation can only be altered by national money
supplies. To be specific,
Zs =
Aw,s
Ww,s
Mw,s and ToTs =
(
Wd,s
Ad,sMd,s
)2
. (1.16)
When goods prices are effectively predetermined, world average consumption Zs can only
be changed ex post by altering the common money supply which reflects in equilibrium a
one-to-one change in real balances available for consumption purchases. The terms of trade,
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in turn, can only be changed ex post by the nominal exchange rate which is determined by
the relative money supplies as in (1.13).
In fact, this monetary propagation mechanism resembles the standard equilibrium trans-
mission of monetary policy in NOEM, (compare eg. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2002a), or Devereux and Engel (2003)). In sharp contrast, however, and key to
the analysis in this paper, the money supply is not the only available monetary instrument
to affect the equilibrium allocation. For a more general short-run monetary policy conduct
it is important to realize that even though the ex post allocation can only be altered by
the actual money supply, the expected period inflation and hence the expected nominal
interest rates play a crucial role for the determination of the equilibrium allocation ex ante
because they affect the wage setting and hence the terms of trade ex ante. The argument
follows the same logic as in case of flexible wages: the expected inflation convey the expected
opportunity cost of keeping labor income as cash. Consequently, higher expected inflation
taxes on labor income lead to higher wage claims ex ante.10 Recall the optimal wage setting
condition (1.8).
1.2.3 Distribution of the Equilibrium Allocation
Uncertainty stems from productivity shocks that are assumed to be iid log-normal. Letting
lower case letters denote logs, productivity shocks have the following properties: Ea =
Ea∗ = 0 and V ar(a) = V ar(a∗) = σ2a, where Ea = 0 is assumed for simplicity. In accordance
with the equilibrium variables, these shocks are expressed in terms of a ”world” component
common to both countries and a ”difference” component making up the gap in productivity.
Thus we have aw,s = 12(as + a
∗
s) and ad,s =
1
2(as − a∗s). The distribution of the decomposed
shocks implies in turn
V ar(as) = σ2a = σ
2
aw + σ
2
ad
since Cov(aw,s, ad,s) = σaw,s,ad,s = 0.
If monetary policies are stationary, iid productivity shocks imply that the households’ and
firms’ optimal decision rules are stationary. As a consequence, the equilibrium of the infinite
horizon setup is simply a repetition of the static version of a single period. Furthermore,
if the money supply is log-normal, too, the distribution of the equilibrium allocation turns
out to be jointly log-normal. Therefore, the solution to the stochastic general equilibrium
10Note that in stochastic environments ex post monetary policy conduct also influences ex ante wage
setting because ex post monetary interventions alter the equilibrium distribution that is relevant for optimal
wage setting. This effect has been emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2002a,b) and comes in addition
to the incentives to alter wages induced by the nominal interest rates. As I argue below, from a welfare
perspective, however, the distribution effects are of second order. In contrast, the effects of the nominal
interest rates will be of first order.
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can be obtained in closed-form. For the rest of the paper, the time-subscripts are skipped
for convenience.
1.3 Short-Run Monetary Policy
In studying optimal short-run monetary policy, I consider policy rules that consist of both
the inflation target as well as the state-dependent actual money supply for each period.
Monetary authorities are assumed to be able to perfectly commit to these policy rules.
This is not only in line with the recent literature but it also reflects the experience that
time inconsistency plays no longer a major role in the actual conduct of monetary policy
in many OECD countries. Moreover, the policy rule that sets both the inflation target
and the actual money supply attends an important feature: Although the commitment
to standard money supply rules eliminates the use of surprise inflation, they implicitly
preclude the use of a potentially desired inflation. Augmenting the money supply rule with
an explicitly targeted inflation, however, is crucial to fully characterize optimal short-run
monetary policy in open economies and potential gains from international monetary policy
coordination.
The key insight of this paper revolves around the question of how policymakers exploit
nominal frictions in different strategic settings in order to improve their respective
resident’s economic well-being. On the one hand, labor being a credit good implies that
inflation taxes labor income. Thereby, the monetary authority can influence workers’
wage setting through the inflation targeting policy. On the other hand, the nominal
inertia places the money supply at monetary authorities’ disposal as an instrument by
which it can alter households’ real balances directly and hence the actual allocation ex
post. National monetary authorities can set the inflation target and the period money
supply independently by steering the expected money growth rate and the state-dependent
deviations from the announced money growth rate. The important difference between the
two policy instruments is the way they affect the equilibrium allocation. The money supply
management determines state-dependent spending flows. From an ex ante perspective,
this corresponds to changes in the variability of the equilibrium allocation. The inflation
target changes the incentives to workers’ wage setting and thereby the expected levels of
the equilibrium allocation. Crucially then, from a welfare perspective, the inflation target
policy is of first order whereas the money supply management is of second order.
There are yet two other non-monetary frictions in the model economy. The lack of inter-
national risk sharing is an important feature as it reveals important strategic interactions
between national monetary authorities. The distortion created by monopolistic competition
is a constant markup over competitive wages which only overlaps with all other economic
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effects of interest but which yields no further insights. Therefore I abstract from the dis-
tortions created by monopolistic competition and follow Ireland (1996) by considering the
limiting case of perfect competition where θ →∞ and the wage markup is unity.11
1.3.1 Inflation Target and the Money Supply as Two Distinct Policy In-
struments
A central element of this paper is the observation that when monetary authorities set their
policy rules, they dispose of two distinct policy instruments, the inflation target Πe and the
state-dependent money supply M , by means of which they effectively alter the equilibrium
allocation. To see that this is true, note that the equilibrium inflation can be stated in
terms of consumption and money supply by the ratio of the cash-in-advance constraints in
two consecutive periods. Expected inflation can then be written as
Πe =
EM ′
M
(
EC ′
C
)−1
exp{−σc,m}, (1.17)
where a prime denotes the next period’s level. In the rational expectations equilibrium,
the expected inflation is rising with the increase in expected money growth EM
′
M and with
the decrease in expected consumption growth EC
′
C . Expected inflation is also decreasing in
the variability of future consumption and money supply. The claim is now the following:
Monetary authorities have a degree of freedom to set separably the expected inflation as the
inflation target and the actual money supply M ′. This can be achieved by the appropriate
and credible announcement of the future periods’ distribution of money supply. To be
specific, the inflation target is set by means of the choice of the expected money growth, ie.
the ratio EM
′
M . The respective period’s actual money supply can then be implemented by
means of the deviation ∆M
′
M of the realized money growth from the expected one, ie.
∆M ′
M =
M ′−EM ′
M . In the rational expectations equilibrium, the announced period money supply
must be consistent in the sense that the deviations are zero in expectations (E∆M ′ = 0).
The important equilibrium relationship that implicitly provides the monetary policy with a
degree of freedom to chose both the inflation target and the money supply is represented by
the intertemporal Euler equation. As the nominal interest rate describes the opportunity
cost of keeping cash and making consumption purchases tomorrow instead of spending cash
for consumption purchases today, the Euler equation relates the current price level and
current consumption to the expected future price level and to expected future consumption.
11An alternative assumption is to introduce national fiscal stances that subsidize labor in order to offset
the inefficient wage markup. As a matter of fact, in a companion paper I demonstrate that this is indeed
part of the optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a two-country sticky wage model like the one at hand.
However, it is not necessarily true that non-coordinated fiscal policy indeed sets labor income taxes to offset
the monopolistic distortion. Instead, taxes are used to manipulate the terms of trade in exactly the same
manner as it turns out to be the case for the nominal interest rate (see Evers (2007b)). Arseneau (2007)
studies the role of monopolistic markups for nominal interest rate policy conduct in open economies in detail.
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This is best captured by a representation of the Euler equation as a modified Fisher relation
that links the nominal interest rate to the real interest rate and the expected inflation:
R = R˜Πe exp{ρ (σ2c − σc,m)}, (1.18)
where R˜ denotes the gross real interest rate. Accordingly, the nominal interest rate is
increasing in the expected inflation as consumption tomorrow becomes more expensive in
expectations as compared to consumption today. The nominal interest rate is also increasing
in the real interest rate because an increase in R˜ reflects an increase in the marginal rate
of substitution of consumption today for consumption tomorrow. As the relative desire for
consumption tomorrow falls, the equilibrium opportunity cost of consumption tomorrow
and thereby the nominal interest rate must rise. Moreover, the Fisher relation is modified
as it takes into account the impact of the consumption and money supply variability on the
nominal interest rate. Expressing the expected inflation in equation (1.17) in terms of the
real interest rate, too, yields
Πe =
EM ′
M
(
R˜β
)−1
ρ exp{(1− ∗ρ)
2
σ2c − σc,m}, (1.19)
Suppose for the moment that the real interest rate is given. Then the expected next
period’s money growth EM
′
M selects for a given future money supply the expected inflation
and hence chooses an explicit inflation target. By the Fisher relation it also follows that the
inflation target is an instrument to affect the current period’s nominal interest rate. This
implies that it can be used to affect the current equilibrium allocation. In turn, the actual
money growth in the next period is going to affect the next periods allocation as depicted
eg. by σc,m. Importantly, there is a subtle difference in the time when the inflation target
on the one hand and the actual money supply on the other hand affect the allocation. This
turns out to be the reason why the separability of inflation target holds true even if one
takes into account the equilibrium effects of the monetary policy on the real interest rate.
For a better illustration, it proves useful to consider the case of flexible wages and the case
of sticky wages in more detail.
First, consider the case of flexible wages. From the two equations in (1.15) follows for given
realizations of productivity shocks that the current allocation is determined by the Home
and Foreign nominal interest rates. It also follows that expected consumption depends on
expected nominal interest rates only. The immediate implication is that σc,m = 0 as only
changes in the future interest rates induce changes in future consumption. The reason
is that changes in money supply are neutral because wages are flexible. For given future
nominal interest rates and for given Foreign monetary policy, the current consumption level
C and hence the real interest rate can only be altered by the nominal interest rate. By the
Fisher relation, however, the result is that in equilibrium the current consumption level
can be uniquely determined by the expected money growth EM
′
M and hence by the inflation
24 Optimal Monetary Policy in an Interdependent World
target Πe. It is important to note that in case of flexible wages, only the expected money
growth rate is relevant. There is a continuum of realized money supplies and associated
price levels that are consistent with the equilibrium allocation. All what the rational
expectations equilibrium requires is the consistency of expectations, namely that ∆M
′
M . As
a result, monetary authorities dispose of two distinct policy instruments.
When wages are preset, things are only slightly more involved. The two equations in (1.16)
imply that for given realizations of productivity shocks, the allocation depends on the preset
wages and on Home and Foreign money supplies. Because wages are preset, ex post changes
to the allocation can only be induced by the deviations from the expected money growth
∆M ′
M . As a consequence, the money supply management plays a crucial role in the determina-
tion of the real interest rates when wages are preset. The actual money supply in the current
period affects the current consumption level whereas the distribution of state-dependent de-
viations from the expected money growth affects the expectation over the consumption level
in the next period. Therefore, the real interest rate depends on both the current period’s
money supplyM and on the distribution of the deviations from the expected money growth
∆M ′
M . The important question, however, is whether each expected level of money growth and
hence each level of the inflation target is consistent in the rational expectations equilibrium
with a continuum of realized money supplies and distributions of future money supplies so
that monetary authorities still dispose of two distinct policy instruments. The answer is yes
and follows in principle the analog logic of the case when wages are flexible. The key insight
again is that the expected money growth doesn’t affect the future allocation and it is in this
sense allocatively neutral to the next period’s allocation. All that is relevant for the future
allocation are the expected future nominal interest rates as they determine the wage set-
ting (compare the optimal wage setting in equation (1.8)) and deviations from the expected
money growth. By the same reasoning as above, for a given real interest rate controlled by
the actual money supply and for given Foreign monetary policy, the expected money growth
alters the current period’s nominal interest rate R. In contrast to flexible wages, however,
the nominal interest rate cannot alter the allocation ex post. With preset wages, however,
they affect the nominal wages in expectation ex ante. Consequently, the consistency of the
rational expectations equilibrium requires that the ex ante expected nominal interest rate
to be on average the realized one. As a result, for any given future nominal interest rates,
for any given consistent future deviations of money supplies from the expected levels with
E∆M ′
M = 0, and for any given current period’s money supply M , monetary authorities can
set any inflation target Πe by the appropriate choice of the expected money growth. Note
that in contrast to flexible wages, each realized actual money supply M requires a unique
choice of expected future money supply EM ′ to set the inflation target at its desired level.
As a result, monetary authorities can exploit the inflation target and the money supply a
two distinct monetary policy instruments.
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The Nominal Interest Rate as a Monetary Policy Instrument
In principle, instead of arguing via the inflation target as the policy instrument, one can
directly argue by means of the nominal interest rate because there is a one-to-one equilibrium
relationship between the two variables. The implication is thus that the nominal interest
rate can be effectively controlled by the monetary policy conduct. In fact, for reasons of
presentations of the results and for better illustration of the economic intuition it proves
useful to directly argue by means of the nominal interest rate as the respective policy
instrument.12 The conclusion is that monetary authorities dispose of two independent policy
instruments - the nominal interest rate and the money supply - no matter whether wages
are flexible or preset.
Short-Run Monetary Policy Rule
National monetary authorities commit to a monetary policy rule that sets the nominal
interest rate and the money supply. The money supply policy is assumed to follow a feedback
rule that conditions the state-dependent levels of money supply on productivity shocks. The
money supply rules comprise of the feedback coefficients µ = {µaw , µad} and µ∗ = {µ∗aw , µ∗ad}
and they are of the form
mˆ = µaw aˆw + µad aˆd and mˆ∗ = µ
∗
aw aˆw − µ∗ad aˆd, (1.20)
where variables with a hat denote deviations from their expected value. Accordingly, in
(1.20), mˆ and mˆ∗ denote the log-deviation from the expected money supply, ie. mˆ = m−Em
and mˆ∗ = m∗ − Em∗. Recall that this specification indeed allows the policymakers to set
both the nominal interest rate by choosing the expected values for money supply Em and
Em∗ and the state-dependent deviations mˆ and mˆ∗ in order to react to productivity shocks.
Note also that thereby the use of surprise inflation is ruled out.13As a consequence, the Home
12Moreover, in their analysis of a two-instrument short-run monetary policy, Adao et al. (2003) directly
argue by means of the nominal interest rate and the money supply as the two distinct policy instruments.
Facilitating the comparison to their analysis is the other reason to refer to the two policy instruments as the
nominal interest rate and the money supply.
13Two remarks to the specification of the monetary policy are in order: First, as concerning the period
single nominal interest rate, it implies no restriction at all to set it in a non state-contingent way. In case of
flexible wages, it can be demonstrated that even the ex post optimal nominal interest rate is independent of
the actual realization of the state. In case of sticky wages, only the expected nominal interest rate matters
as it was also argued in the foregoing discussion of the separability of monetary policy instruments. Hence,
there is no requirement for state-dependent nominal interest rate setting, too. Second, as concerning the
state-dependent money supply, using the standard feedback rule as eg. in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a) and
Devereux and Engel (2003) would be to take the following AR(1) form: ms = ms−1 + µaw,saˆw,s + µad,saˆd,s.
This, however, implies Ems = ms−1, which factually precludes the use of both, the nominal interest rate
and the money supply as monetary policy instruments at the same time.
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monetary policy rule is denoted by {R,µ} and the Foreign monetary policy is denoted by
{R∗, µ∗}.
1.3.2 Policymakers’ Objective
The objective of national monetary authorities is to maximize their respective residents’
welfare. By the simplified iid structure of the model, Home policymaker’s problem reduces
to choose {R,µ} so as to maximize expected period utility EU . The Foreign policymaker
decides over {R∗, µ∗} so as to maximize EU∗. Making use of the equilibrium wage setting,
Home and Foreign expected utility can be expressed as
EU = E
(
1
(1− ρ) −
1
ν
1
R
)
(C)(1−ρ) and (1.21)
EU∗ = E
(
1
(1− ρ) −
1
ν
1
R∗
)
(C∗)(1−ρ) ,
respectively. It is important to observe that Home and Foreign policymakers’ objectives are
symmetric except for the impact of the terms of trade. Recall from the discussion of the
equilibrium allocation that the difference between the consumption levels is fully captured by
the terms of trade (compare Table 1.1). Hence, deviations from the jointly optimal monetary
policy will be solely on the grounds of strategically motivated manipulations of the terms of
trade in the respective country’s own favor. Moreover, as the impacts of the terms of trade
on Home and Foreign objectives are orthogonal, the incentives to strategically deviate from
the socially optimal policy must necessarily be the kind of ”beggaring-thy-neighbor”.
Expressing the expected utility in terms of the closed-form solution of the equilibrium per-
mits further insights into the short-run monetary policy conduct. In particular, this leads to
a particularly convenient separation of the equilibrium implications of monetary policy that
directly affect the average consumption level from the equilibrium implications of monetary
policy that changes the variability of the allocation and hence consumption. Consider first
the expression of expected utility for the flexible wage environment because it is embedded
in the expression of the expected utility under sticky wages.
Flexible Wages
When wages are flexible, Home expected utility takes the form
EU |flex =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
1
νRwRd
)(
1
Rw
) (1−ρ)
X
R
− (1−γ)(1−ρ)Y
d · exp{Ωflex}
≡ Uflex(R;R∗). (1.22)
The term Ωflex summarizes the part of expected utility which depends on uncertainty only
and it is given by
Ωflex =
(1−ρ)2ν2
2X 2Y2
(Y2σ2aw + (1− γ)2X 2σ2ad) .
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In case of flexible wages, all variability of the allocation and hence consumption stems from
exogenous changes in productivity. Importantly, the nominal interest rate determines the
part of expected utility which doesn’t depend on uncertainty but it alters the mean level
of expected utility. The consequence is that as nominal interest rate policy affects the first
moment of expected utility, the policy implications are of first order.
Sticky Wages
When wages are sticky, Home expected utility can be decomposed such that it contains the
expression for expected utility under flexible wages,
EU |sticky = Uflex(R;R∗) · exp{Ωsticky(µ;µ∗)}. (1.23)
Similarly to the above, Ωsticky(µ, µ∗) summarizes the second moment variance and covariance
terms of expected utility, namely
Ωsticky(µ;µ∗) =
(1−ρ)ν
2
(
ω − σ2z − Z4X σ2e + 2νX σz,aw + (1−ρ)(1−γ)
2
X σe,ad
)
+ν(1−ρ)(1−γ)2Y
(
−(1− γ)Xσz,e + νσe,aw + (1−ρ)(1−γ)Y σz,ad
)
,
where Z = ν − (1− ρ)(1− γ)2 and ω is a constant independent of endogenous variables.14
In contrast to flexible wages where all uncertainty stems from exogenous productivity distur-
bances, under preset wages an active state-dependent money supply management according
to the feedback coefficients {µ, µ∗} entails endogenous uncertainty over the allocation. Cru-
cially, the money supply policy affects the average level of consumption and hence the
expected utility through the changes in the variability of the equilibrium allocation only.
Consequently, and in contrast to the welfare implications of the nominal interest rate pol-
icy, as the money supply policy affects the equilibrium by altering second moments of the
equilibrium distribution of the allocation, the welfare implications are thus of second order.
Because the importance of the different implications of the two monetary policy instruments
on expected utility cannot be overemphasized, the discussion is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1.1 The welfare implications of short-run nominal interest rate policy are of
first-order whereas the welfare implications of short-run money supply management are of
second-order.
Proof.
See Appendix.
Proposition 1.1 shall constitute the backbone of the argument put forth in this analysis. By
the discussion in the beginning, the literature on international monetary policy regimes has
14It is defined as ω = (1−ρ)ν
2X2Y2
(−ν2Y2σ2aw + (1− ρ)(1− γ)2X (Y2 − νX )σ2ad).
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largely focused on stabilization issues. Gains from policy coordination, however, are quan-
tified to be fairly small. Relating to the discussion in Lucas (2003), gains from stabilization
and thereby gains from international coordination of stabilization policies are generically
quite limited as they are of second order. On the contrary, the nominal interest rate policy
as discussed here means that monetary authorities exploit the inflation tax to govern the
workers’ wage setting. In terms of Lucas, this denotes a supply side effect which is of first
order. Consequently, from a quantitative perspective, welfare gains from international coor-
dination of nominal interest rate policies are to be expected of an order of magnitude larger
than welfare gains from coordinating monetary stabilization policy as it has been done in the
past. A numerical example shall support this claim. Next, however, the analysis is contin-
ued with a discussion of the theoretical results of optimal coordinated and noncooperative
international policy conduct.
1.4 Optimal Cooperative Monetary Policy
When national policymakers coordinate their respective monetary policies, they do so as to
maximize the sum of the equally weighted Home and Foreign residents’ welfare.
1.4.1 The Optimal Nominal Interest Rate
The globally optimal interest rate policy is as follows.
Proposition 1.2 The optimal nominal interest rate policy is to follow the Friedman rule,
ie.
ROpt = 1,
and R∗Opt = ROpt by symmetry.
Proof.
See Appendix.
The intuition for optimality of the Friedman rule can be best seen in the context of optimal
taxation since it is an immediate implication of the optimal taxation principle (Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971)) which postulates not to tax intermediate inputs. Recall that as labor
income is available for consumption only the following period, the gross nominal interest
rate reflects the intertemporal nominal cost of keeping labor income as cash that cannot be
spent within the sam period as when it is earned. This can then be understood as a tax on
labor income and thus as a tax on an intermediate input to the production of goods. As a
consequence, it is optimal to set the net nominal interest rate to zero and thereby to offset
the implicit tax on labor input. Importantly, the optimality of the Friedman rule obtains
for both environments, with flexible wages as well as sticky wages. When wages are flexible,
a positive net nominal interest rate leads to a distortive wedge between the marginal rate
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of substituting labor and consumption (MRS) on the one hand and marginal product of
labor (MPL) on the other hand in all instances. When wages are sticky, labor is demand
determined and the ratio between MRS and MPL is not necessarily at an inefficiently high
level. However, expected utility is maximized when the distortion is minimized on average.
Hence, the Friedman rule is optimal under sticky wages, too.15
1.4.2 The Optimal Money Supply
In contrast to the nominal interest rate, money supply is allocatively effective only when
wages are sticky. In the discussion of monetary policy instruments, the bottom line was that
the money supply management affects the variability of the equilibrium allocation. As an
immediate consequence, the two relevant frictions that impose distortions to the equilibrium
allocation which could be on target for the money supply are wage rigidity and the lack of
international asset markets. The next proposition states the optimal feedback coefficients
on aggregate and asymmetric productivity shocks.
Proposition 1.3 The optimal money supply feedback rule follows
µOptaw =
(1− ρ)
X and µ
Opt
ad
=
(1− ρ)(1− γ)2
Z ,
where µ∗Optaw = µ
Opt
aw and µ∗
Opt
ad
= µOptad by symmetry. Furthermore, with µ
Flex as the feedback
coefficients replicating the flexible wage equilibrium, it follows that
µOptaw = µ
Flex
aw and µ
Opt
ad

> µFlexad if ρ > 1 and 0 < γ < 1,
< µFlexad if ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1,
= µFlexad if ρ = 1 or γ ∈ {0, 1} ,
where µad
Flex = (1−ρ)(1−γ)Y .
Proof.
See Appendix.
In case of aggregate productivity shocks, the only distortion that matters stems from
preset wages. The optimal money supply response is then to replicate the flexible wage
allocation. To be more precise, in case of flexible wages it easy to see that the intra-temporal
substitution elasticity of consumption and labor is 1−ρν . When wages are preset, labor
is fully demand determined and hence uncoupled from the consumption decision. As
a consequence, in order to mimic the optimal labor-consumption trade-off, the optimal
money supply response to aggregate productivity shocks adjusts real balances so that
15Compare also Chari et al. (1996), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Adao et al. (2003), or Kocherlakota (2005)
for closed economy setups and Cooley and Quadrini (2003) and Arseneau (2007) in the context of open
economies.
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consumption and labor changes in the right proportion. To be specific, consider a positive
aggregate productivity shock. If wages were flexible, households’ would raise nominal wages
up to the point where real wages would equal the marginal rate of substituting labor and
consumption (see equation 1.7). For ρ > 1 consumption and labor are substitutes and
hence households increase consumption and also reduce labor in response to a rise in real
labor income. Under sticky wages, this adjustment is not possible. The positive aggregate
productivity shock leads ceteris paribus to a one-to-one drop in goods prices and thereby
to a one-to-one increase in consumption whereas employment stays unaffected. As a result,
the optimal response of monetary policy must be to dampen the increase of consumption
by contracting the money supply. This leads to a reduction of equilibrium employment,
too, and thereby the optimal consumption-labor ratio can be restored. In contrast, if ρ < 1,
consumption and labor are complements and optimality requires a conjoint increase in labor
and consumption. As a consequence, money supply must respond pro-cyclically. In case of
log-utility, ie. ρ = 1, it is optimal that labor doesn’t respond to consumption fluctuations
at all. The optimality of targeting the flexible wage allocation reproduces the findings of
several recent contributions where wage or price rigidity prevents the equilibrium allocation
from efficiency.16
In case of idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the lack of international risk sharing comes in
addition to the inefficiency caused by preset wages. Complete asset markets would enable
Home and Foreign households to contract state-contingent payments in order to insure
against all idiosyncratic risks. The consequence of perfect consumption risk sharing for
the initially identical countries would be that for all goods the ratio of Home and Foreign
marginal consumption utilities equals the ratio of the respective equilibrium goods prices
(compare, for example, Backus and Smith (1993)). In particular, for the basket of tradable
goods the implication is that the ratio of Home over Foreign marginal utilities must be
unity, ie.
UCT
UC∗
T
= 1. In terms of the equilibrium without asset markets, the ratio of marginal
utilities of tradable goods consumption reads
UCT
UC∗T
= ToT−(1−ρ)(1−γ).
Following, the ratio
UCT
UC∗
T
decreases in response to, for example, a terms of trade depreciation
if ρ > 1 and the ratio increases if ρ < 1. The intuition is best captured in terms of sub-
stitutability and complementarity of consumption goods in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense.17
16Examples for closed economies can be found in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1998), Goodfriend and
King (1997), Erceg et al. (2000), or Adao et al. (2003). For open economies, compare Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2002a), Benigno and Benigno (2003, 2006), or Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
17Two goods are substitutes (complements) in the Edgeworth-Pareto sense if the marginal utility of one
good is decreasing (increasing) with the consumption of the other good. For open economy setups, see also
Svensson (1987) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
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If ρ > 1, the different consumption goods are substitutes. A terms of trade depreciation
caused by a positive Home productivity shock leads households to substitute the costlier
Foreign goods for the cheaper Home goods. Thereby, Home households consume more Home
tradables and non-tradables whereas Foreign households consume less Foreign tradables and
non-tradables. In equilibrium, however, it is that Home and Foreign households consume
the same amount of tradables, ie. CT = C∗T . As a consequence, the difference in marginal
utilities of tradable goods consumption necessarily stems from the difference in consumption
of non-tradables: Home households consume too much tradables relative to non-tradables
as risk sharing would imply, Foreign households consume too less tradables relative to non-
tradables as risk sharing would imply. The appropriate money supply change to offset this
effect is to make Home households pay more for Foreign tradable goods and thereby to make
them paying more for overall tradable goods and to make Foreign households pay less for
Home tradables and thereby to make them paying less for overall tradable goods. Hence,
to attenuate the lack of risk sharing, optimal money supply necessitates an depreciating of
Home nominal exchange rate. For ρ < 1, when consumption goods are complements, the
according logic applies. In this case, however, it is that Home households consume too less
tradables relative to non-tradables whereas Foreign households consume too much tradables
relative to non-tradables than under perfect risk sharing. The optimal money supply man-
agement therefore leads to an appreciation of Home nominal exchange rate in order to make
Home households pay less for Foreign goods and to make Foreigners pay more for Home
goods.
To see that there is in general a conflict of closing the domestic gaps between the marginal
rate of substituting consumption and labor on the one hand and closing the international gap
between Home and Foreign marginal consumption utilities on the other hand, suppose that
Home and Foreign monetary authorities target the flexible wage allocation and implement
µad
flex = µ∗ad
flex. This policy response, however, never fully offsets the impact of asymmet-
ric productivity shocks on the terms of trade, ie. t̂ot = − νY aˆd. Consequently, by the logic
developed above, monetary authorities face an incentive also to attenuate the implications
of the lack of international consumption risk sharing.18 Moreover, the trade-off between
targeting the two distortions is characterized by a more active response when money supply
management targets the flexible wage allocation than it is optimal. To prevent a repetition
of arguments, however, a discussion is left to the reader. The importance of this trade-off
is also discussed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a).
18There are three special cases where no such trade-off exists: When i) ρ = 1, the intertemporal and the
intratemporal substitution elasticities coincide and hence risk is fully diversified via goods consumption in
market equilibrium; when ii) γ = 1, only tradable goods are consumed and hence CT = C
∗
T directly implies
perfect consumption risk sharing; and when iii) γ = 0, no tradable goods are demanded at all and therefore
the only inefficiency that is prevailing is wage stickiness.
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1.5 Noncooperative Monetary Policy
In the discussion of national policymakers’ objectives, the central message is captured by
Proposition 1.1: The nominal interest rate policy has first-order welfare implications whereas
the money supply policy implications are of second order. Consequently, the losses from
not coordinating monetary policy are of first-order when national monetary authorities face
the incentive to deviate from the jointly beneficial Friedman rule (Proposition 1.2). In
this section it is shown that self-oriented national policymakers follow the Friedman rule
if and only if the two countries are closed. As long as there are trade linkages between
the two countries, the incentives to manipulate the terms of trade cause the policymakers
to unilaterally deviate from the optimal cooperative solution. Thereby, the gains from
cooperation that are forgone if national monetary authorities act independently are of first
order.
1.5.1 The Nominal Interest Rate
The following proposition establishes that the nominal interest rate in a Nash equilibrium
of the policy setting game in general differs from the cooperative nominal interest rate.
Proposition 1.4 The unique Nash equilibrium of non-cooperatively set nominal interest
rates implies
RNash = 1 +
γX
Y + (1− γ)X ,
and R∗Nash = RNash by symmetry. Furthermore,
RNash > ROpt for γ 6= 0 and RNash = ROpt iff γ = 0.
Proof.
See Appendix.
The intuition for this finding is straight forward: Policymakers face the incentive to improve
their respective households’ consumption-labor trade-off. If there are any trade linkages
between the two countries, ie. if γ > 0, the non-cooperative solution prescribes the poli-
cymakers to induce workers to claim higher wages by raising the nominal interest rate and
consequently the implicit tax on labor. For instance, given Foreign wages and goods prices,
an increase in Home wages imply an appreciation of the Home’s terms of trade. In equilib-
rium, this causes a fall in labor demand: first, higher wage claims lead to a direct fall in
Home labor demand. Second, the increase in the Home’s relative prices induces a reduction
of the demand for Home goods. As a consequence, both Home labor demand and labor
income falls. Foreign households, however, have to give more of their goods in exchange for
Home goods. This yields ceteris paribus a higher Home consumption-labor ratio and thereby
higher welfare. As a result, domestic policymakers ”beggar-thy-neighbor” by inducing the
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Foreign households to work more and thus to worsen Foreign consumption-labor trade-off.
In the symmetric equilibrium, the consequence are higher distortive Home and Foreign nom-
inal interest rates that reduce aggregate output and thereby aggregate consumption as labor
is supplied at an inefficiently low level. Again, this holds true for both environments: for
flexible wages in all instances and under sticky wages on average.
Importantly, the incentive to unilaterally deviate from the globally optimal Friedman rule
is increasing with the degree of openness. That is, the larger the economic interdependence
through trade linkages between the two countries, the higher is the incentive to ”beggar-
thy-neighbor” and to unilaterally manipulate the terms of trade by increasing the domestic
interest rate. As the welfare implications are of first-order, the consequences of the failure
to cooperate on the nominal interest rates become more severe the more interdependent the
countries are.
1.5.2 The Money Supply
The next Proposition shows the equilibrium money supply when national policymakers act
independently.
Proposition 1.5 The unique Nash equilibrium of non-cooperatively set money supply rules
is
µNashaw =
(1− ρ)
X and µ
Nash
ad
= (1− ρ)(1− γ)
( X + (1− γ)Y
ZY + (1− γ)X 2
)
,
and µ∗Nashaw = µ
Nash
aw and µ
∗Nash
ad
= µNashad by symmetry. Furthermore,
µNashaw = µ
Opt
aw and µ
Nash
ad

< µOptad if ρ > 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
> µOptad if ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
= µOptad if ρ = 1 or γ ∈ {0, 1} .
Proof.
See Appendix.
In case of aggregate productivity shocks, the Nash solution does not differ from the optimal
solution. Aggregate shocks shift consumption expenditures in a way that is common to
both countries. Therefore, the policy targets coincide. Why, however, is it that national
policymakers do not use aggregate productivity shocks as a stochastic anchor to manipulate
the terms of trade? Indeed, they face the incentive to do so. Nevertheless, the only friction
that prevents from individual optimality is wage rigidity. Therefore, the only incentive
to manipulate the terms of trade is to achieve the optimal consumption-labor trade-off.
Hence, the optimal policy response to aggregate productivity shocks also solves the Nash
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problem.
This is no longer the case for asymmetric productivity shocks. Recall that the optimal
cooperative money supply management faces a trade-off between targeting the domestic gap
between the marginal rate of substituting consumption and labor and the international gap
between Home and Foreign marginal consumption utilities. Proposition 1.5 shows that as
long as imperfect international risk sharing is a matter of concern, ie. as long as ρ 6= 1 or 0 <
γ < 1, both single national monetary authorities unilaterally deviate from the jointly optimal
response and thereby from the optimal trade-off. The reason is again that self-oriented
policymakers try to rather close the domestic gap to improve the domestic consumption-
labor trade-off. In fact, in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, authorities set money
supply to react more actively to idiosyncratic shocks than it is globally efficient. Hence,
from the discussion of the optimal trade-off follows that non-cooperative policymakers attach
more value to targeting the domestic gap at the expense of a widening of the international
gap. The immediate consequence is that the unilateral deviation ”beggars-thy-neighbor”.
1.6 A Numerical Example
A numerical example shall illustrate the quantitative importance of international monetary
policy cooperation and evaluate the different welfare implication of the nominal interest rate
policy and the money supply management. To keep the comparison to the literature simple,
I take parameters values from Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a): σaw = σad = 0.01 and ν = 1.
Moreover, two possible trade scenarios are considered: a low-trade scenario (γ = 0.2) which
corresponds to an import over GDP ratio of 10% and high-trade scenario (γ = 0.6) which
corresponds to an import over GDP ratio of 30%.
The gains from international monetary policy coordination are reported in Table 1.2. For
varying values of ρ, three numbers are stated: ξ denotes the necessary percentage increase
in consumption so that households are indifferent between international monetary policy
coordination and independent policy conduct. By the structure of the model, the overall
measure can be further decomposed into ξR for nominal interest rate policy and ξM for
money supply management.
Independent of the degree of openness γ, welfare gains from coordinating the nominal inter-
est rate are decreasing in ρ. For larger values of ρ, the inter-temporal substitution elasticity
is decreasing. Consequently, as households attach greater importance to actual consump-
tion, the higher non-cooperative nominal interest rate and hence the intertemporal costs
of holding labor income as cash doesn’t preponderate too much. Importantly, the gains
are, however, increasing in the extend to which the two countries are linked through trade.
Clearly, the more important the terms of trade are for domestic households, the more prone
are domestic policymakers to manipulate relative nominal goods prices in order to make
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Low-trade scenario (γ = 0.2) High-trade scenario (γ = 0.6)
Different values for ρ Different values for ρ
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8 ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8
Welfare Measure (compensating % change in consumption)a
ξR 1.674 0.537 0.155 0.042 0.011 11.566 5.831 2.378 0.811 0.243
ξM 0.151 0 0.062 0.158 0.229 0.007 0 0.006 0.019 0.037
ξ 1.827 0.537 0.217 0.200 0.240 11.574 5.831 2.384 0.830 0.280
Table 1.2: Gains from International Monetary Policy Coordination.
a Following Lucas (1987, 2003), ξ denotes the percentage compensation of consumption so that
U((1 + ξ)CA, LA) = U(CB , LB), where A and B are two different policies. Moreover, the
decomposition of the equilibrium welfare yields the measure ξR for the welfare implication of
different nominal interest rates and ξM for different money supply managements.
national residents better off. In contrast, welfare gains from coordinating the money sup-
ply management are increasing in absolute deviation of ρ from unity because thereby the
consequences of the lack of international risk sharing are more pronounced. Gains are, how-
ever, smaller in the high-trade scenario because international consumption risk sharing is
achieved to a larger extend through international trade on goods markets and consequently
the relative importance of attenuating the lack of international asset markets is decreasing.
Notably, as already indicated by Proposition 1.1, since the nominal interest rate effects are of
first order, welfare gains are of first order. In the high-trade scenario, gains from coordinating
the nominal interest rate are up to 4 orders of magnitude larger than gains from coordinating
macroeconomic stabilization through money supplies. These results are consistent on the
one hand with the broad literature on policy coordination that concentrated on stabilization
issues as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a), Pappa (2004), and Canzoneri et al. (2005), and
on the other hand with the very recent considerations of the optimal nominal interest rate
policy in open economies in Cooley and Quadrini (2003) and Arseneau (2007).
1.7 Conclusion of Chapter 1
Within the large body of the literature on international monetary policy coordination, the
broad consensus is that gains from policy coordination are small if not negligible. This view
is corroborated by theoretical considerations that focus on the coordination of international
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monetary stabilization policies. While all these contributions deserve their very merits for
revealing important insights, the finding that the quantitative importance is fairly small is
not surprising: stabilization policies target the variability of the allocation and monetary
policy focuses on short-run demand side management. They are hence generically of second
order. However, to plagiarize Lucas (2003), the ”potential for welfare gains from better long-
run, supply side policies exceeds by far the potential from further improvements in short-run
demand management”.
The contribution of the present paper is to take up this proposition and introduce it into
the context of international monetary policy coordination. The arguments made are formal-
ized within a simple dynamic stochastic two-country model with preset wages and cash-in-
advance restrictions. In this environment, monetary authorities can manipulate the terms of
trade by conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the inflation target and
the money supply. On the one hand, money supply affects the allocation and the terms of
trade ex post by altering relative nominal spending and thereby the nominal exchange rate.
In this respect, monetary policy is used in the traditional way so as to stabilize macroeco-
nomic fluctuations by fine tuning spending flows. On the other hand, the inflation target
effectively controls the nominal interest rate. Thus, it affects the allocation and the terms
of trade ex ante by altering the households’ wage setting conditions and thereby goods
prices. In this respect, monetary policy changes the incentives to work and might cause
inefficiencies on the supply side. It is demonstrated that the resulting welfare implications
of inflation target policy are of first order whereas the welfare implications of money supply
management are of second order.
The important consequence - and the central message of this analysis - is that gains from
coordinating money supply management are generically of second order if they focus on
stabilization issues. In contrast, gains from preventing excessively high inflation rates and
hence nominal interest rates resulting from self-interested strategic manipulations of the
terms of trade are of first order and hence expected to be of higher orders of magnitude. A
numerical example of the simple model already indicates that welfare gains from globally
optimal monetary policy conduct might be substantial. The present analysis of a more
general monetary policy conduct in interdependent economies hence leads to the conclusion
that gains from policy coordination might have been to a large extend underestimated.
Chapter 2
Optimum Policy Domains in an
Interdependent World
Throughout the last couple of decades the world has experienced a strong and steady
increase in the economic interdependence among national economies. Accordingly, national
macroeconomic policies are also subject to a steady increase in mutual interdependence.
As a consequence, because conflicting national policy objectives might lead to international
disagreements, the necessity of the international coordination of macroeconomic policies
has become a central postulation within both the public as well as the academic debate:
Countries should coordinate macroeconomic policies in order to incorporate externalities
of national policies on other countries and - more importantly - to overcome inefficiencies
arising from strategic considerations to exploit the international transmission of national
macroeconomic policies in one country’s own favor. In the international macroeconomics
literature, these game-theoretic arguments formed the basis for the theoretical rationale in
favor of policy coordination. Following the natural separation of national macroeconomic
policymaking into monetary and fiscal policy, the academic literature evolved along two
major strands: Beginning with Hamada (1974, 1976), the larger body of the literature
focuses on the analysis of monetary policy.1 The role of fiscal policy is largely ignored in
these models. The other strand of the literature as in Hamada (1986), Kehoe (1987), and
Chari and Kehoe (1990) analyzes fiscal policy where the international monetary policy
regimes are taken as given.2 By uncoupling the analysis of the international monetary policy
1The most prominent contributions to the early stage of the literature are Oudiz and Sachs (1984), Rogoff
(1985), and Canzoneri and Gray (1985). More recent contributions include Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2002a),
Clarida et al. (2002), Devereux and Engel (2003), Cooley and Quadrini (2003), Benigno (2001), Benigno and
Benigno (2003, 2006), Pappa (2004), Liu and Pappa (2005), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005), and Evers (2007a), where this list is far from complete. Overviews are provided by Cooper (1985),
Canzoneri and Henderson (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1995), and Canzoneri et al. (2005).
2Other contributions are Hamada (1986), Devereux (1987), Turnovsky (1988), Backus et al. (1988), Kehoe
(1989), Devereux (1991), Persson and Tabellini (1995) (who also provide an overview), and Kim and Kim
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domain and the fiscal policy domain, however, a crucial question cannot be addressed:
How does the international coordination of only a part of national macroeconomic policies
change the strategic behavior of the independently conducted remaining part of national
policies. Put differently, how does independent national fiscal policy, for example, shift in
response to the international coordination of monetary policy?
In this paper, I seek to close the gap in the literature and ask how the strategic incentives
shift in one policy field where authorities still act independently when national policies
move to coordination within the other policy field. In particular, I argue that the analysis
of international policy coordination requires to include both the monetary side and the
fiscal side because either monetary or fiscal policy coordination alone does not suffice to
extract gains from international coordination of national macroeconomic policies. The
intuition for this proposition is straight forward: The necessity of international policy
coordination is based on the fact that national policy entities can exert monopoly power
on macroeconomic variables in general and the terms of trade in particular. Crucially
then, both monetary and fiscal policy can be used to strategically manipulate the terms of
trade. Hence, the coordination of a single policy stance through an international agreement
still leaves room for national authorities to still unilaterally manipulate the terms of trade
by means of different policy instruments. As a consequence, potential gains from, say,
international monetary policy coordination are squandered or may even turn negative by
letting the fiscal policy instruments be chosen non-cooperatively.
The economic setup to address this question builds on the standard framework of the New
Open Economy Macroeconomics as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2002a) and augments the model in Evers (2007a) with fiscal policy. It is a simple stochastic
two-country general equilibrium model without capital. Goods prices are assumed to be
perfectly flexible, but workers have to set monopolistic wages one period in advance.
Furthermore, households make their consumption decision in face of a cash-in-advance
restriction. In this environment, monetary authorities can affect the terms of trade by
conducting a general short-run monetary policy resorting to the credibly announced
expected future money supply and state-dependent, expectationally consistent deviations
from the expected money supply: By means of the announcement of the expected future
money supply, monetary authorities can directly control the nominal interest rate. This
(2006) who all consider real economies. More recent contributions rather focus on the strategic interaction
of monetary and fiscal policymaking in monetary unions as in Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003). Among
others, Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma and Bovenberg (1999), Chari
and Kehoe (1998, 2002) analyze the strategic interaction of public debt in monetary unions. More related
to ours are Beetsma and Jensen (2005) and Andersen and Spange (2006) who consider strategic interaction
of fiscal policies within a monetary union in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) framework.
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enables the monetary authority to alter the worker’s wage setting condition and thereby the
goods prices ex ante. The period’s actual money supply alters the nominal exchange rate
and thus the terms of trade ex post.3 Fiscal authorities, on their part, can influence the
terms of trade ex ante by using distortionary taxes on labor income and ex post by changing
distortionary taxes on consumption. The key property of the different policy instruments
is that the labor income tax and the nominal interest rate on the one hand and the
consumption tax and money supply on the other hand are perfectly substitutable national
policy instruments. To be specific, when authorities want to exert, say, a positive impact
on the workers’ wage setting so as to raise the expected terms of trade ex ante, they can
do so either by increasing the nominal interest rate which is implicitly achieved by raising
expected inflation and comes along with an increase in expected inflation tax on labor
income. The same positive impact on the expected terms of trade can be induced directly
by an increase in the labor income tax. Both interventions cause the workers to ask higher
nominal wages. This, in turn, implies an increase in goods prices and leads ceteris paribus
to an appreciation of the terms of trade. Factually, only the compound effect of national
policy intervention matters for the consequences on the workers’ optimal wage setting. The
same is true for the ex post interventions to the nominal exchange rate. Changes in the
money supply induce changes in relative international nominal goods demand and hence
in the nominal exchange rate. In fact, the same movement in nominal spending can be
achieved by adjusting the consumption tax. Thus, the identical ex post innovation to the
nominal exchange rate and thereby to the terms of trade can be attained by fiscal policy.
The important consequence is that the joint monetary and fiscal policy conduct determines
the national impact on the terms of trade. Hence, taking up the arguments developed in
favor of policy coordination and seeking an international cooperation of either monetary or
fiscal policy alone will only leave room for policymakers to still follow national interests by
exploiting their monopolistic power on the terms of trade via the respective other policy
instruments.
In the next section, the model is described and the equilibrium conditions are derived. I
discuss the equilibrium allocation and its distribution in Section 2.2. In this section, it
3Ireland (1996) already recognized that monetary policy can be conducted by using both the expected
money growth rate and the state-dependent deviations from the expected level. Adao et al. (2003) take
up his point and analyze general short-run monetary policies where the authors directly argue by means of
the nominal interest rate as controlled by the expected level of money supply and the actual money supply
as the state-dependent deviation from the expected level. I follow Adao et al. for convenience and argue
directly in terms of the nominal interest rate and the money supply, too. That monetary authorities indeed
dispose of two distinct policy instruments and that they control the nominal interest rate and the money
supply independently is demonstrated in Evers (2007a) and in Chapter 1 of this thesis where I introduce the
generalization of the short-run monetary policy conduct into a standard NOEM framework as in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2002a) and Devereux and Engel (2003).
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is also shown that respective national monetary and fiscal policy instruments are perfect
substitutes and derive the national policymakers’ objective in closed form. In Section 2.3,
I consider optimal public policy coordination and the Nash equilibria of independently set
national policy interventions. The analysis of cooperating monetary authorities under fiscal
independence is carried out in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 I give a numerical example in order
to assess the relevance of policy coordination. In Section 2.6 I conclude. The derivations of
the equilibrium and the of the results are delegated to an Appendix.
2.1 The Model
In the model, the world consists of two countries, denoted as Home (H) and Foreign (F).
Each country produces two types of consumption goods, one that is traded with foreigners,
and one that is demanded only within the country. In all, there are thus four goods. These
goods are produced with labor as the only input factor. Furthermore, goods are traded in
perfectly competitive markets and at perfectly flexible prices. Both countries are populated
by a continuum of households with size one. Each household is characterized by a specific
variety of labor of which it is the monopolistic supplier. Households can choose their wages
individually. However, they have to be set one period in advance. In order to identify a
particular household, the household will be indexed by a superscripted i.4
2.1.1 Firms
Within countries, technologies to produce the tradable and the non-tradable goods are
assumed to be identical:
Yj,s = AsLj,s with Lj,s =
(∫ 1
0
Lij,s
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
, (2.1)
where θ > 1. For both sectors, a typical firm j producing either the Home tradable good
(HT ) or the Home non-tradable good (HN) employs labor that is composed according to
a CES aggregator over all domestic varieties of labor. The aggregate productivity of labor
As in (2.1) is subject to shocks. The associated demand for a specific type of labor is
Lis =
(
W is
Ws
)−θ
Ls, (2.2)
where Ls is Home aggregate demand for labor. W is denotes the monopolistic money wage
claimed by household i and Ws =
(∫ 1
0 W
i
s
(1−θ)di
) 1
1−θ defines the aggregate home wage
level. Foreigners share an analogous aggregation technology and therefore the corresponding
equations apply.
4Superscripts denote where a variable belongs to, foreign variables are distinguished by an asterisk ∗.
Subscripts identify the characteristics of that variable, e.g. whether it’s the home non-tradable or the foreign
tradable good.
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2.1.2 Households
Households within a country have identical preferences over consumption and labor effort.
They are described by
U it = Et
∑∞
s=t β
s−tuis, where (2.3)
uis =
(
Cis
1−ρ − 1
1− ρ −
1
ν
Lis
ν
)
with Cis =
CiT,s
γ
CiHN,s
1−γ
γγ(1− γ)(1−γ) ,
where 0 < β < 1, ρ > 0, ν 5 1, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The real consumption index Cis is given by a
CES aggregator over the Home non-tradable good CiHN,s and a composite of tradable goods
CiT,s. The elasticity of substitution is equal to one. The composite of tradable goods C
i
T,s
is given by a CES aggregator over the Home tradable good CiHT,s and the Foreign tradable
good CiFT,s, where the elasticity of substitution is equal to one, too. Foreign households have
the same preferences over tradable goods but differ with respect to their own non-tradable
good.
Asset Markets
Households can trade nominal bonds with other households within borders. However, house-
holds cannot trade any assets internationally. It turns out that incomplete international risk
sharing has an important implication: in contrast to most other contributions that assume
households to have access to a full set of state-contingent claims, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a)
and Evers (2007a) point out that the lack of private consumption risk sharing indeed leads
to the non-optimality of replicating flexible wage and price allocation. In particular, they
identify the optimal nominal exchange rate management to face the trade-off between repli-
cating the flexible wage allocation and the efficient consumption risk sharing. It is this
trade-off on which national policymakers will seek to manipulate the terms of trade through
ex post market interventions to improve domestic welfare that is absent under complete
asset markets.
Individual Budget and Cash Constraints
Household i starts out in period s with nominal wealth Wis. First, the asset markets open.
Household i receives money transfers Xis, decides about nominal domestic bond holdings B
i
s
that repay RsBis at a gross nominal return Rs in next period, and about cash holdings M
i
s.
The asset market constraint reads
M is +B
i
s ≤ Wis +Xis. (2.4a)
Thereafter, the goods markets open. Purchases of consumption goods that are taxed at a
rate tC,s must not exceed initial cash holdings, ie.
(1 + tC,s)PsCis ≤ M is. (2.4b)
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At the end of the period, household i receives net wage earnings (1− tL,s)W isLis, where tL,s
denotes a proportional tax on labor income, and a lump-sum transfer T is that rebates the
receipts of consumption and labor income taxes. Thus, the nominal wealth at the beginning
of the next period is
Wis+1 = M
i
s +RsB
i
s − (1 + tC,s)PsCis + (1− tL,s)W isLis + T is . (2.4c)
Optimal Decisions
The household’s problem is to maximize its expected lifetime utility (2.4) by deciding over
bond and cash holdings, consumption, and their monopolistic wages subject to the con-
straints (2.4a-2.4c), the demand for their specific type of labor (2.2), and subject to the
constraint that they have to set wages one period in advance. Optimal bond holdings
implies the intertemporal Euler equation,
1
Rs
= βEs
((
Cs+1
Cs
)−ρ Ps(1 + tC,s)
Ps+1(1 + tC,s+1)
)
. (2.5a)
The net nominal interest rate is assumed to be strictly positive and reaches zero only in the
limit. Consequently, the cash constraint is binding and optimality implies that the household
uses all its initial cash for consumption goods purchases.5 Individual optimization yields
for any person i the standard composition of consumption between the tradable goods
basket and the non-tradable good and between Home and Foreign tradable goods. The
corresponding Home consumption-based price indices are given by Ps = P
γ
T,sP
(1−γ)
HN,s and
PT,s = P
1
2
HT,sP
1
2
FT,s. The optimal money wage claim is constrained to be set one period in
advance. Optimality requires the money wage posted for period s to be set such that the
expected marginal utility loss implied by labor effort equals the expected marginal utility
from consumption in period s+1 that additional labor income in s allows but which cannot
be spent before s+ 1. Making use of the intertemporal Euler equation, we end up with
W is =
θ
θ − 1
Es−1
(
Lis
ν)
Es−1
(
(1−tL,s)
(1+tC,s)Rs
Lis
PsCsρ
) (2.5b)
as the optimal wage claim. For Foreign households, the corresponding equations apply.
2.1.3 Governments’ Budget Constraints
At the beginning of a period, national governments make money transfers to the households.
At the goods markets, they collect state-contingent proportional consumption taxes. At the
5As it is well known, the cash-in-advance constraint with the Lucas timing protocol (Lucas (1982)) is
binding if the net nominal interest rate is positive. Here I follow Adao et al. (2003) and Evers (2007a) and
assume that the interest rate is positive but is arbitrarily close to zero.
2.2. Equilibrium in Closed Form 43
end of the period, national governments collect state-contingent labor income taxes and
rebate the receipts of all taxes lump-sum to the households. The two associated constraints
for the Home government read ∫ 1
0 M
i
sdi =
∫ 1
0 M
i
s−1di+
∫ 1
0 X
i
sdi (2.6)
and tC,sPs
∫ 1
0 C
i
sdi+ tW,s
∫ 1
0 W
i
sL
i
sdi =
∫ 1
0 T
i
sdi,
respectively. Money supply and state-dependent tax rates will be set according to policy
rules that we specify later in the discussion of monetary and fiscal policy conduct. The
Foreign policy authorities share the same budget constraints.
2.2 Equilibrium in Closed Form
All households within a country are identical except for their own special type of labor.
Specifically, they are assumed to start out with identical initial nominal wealth. Hence, as
these households face ex ante the same optimality conditions and since there is no asymmet-
ric redistribution of wealth among households within a country on behalf of the governments
at all, households will take identical actions. For the rest of the analysis the superscript i is
dropped.
2.2.1 Equilibrium Prices and the Terms of Trade
By perfectly competitive goods markets, prices for home and foreign goods are
PHT,s = PHN,s =
Ws
As
and P ∗FTs = P
∗
FNs =
W ∗s
A∗s
, (2.7)
respectively. In (2.7), Ws and W ∗s denote the preset Home and Foreign wage levels which
cannot be adjusted to any period innovations. Therefore, the realization of the productivity
shocks fully determines goods prices when wages are set the period before. The terms of
trade, ToTs, are defined as the price of home imports in terms of home exports, ie. in money
prices ToTs =
(
PH,s
EsPF,s
)
, where Es denotes the nominal exchange rate. In terms of relative
wage levels, we can restate the terms of trade as
ToTs =
A∗s
As
(
Ws
EsW ∗s
)
. (2.8)
The real exchange rate, RERs, is then by the consumption-based price indices RERs =
ToT
(1−γ)
s . The implication of effectively predetermined prices is that only the nominal
exchange rate alters the current terms of trade and thereby relative consumption spending.
2.2.2 Ex Post Equilibrium Allocation
As a consequence, given monetary and fiscal policies, the ex post realized equilibrium allo-
cation is uniquely determined by the cash-in-advance constraints and the market clearing
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conditions for goods and financial assets. To be more precise, because the current ac-
count must be balanced (as there is no international trade in financial assets) and Home
and Foreign households equally split their expenditures between the Home and the Foreign
tradable goods, the market clearing of tradable goods implies PH,sYHT,s = EsP ∗F,sY ∗FT,s, ie.
both countries earn the same revenue on tradable goods production. Moreover, producer
currency pricing and identical preferences over tradable goods imply that the law of one price
holds for tradable goods baskets. Consequently, home and foreign households will consume
the same amount of tradable goods in equilibrium, ie. CT,s = C∗T,s. If we follow Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2000) and express overall consumption expenditures in terms of tradable goods
consumption, ie.
Zs ≡ Ps
PT,s
Cs and Z∗s ≡
P ∗s
P ∗T,s
C∗s , (2.9)
we can use Home and Foreign optimal divisions of tradable and non-tradable goods con-
sumption to find the equilibrium ratio of overall Home and Foreign consumption spending
in terms of tradable goods to be unity, ie. Zs = Z∗s . Next, asset market clearing requires
nominal bonds to be in zero net supply. Since households are identical in wealth, there
will be zero net trade in nominal bonds. Consequently, households’ nominal wealth consists
of equilibrium cash holdings only. Furthermore, because nominal consumption spending
is given by the cash-in-advance constraint, goods market clearing and the equalized trade
balance requires the nominal exchange rate to adjust so that consumption spending in terms
of tradable goods is equalized across countries. Since the equilibrium nominal consumption
spending, in turn, depends on the money supply and the consumption taxes, it turns out
to be very useful to express money supply and taxes on consumption expenditures as a
compound policy intervention.
Definition 1 (National public policy intervention to ex post consumption spending)
Let IC,s and I∗C,s denote the respective compound national public policy intervention to goods
markets via the cash-in-advance constraint with
IC,s =
Ms
1 + tC,s
and I∗C,s =
M∗s
1 + t∗C,s
. (2.10)
The ratio of Home and Foreign nominal consumption spending which are determined by
the cash holdings therefore delivers the nominal exchange rate. With Definition 1 it follows
that
Zs = Z∗s and Es =
IC,s
I∗C,s
. (2.11)
With a uniquely determined nominal exchange rate, consumer prices Ps and P ∗s and the
real exchange rate are given. Consequently, by the cash-in-advance constraint, Home and
Foreign equilibrium consumption levels are given. Hence, goods market clearing determines
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Home Foreign
Consumption Cs = Zs(ToTs)−
1
2
(1−γ) C∗s = Zs(ToTs)
1
2
(1−γ)
Output Ys = Zs(ToTs)−
1
2 Y ∗s = Zs(ToTs)
1
2
Labor Ls = A−1s ZsToT
−1
2
s L∗s = A∗s
−1ZsToT
1
2
s
Table 2.1: The ex post period equilibrium allocation given monetary and fiscal policy.
the equilibrium employment levels because labor is fully demand determined. Table 2.1
summarizes Home and Foreign ex post equilibrium levels of consumption, output and labor.
As a result, the ex post equilibrium allocation is uniquely determined for given common
consumption level Zs and the terms of trade ToTs. It is important to observe that the
differences between Home and Foreign consumption and output are entirely captured by
the terms of trade. Consequently, the impact of a shift in the terms of trade on Home and
Foreign variables are orthogonal. It proves useful to follow the method proposed by Aoki
(1981) to express these variables in terms of world averages and differences. Accordingly, let
subscript ”w” denote the ”world” average level of a variable which is the geometric mean
of Home and Foreign variables and let subscript ”d” denote the ”difference” component
which is the ratio of Home over Foreign variables.6 The equilibrium consumption spending
in terms of the tradable goods Zs and the terms of trade ToTs can then be written as
Zs =
Aw,s
Ww,s
ICw,s and ToTs =
(
Wd,s
Ad,sICd,s
)2
. (2.12)
2.2.3 Ex Post Public Policy Intervention to Consumption Spending:
Money Supply and Consumption Taxes
The innovations to the ex post equilibrium allocation can be summarized by the deviations
of spending Zs and the terms of trade ToTs from their expected values. Letting small letters
denote logs, ie. x = logX, and letting a hat denote the deviation from the expected level,
ie. xˆ = x− Ex, it follows that
zˆs = aˆw,s + iˆCw,s and ˆtots = −2
(
aˆd,s + iˆCd,s
)
. (2.13)
6For a Home variable X and a Foreign variable X∗, the decomposition in levels is X = XwXd and
X∗ = Xw
Xd
where Xw = (XX
∗)
1
2 and Xd = (
X
X∗ )
1
2 . The exponents are relative country sizes which in our
case are identical.
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When wages are predetermined and given the realization of productivity shocks, the ex
post allocation can only be altered by changes in Home and Foreign money supplies or
consumption tax rates as captured by iˆCw,s and iˆCd,s. The world consumption spending Zs
can only be changed ex post by altering the average money supply or the average consump-
tion tax rate which reflects in equilibrium a one-to-one change in real balances available for
consumption purchases. The terms of trade, in turn, can only be changed ex post by the
nominal exchange rate which is determined by relative money supplies and relative con-
sumption tax rates as in (2.11). Hence, the terms of trade can only be moved by iˆCd,s ex post.
Importantly, the effects of changes in the national money supply and the consumption tax
rate on the ex post allocation are perfectly equivalent. In particular, an expansion of Home
money supply leads to an increase in cash holdings dedicated to consumption purchases
and hence to an increase in consumption spending. An equivalent change in net spending
is achieved, however, by a reduction of the consumption tax rate. The same applies for
nominal exchange rate and therefore for the terms of trade. A relative increase in Home
money supply over Foreign money supply causes a depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. The determination of the nominal exchange rate by relative money supplies is stan-
dard in the NOEM literature (compare Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996)). However, an
equivalent manipulation to the nominal exchange rate can be achieved by lowering Home
consumption taxes relative to Foreign consumption taxes since this increases relative Home
consumption spending relative to Foreign consumption spending, too. Goods market clear-
ing then requires the nominal exchange rate to depreciate, as in case of a money supply
increase. As a result, the following holds true:
Lemma 2.1 The money supply and the consumption tax are perfectly substitutable national
policy instruments. Relevant for the consumption spending and the exchange rate determi-
nation is only the compound intervention to consumption spending.
Consequently, since the ex post innovations depend only on productivity shocks and the ex
post policy interventions to spending, the variance and covariance terms of the equilibrium
allocation can be solved for once the joint distribution of productivity shocks and policy
interventions is specified. This allows the explicit calculation of the ex ante expected levels
of the equilibrium allocation and hence the preset nominal wage levels.
2.2.4 Distribution of the Ex Post Equilibrium Allocation
Productivity shocks are assumed to be iid log-normal with the following properties: Ea =
Ea∗ and V ar(a) = σ2a = σ2a∗ = V ar(a∗). For ease it is assumed that Ea = 0. In terms of
world and difference components it follows for the variances and covariances that
V ar(as) = σ2a = σ
2
aw + σ
2
ad
since Cov(aw,s, ad,s) = σaw,s,ad,s = 0.
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By iid productivity shocks and given that public policies are stationary, the optimal choices
of households and firms are stationary. As a consequence, the equilibrium of the infinite
horizon setup is simply a repetition of a single period. For the rest of the paper, we therefore
leave out time-subscripts for convenience. Moreover, if Home and Foreign public policy
interventions to consumption spending iC and i∗C and productivity shocks are jointly log-
normal, the distribution of the ex post equilibrium allocation turns out to be log-normal,
too.
2.2.5 Ex Ante Public Policy Intervention to Wage Setting: Nominal In-
terest Rate and Labor Income Tax
In equilibrium, households within a country choose the same wage levels. Therefore, Home
and Foreign equilibrium wage levels W and W ∗ are given by the aggregate versions of
individual optimal wage setting as in (2.5b) and its Foreign counterpart. Recall that the
nominal interest rate on the one hand and the labor income tax on the other hand affect
the households’ optimal wage setting in the same way. Similar to the first definition, we
express the nominal interest rate and the labor income tax relative to the consumption tax
as a compound policy variable.
Definition 2 (National public policy intervention to ex ante wage setting) Let
IW,s and I∗W,s denote the respective compound national public policy intervention to wage
setting with
IW =
1 + tC
1− tW R and I
∗
W =
1 + t∗C
1− t∗W
R∗. (2.14)
The aggregate Home and Foreign wage levels are thus determined by
W =
θ
θ − 1
E (Lν)
E
(
1
IW
L
PCρ
) and W ∗ = θ
θ − 1
E (L∗ν)
E
(
1
I∗W
L∗
P ∗C∗ρ
) . (2.15)
Consequently, the equilibrium wage levels can then be explicitly solved for in terms of
the distribution of the ex post equilibrium allocation. The determination of the ex post
allocation, however, yields an important implication for nominal interest rates and the
distorting labor income taxes: These two policy instruments are completely ineffective if
it is to alter the equilibrium allocation ex post. Consequently, the endogenous variability
of consumption spending and the terms of trade are independent of Home and Foreign
nominal interest rates and labor income taxes. Nevertheless, they do have an important
impact ex ante because they change the environment for the households to set nominal
wage claims as they shift expected levels of consumption spending and the terms of trade.
In particular, Home and Foreign aggregate wage levels in (2.15) can be used to express the
expected consumption spending and the terms of trade by means of the expected levels of the
respective policy choices and the variances and covariances of endogenous and exogenous
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variables. Accordingly, the expected consumption spending measured by tradable goods
reads
Ez = − 1X
(
iWw + ln
θ
θ − 1 + Σz
)
(2.16)
where X = ν− (1−ρ) > 0. The addend Σz collects the endogenous and exogenous variance
and covariance terms of the equilibrium allocation7, ie.
Σz =
1
2
(ν2 − (1− ρ)2)σ2z +
1
8
(ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ)2)σ2tot
−ν
2
2
(2σz,aw − σtot,ad) +
ν2
2
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
.
In equilibrium, expected consumption spending can be raised ex ante either by lowering
expected world nominal interest rates or by cutting the expected world labor income taxes.
The expected terms of trade are given by
Etot =
2
Y (iWd − Σtot) (2.17)
where Y = ν − (1− ρ)(1− γ) > 0, and
Σtot =
1
2
(ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ))σz,tot + ν
2
2
(2σz,ad − σtot,aw) .
The terms of trade depend on differences in both the nominal interest rates and the la-
bor income taxes. A relative rise of the expected Home nominal interest rate or Home
labor income taxes leads to higher Home wage claims and hence higher Home goods prices.
Consequently, the expected terms of trade rise.
It is important to observe that similar to the public policy interventions to the ex post
spending the effects of expected national nominal interest rate policy and the labor income
taxation on the equilibrium allocation ex ante are perfectly equivalent. For instance, mon-
etary policy can be used to increase the expected Home nominal interest rate by means of
an (credible) announcement to increase the money supply in the following periods. Since
labor income becomes available for consumption only with a delay of one period, higher
inflation imposes a tax on labor income and leads to higher nominal wage claims ex ante.
7Observe that there is no loss of generality to treat the levels of intervention iW and i
∗
W to be non-
stochastic because the compound national public policy intervention to the optimal wage setting cannot
alter the realization of the allocation ex post. All that matters are expected levels of iW and i
∗
W , not
the distribution around expected levels. Note also that because the consumption taxes will be set state-
contingent, labor taxes must be set so as to be perfectly negatively correlated with the consumption taxes
in order to keep the ratio constant at its desired level.
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The equilibrium consequences are on the one hand that ceteris paribus world average con-
sumption spending decreases because the expected inflation tax on labor income worsens
Home households’ incentive to supply labor and therefore production becomes more expen-
sive. On the other hand, higher Home wage levels improve the expected terms of trade
because Home goods become more expensive relative to Foreign goods. The same shift
in Home households’ wage setting and hence Home wage level, however, can be achieved
by an appropriate change in the labor income tax because this has the identical distorting
effect on the aggregate wage level. As a result, higher expected nominal interest rates and
higher labor income taxes have identical implications on the equilibrium allocation as it is
established in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2 The nominal interest rate and the labor income tax are perfectly substitutable
national policy instruments. Relevant for the wage level determination is only the compound
intervention to households’ wage setting.
Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 form the backbone of this analysis. There are two ways in which
public policy can be used to affect the equilibrium allocation: ex post by market interven-
tions and ex ante by giving incentives for households to change their wage setting. In either
way, both monetary and fiscal policy instruments have a counterpart that constitutes a per-
fect substitute.8 As an immediate consequence, it follows that if national policymakers face
the incentive to exploit their monopoly power on the terms of trade, they will do so either ex
ante by changing the conditions for households to set wages or ex post by market interven-
tions in order to manipulate the nominal exchange rate. Considering international policy
coordination to surmount inefficiencies arising from non-cooperatively set public policies,
either monetary or fiscal, policymakers must take into account that the compound mone-
tary and fiscal policy intervention is decisive, not a single policy instrument. As we will see,
this has important implications for the choice of international policy domains: For instance,
suppose national monetary authorities coordinate and set nominal interest rates and money
supply to the globally optimal level but they myopically consider the fiscal stance not to
be responsive to the change in monetary policy conduct whatsoever. Self-oriented national
fiscal policies then will determine the degree of interventions by choosing their target level
and thereby render monetary policy coordination completely gainless. Before starting with
the analysis of the different policy domains, however, first the policymakers’ objectives are
derived in closed form.
8The equivalence result in Lemma 2.1 resembles a recent finding in Adao et al. (2006) who also demonstrate
that a state-dependent consumption tax might be used as an alternative expenditure-switching instrument
in a monetary union where the flexibility of the nominal exchange rate is sacrificed. The equivalence of the
nominal interest rate and the labor income tax as policy instruments is well known in closed economy setups
(compare eg. Chari and Kehoe (1999)) but it has been so far ignored in the analysis of open economies.
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2.2.6 The Objectives in Closed Form
National authorities aim at maximizing their respective residents’ expected utility. By mak-
ing use of the equilibrium wage levels in equation (2.15) and aggregate budget constraints
it follows that Home and Foreign expected period utility can be written as
Eu =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
(θ − 1)
νθ
1
IW
)
EC1−ρ and (2.18)
Eu∗ =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
(θ − 1)
νθ
1
I∗W
)
EC∗1−ρ.
Recall that in equilibrium the only difference between Home and Foreign consumption
stems from the terms of trade. Consequently, if Home or Foreign authorities deviate from
the jointly optimal policy, they will do so only as they face the incentive to manipulate the
terms of trade in their own favor. In this case, independently and strategically conducted
monetary and fiscal policy must be ”beggar-thy-neighbor”.
Expected utility written in terms of the equilibrium distribution of consumption permits
a particularly convenient separation of the public policy interventions to the wage setting
that only affect the expected consumption level from the public policy interventions to
consumption spending that alter the variability of consumption. To be specific, Home
expected utility can then be written as
Eu =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
θ − 1
θν
1
IW
)(
θ − 1
θ
1
IWw
) (1−ρ)
X
I
− (1−γ)(1−ρ)Y
Wd
· exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(iC ; i
∗
C)
}
≡ u¯(IW ; I∗W ) · exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(iC ; i
∗
C)
}
. (2.19)
In (2.20), the term u¯(IW ; I∗W ) depicts the part of expected utility that is independent of con-
sumption variability and which can only be controlled through ex ante policy interventions
to households’ wage setting. The term Ω(iC ; i∗C), in turn, summarizes the part of expected
utility which depends on uncertainty only and which is a function of ex post public policy
interventions to consumption spending. It is given by
Ω(iC ; i∗C) = −Xσ2z − 14Zσ2tot + (1−γ)2Y X 2σz,tot + ν(2σz,aw − σtot,ad)
+ν(1−γ)Y X (2σz,ad − σtot,aw) + νX
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
2.3. International Cooperation of Public Policies 51
where Z = ν − (1− ρ)(1− γ)2 > 0.9
It is important to observe that the ex ante interventions differ from the ex post interventions
in the order of magnitude with respect to their welfare implications. As already empha-
sized in Evers (2007a), ex post interventions are stabilization responses to deviations of
productivity levels. Enhancing expected utility thus entails that risk aversion enforces the
minimization of fluctuations in consumption and labor. These welfare effects are, however,
generically of second order (compare the discussion by Lucas (2003)). Hence, gains from
coordinating ex post stabilization policies are of second order. On the other hand, ex ante
interventions to the wage setting are of first order because the distortions resulting from
policies drive an inefficient wedge between the optimal labor-leisure trade-off on average.
Consequently, gains from coordinating ex ante wage setting distortions are of first order.
2.3 International Cooperation of Public Policies
Monetary and fiscal policymakers are assumed to be able to perfectly commit to the policies
they announce. In case of ex post market interventions that will alter the nominal exchange
rate, monetary policy follows a money supply feedback rule that conditions on productivity
shocks. They are given by
mˆ = µaw aˆw + µad aˆd and mˆ∗ = µ
∗
aw aˆw − µ∗ad aˆd.
Fiscal policy follows a similar feedback rule for consumption taxes, namely
τˆC = τC,aw aˆw + τC,ad aˆd and τˆ
∗
C = τC∗,aw aˆw − τC∗,ad aˆd,
where τC = log(1 + tC) and τ∗C = log(1 + t
∗
C). The compound public policy reactions to
productivity shocks can therefore be written as
iˆC = iC,aw aˆw + iC,ad aˆd and iˆ
∗
C = i
∗
C,aw aˆw − i∗C,ad aˆd, (2.20)
where iC,aw = µaw − τaw , i∗C,aw = µ∗aw − τ∗aw , iC,ad = µad − τad , and i∗C,ad = µ∗ad − τ∗ad .
9Foreign expected utility can be stated as
Eu∗ = u¯∗ (IW ; I
∗
W ) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(iC ; i
∗
C)
}
, where
u¯∗ =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
θ − 1
θν
1
I∗W
)(
θ − 1
θ
1
IWw
) (1−ρ)
X
I
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
Wd
, and
Ω∗(iC ; i
∗
C) = −Xσ2z − Z
4
σ2tot − (1− γ)Y X
2σz,tot + ν(2σz,aw − σtot,ad)
−ν(1− γ)Y X (2σz,ad − σtot,aw ) + νX
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
.
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In case of ex ante policy interventions to the optimal wage setting, the monetary policy is to
set the expected gross nominal interest rate. Implicitly, this is achieved by the choice of the
mean money supply for the next period, ie. by Em and Em∗.10 Fiscal policy chooses the
labor income tax rates which must be perfectly negatively correlated to the consumption
taxes so that the ratio of both is at the desired level.
2.3.1 Optimal Public Policy Coordination
The analysis begins with the consideration of single national policymakers who choose both
the monetary and the fiscal policy instruments, ie. there is a single Home authority that
chooses {IW , iC,aw , iC,ad} and a single Foreign authority that chooses {I∗W , i∗C,aw , i∗C,ad}. When
single national policymakers coordinate their respective policy interventions, they do so as
to maximize the joint welfare of Home and Foreign residents.
Ex Ante Intervention to Wage Setting
The first proposition establishes the globally optimal policy intervention to ex ante wage
setting:
Proposition 2.1 The optimal public policy intervention to the wage setting is
IOptW =
θ − 1
θ
,
and I∗W
Opt = IOptW by symmetry.
Proof.
See Appendix.
The optimal public policy to the wage setting is to offset both distortions that prevent
ex ante efficient wages: first, the markup of monopolistic suppliers of specific labor types,
and second, the inflation tax caused by the cash-in-advance distortion. The combination of
the fiscal and monetary policy instrument to achieve this is indeterminate. However, the
most prominent combination to achieve the optimal level of ex ante intervention to the wage
setting is to use labor income taxes to offset monopolistic distortions and to run the nominal
interest rates according to the Friedman rule.
Ex Post Intervention to Consumption Spending
The next proposition states the optimal ex post intervention to spending:
Proposition 2.2 The optimal ex post public policy intervention to consumption spending
follows
iOptC,aw =
(1− ρ)
X and i
Opt
C,ad
=
(1− ρ)(1− γ)2
Z ,
10See also the detailed discussion in Evers (2007a).
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and i∗OptC,aw = i
Opt
C,aw
and i∗OptC,ad = i
Opt
C,ad
by symmetry.
Proof.
See Appendix.
When both countries are hit by a common productivity shock, the only friction that matters
are preset wages. Indeed, optimal public policy then replicates the flexible wage allocation
by closing the gap between the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility
of labor in each instance. Under flexible wages, (1−ρ)ν determines the efficient intra-temporal
elasticity of substituting labor for consumption.11 Under rigid wages, however, labor is fully
demand determined and hence uncoupled from the consumption decision. Optimal public
policy must therefore be used to imitate the optimal trade-off between consumption and
labor. A positive aggregate productivity shock and subsequently lower goods prices lead
to an increase in consumption spending. Without intervention, equilibrium employment
would stay unaffected. Following, if ρ > 1, the optimal policy rule corrects the inefficiently
high consumption level by counter-cyclically reducing nominal consumption spending up
to the level that equates marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of labor.
If ρ < 1, optimality requires a positive reaction of labor to an increase in consumption.
Hence, the optimal policy rule has then to be pro-cyclical. Only in case of log-utility, it is
in fact optimal having labor not to respond to consumption fluctuations at all.
Things are different when the two countries are hit by fully asymmetric productivity shocks.
Then, in addition to rigid wages, the incomplete risk sharing places the policymakers to
tackle another source of inefficiency. In particular, efficient risk sharing requires the ra-
tio of Home over Foreign marginal utilities of tradable goods consumption to be unity.12
In general, however, closing the domestic gap between the marginal rate of substituting
consumption and labor and the marginal rate of transformation by replicating the flexible
wage allocation leaves an international gap between Home and Foreign marginal utilities
of consumption. Hence, there exists a trade-off between closing domestic and international
gaps. To be more precise, consider an asymmetric productivity shock that increases Home
productivity over Foreign, say, which implies the terms of trade and thereby the real ex-
change rate to depreciate. Consequently, relative Home over Foreign nominal consumption
spending increases by one-to-one to the fall in the real exchange rate. This leaves employ-
ment unaffected. In case of ρ > 1, to improve upon the gap between the marginal utility of
11Optimal wage setting implies ELν = EC(1−ρ). As this has to hold for each instance under flexible wages,
we get Lν = C(1−ρ). Hence, the implied intra-temporal elasticity of labor with respect to consumption is
(1−ρ)
ν
.
12This follows as an immediate implication of (i) marginal utilities of any shared consumption good must
equal relative prices and (ii) in case of tradable goods PPP of tradable goods imply that marginal utilities
of tradable consumption goods must be identical across countries. Hence,
UCT
UC∗
T
= 1 under complete financial
markets and initially identical countries (compare Backus and Smith (1993)).
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consumption and marginal disutility of labor effort, Home national authority has to counter-
cyclically decrease consumption by either increasing consumption taxes or reducing money
supply. Foreign national authority counter-cyclically increases consumption to oppose the
negative foreign productivity shock.13 Thereby, the nominal exchange rate appreciates but
by less than necessary to offset the direct effect of the productivity shock on the terms of
trade. As a consequence, the terms of trade and the real exchange rate still deteriorate even
when national authorities target the flexible wage allocation. The immediate implication for
Home and Foreign marginal utilities of consumption is that Home marginal utility is lower
than Foreign. To see this, note that in the equilibrium without international asset markets,
the ratio of marginal utilities of tradable goods consumption reads
UCT
UC∗T
= ToT−(1−ρ)(1−γ).
Thus, Home households consume too much tradable goods whereas Foreign households con-
sume to few tradable goods as efficient risk sharing would require. If households were able
to perfectly contract state contingent payments in international financial markets, Home
households would have to make a transfer to Foreign households to equate marginal utilities
of tradable goods consumption. However, by the lack of international financial markets,
consumption risk sharing can only be achieved by nominal exchange rate management. In
fact, an implicit Home transfer to Foreign can be attained by a depreciation of Home cur-
rency: the Home tradable good becomes cheaper for Foreign residents whereas the Foreign
tradable good becomes dearer for Home residents. Therefore, Home residents pay more in
exchange for Foreign goods which indeed comes along with a reproduction of a transfer. As
a result, from a global perspective it is not optimal to nationally target the flexible wage
equilibrium. As the story goes exactly the symmetric way for ρ < 1, it turns out that the
optimal market interventions to asymmetric productivity shocks are less responsive than
simply targeting the flexible wage allocation. Hence, in general, optimal policy responses
to asymmetric shocks face the trade-off between dispelling domestic inefficiencies caused by
wage rigidity and the inefficiency caused by the lack of international risk sharing. Note that
it is this trade-off only that renders the optimal policy conduct to be second-best.14
2.3.2 Non-Cooperative Public Policy: Nash
Next, I consider what public policies look like when the single Home and Foreign national
policymakers conduct public policy independently. Recall the discussion of the respective
welfare functions that policymakers seek to maximize. The only difference between Home
13In fact, one can easily show that iflexC,ad =
(1−ρ)(1−γ)
Y indeed replicates the flexible wage allocation in case
of asymmetric shocks and one finds that −1 < iflexC,ad . Moreover, the terms of trade than still changes by
t̂ot = − νY aˆd.
14Compare also the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a) and Evers (2007a) on this trade-off.
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and Foreign residents’ welfare stems from the terms of trade. Hence, national policymakers
deviate from the optimal policy only on the grounds of manipulating the terms of trade to
their own national benefits.
Ex Ante Intervention to Wage Setting
Proposition 2.3 The (unique) Nash equilibrium of non-cooperatively set public policy in-
terventions to the wage setting yields
INashW =
θ − 1
θ
(
1 +
γX
Y + (1− γ)X
)
,
and I∗W
Nash = INashW by symmetry. Furthermore,
INashW > I
Opt
W if γ 6= 0 and INashW = IOptW if γ = 0.
Proof.
See Appendix.
From this proposition follows that non-cooperatively set policy interventions to workers’
wage setting will be strictly larger than the optimal one unless the two countries are in
autarky, ie. γ = 0. By the discussion of the equilibrium wages, higher nominal interest
rates or labor income taxes entail higher wage claims ex ante. Why, then, has the national
policymaker the incentive to induce wage claims to be inefficiently higher than the optimal
level? The answer is to improve upon the consumption-labor trade-off. Given the other
country’s wage level, an increase in domestic wages implies an increase in labor income and
consequently in expected consumption the next period. However, in equilibrium, higher
relative wages imply higher terms of trade and a reduction in domestic goods demand. Fur-
thermore, higher relative wages also induce a direct fall in labor demand. Hence, aggregate
labor demand and labor income falls. The net effect on the consumption-labor ratio and
thus on welfare, however, is positive because households substitute to the relatively cheaper
foreign goods. Thus, domestic policymakers ”beggar-thy-neighbor” by exporting labor effort
and importing more consumption goods at relatively higher domestic wages. As a result,
as both Home and Foreign national authorities behave symmetrically in equilibrium, higher
Home and Foreign inflation and labor income tax induce inefficiently high nominal wage
claims that reduce in turn aggregate world output and world consumption. Only in case
of no trade, ie. when the two countries are closed economies (γ = 0), does the positive
net substitution effect vanish and the optimal policy intervention to wage setting indeed
constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Ex Post Intervention to Consumption Spending
Proposition 2.4 The (unique) Nash equilibrium of non-cooperatively set public policy in-
terventions to consumption spending yields
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iNashC,aw =
(1− ρ)
X and i
Nash
C,ad
= (1− ρ)(1− γ)
( X + (1− γ)Y
ZY + (1− γ)X 2
)
,
where i∗NashC,aw = i
Nash
C,aw
and i∗NashC,ad = i
Nash
C,ad
by symmetry. Furthermore,
iNashC,aw = i
Opt
C,aw
and iNashC,ad

< iOptC,ad if ρ > 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
> iOptC,ad if ρ < 1 and 0 < γ < 1.
= iOptC,ad if ρ = 1 or γ ∈ {0, 1} .
Proof.
See Appendix.
Indeed, when the two countries are hit by a common aggregate productivity shock, it is not
surprising that the Nash solution does coincide with the optimal response: The only source
of frictions are preset wages. Hence, as the impact of the shock is identical, the policy
targets coincide.
In contrast, when the two countries are hit by idiosyncratic shocks, the optimal response
does not constitute a Nash equilibrium of the policy rule setting game in general. If national
policymakers decide on their respective policy interventions non-cooperatively, Proposition
2.4 implies that as long as the lack of complete international financial markets matters,
ie. as long as ρ 6= 1 or 0 < γ < 1, both single national authorities face the incentive to
unilaterally react more actively to idiosyncratic shocks than it is globally efficient. Why?
The answer is again to improve upon the domestic labor-leisure trade-off. Put differently,
national policymakers regard it beneficial to close the domestic gap between marginal utility
of consumption and marginal disutility of labor at the cost of increasing the international
gap between Home and Foreign marginal utilities of consumption. By the discussion above,
optimal public policy responses to idiosyncratic productivity shocks trade off gains from
replicating the flexible wage allocation and the gains from international consumption risk
sharing. In particular, the optimal policy rule moves away from replicating the flexible wage
equilibrium because the efficient consumption risk sharing requires a less active response
to shocks in order to implicitly compensate for the lack of state-contingent transfers within
complete international financial market. For instance, when ρ > 1 and an asymmetric
shock increases Home productivity and reduces Foreign productivity, the optimal policy
rule induces the nominal exchange rate to fall by less than under replicating the flexible
wage equilibrium in order to lessen the appreciation of the terms of trade. That is, the
Home tradable good must be cheaper for Foreign residents and Foreign tradable good must
be dearer for Home residents than under replicating the flexible wage equilibrium. The
consequence is an implicit transfer of tradable goods from Home to Foreign that increases
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demand for Home labor and reduces demand for Foreign labor. From a national perspective,
however, it pays to deviate from the optimal policy response since given the other national
policymaker sticks to the optimal rule, the gains from reducing the domestic marginal
utility gap by altering the terms of trade outweighs the loss implied by the widening of the
international gap between marginal consumption utility. Specifically, Home reduces labor
effort by cutting consumption spending in order to further bridge the domestic gap by
either expanding money supply or lowering consumption taxes. For ρ > 1, the consumption
level itself falls by less than the labor effort (compare the discussion of Proposition 2.2).
The reason is that a cut in Home consumption spending appreciates Home currency and
improves the terms of trade. Hence, Home residents’ substitute for the then cheaper
Foreign good. The Home currency appreciation in turn inflicts a beggar-thy-neighbor effect
on Foreign because it directly reduces Foreign consumption and increases Foreign labor
effort. The analog story holds true for ρ < 1.
As a consequence, deviations from the optimal policy responses to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks result in an amplification of the response of the nominal exchange rate and thereby
of the terms of trade. From a global perspective, this amplification of the terms of trade
fluctuations harms both Home and Foreign residents since this leads to higher consumption
fluctuations. The result is that international risk sharing and thus international consumption
smoothing has worsened.
2.4 Monetary Cooperation and Fiscal Independence
Next, the analysis of decentralized public policies follows. In this case, national policy-
making is separated between two distinct authorities: a monetary policy authority that
decides on the nominal interest rate and the money supply rule and a fiscal policy authority
that decides on consumption and labor income taxes. I focus on the case when monetary
authorities coordinate their respective policy instruments in order to maximize the sum
of Home and Foreign residents welfare whereas the fiscal authorities implement their
respective policies independently of each other so as to maximize the domestic residents’
welfare only.
In this section, it is shown that for all instances when there is an incentive for self-oriented
national authorities to deviate from both the optimal ex ante intervention to the wage
setting (compare Proposition 2.3) and the optimal ex post market intervention rules
(compare Proposition 2.4), monetary policy coordination inevitably leaves room for
independently operating national fiscal authorities to exploit their power on the terms
of trade. In particular, by the two lemmata in Section 2.2, monetary and fiscal policy
instruments are perfect substitutes with regard to the respective interventions. Only
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the compound action of domestic monetary and fiscal policy accounts for the effect on
private households behavior. Hence, coordinating monetary authorities seek to implement
the optimal levels of public policy interventions. Independently acting fiscal authori-
ties, however, undermine monetary authorities endeavor by enforcing a deviation of the
optimal public policy intervention levels by the motives as discussed in the foregoing section.
Ex Ante Wage Setting Intervention
The following proposition states that in case of ex ante intervention to the wage setting
gains from monetary policy coordination are fully carried off by the fiscal sides:
Proposition 2.5 The (unique) Nash Equilibrium between the cooperating monetary au-
thorities and the two symmetric independent fiscal authorities entails fiscal dominance, ie.
the net nominal interest rates are tied down to zero whereas the wage taxes are set to the
non-cooperative level.
Proof.
See Appendix.
Since the net nominal interest rates cannot become negative, the two fiscal authorities will
force the cooperating monetary authorities to implement zero net nominal interest rates as
then fiscal authorities exerts full control over Home and Foreign wage setting. As a result, in
the Nash equilibrium with symmetric fiscal actions, Home and Foreign fiscal authorities will
implement the non-cooperative levels of public policy intervention I∗W
Nash = INashW . The
importance of this result cannot be overemphasized: As argued above, the magnitude of
welfare implications of ex ante intervention to the wage setting is of first-order. Therefore,
gains from policy coordination are of first-order. As a consequence, by Proposition 2.5,
potentially large gains from policy coordination can only be realized if the fiscal policy is
included in the international policy cooperation.
Ex Post Market Intervention
In case of common productivity shocks, the only distortion that matters ex post are preset
wages. Hence, there is no basis on which the cooperating monetary authorities and the
two self-oriented fiscal policymakers might dispute. As a consequence, we find the following
result.
Proposition 2.6 The (continuum of) Nash Equilibria between the cooperating monetary
authorities and the two symmetric independent fiscal authorities entails the optimal national
compound policy responses to aggregate shocks.
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Proof.
See Appendix.
In fact, since both domestic monetary and fiscal authority want to implement the optimal
feedback rule of ex post public intervention i∗OptC,aw = i
Opt
C,aw
, all combinations of monetary
and fiscal coefficients that lead to the optimal feedback rule are equilibria. Hence, all what
domestic public policymakers face is a coordination problem of which combination to choose.
In case of idiosyncratic shocks, however, national fiscal authorities face an incentive to
enforce a deviation from optimal policy responses on the grounds that they want to improve
upon the domestic gap between the marginal consumption utility and the marginal disutility
of labor effort at the cost of worsening international consumption risk sharing. The next
proposition shows that as long as the need for a risk sharing arrangement matters, self-
oriented national fiscal authorities will indeed effectively deteriorate optimal public policy
responses to idiosyncratic shocks.
Proposition 2.7 Only if ρ = 1 or γ ∈ {0, 1}, the (continuum of) Nash equilibria between
the cooperating monetary authorities and the two symmetric independent fiscal authorities
in pure strategies entail optimal national compound policy responses to idiosyncratic shocks.
Otherwise, if ρ 6= 1 and 0 > γ > 1, the (continuum of) Nash equilibria that exhibit mixed
strategies lead to a (unique) distribution of the compound public policy intervention that
inevitably leads to welfare losses as compared to the optimal response to asymmetric shocks.
Proof.
See Appendix.
Obviously, when the goals of cooperating monetary authorities and the two distinct national
fiscal authorities coincide and all policymakers seek to close the domestic gaps induced by
the wage rigidity, the Nash equilibria must consist of optimal responses to asymmetric
shock. This is the case either if the countries are closed (γ = 0) or if international financial
markets are redundant (ρ = 1 or γ = 1). Again, as in case of aggregate productivity shocks,
policymakers still face a coordination problem that implies the Nash solution to be non-
unique. On the other hand, if the goals do not coincide, cooperating monetary policymakers
want to implement the optimal policy responses iOptC,ad and i
∗Opt
C,ad
. Given the action taken by
the monetary authorities, the equilibrium best responses of national fiscal authorities are to
choose consumption taxes so as to implement the Nash intervention rules iNashC,ad and i
∗Nash
C,ad
.
Hence, it follows from the perfect substitutability of national policy instruments (Lemma
2.1) that there cannot exist a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Nevertheless, there exist
Nash equilibria in mixed strategies. As a result, the mixed strategies equilibria must entail
welfare losses as compared to the globally optimal response to asymmetric productivity
shocks because on average the national responses are more active as it is optimal. To
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evaluate the relevance of these theoretical results, I consider a numerical exercise in the
next subsection.
2.5 Gains and losses from Policy Cooperation with and with-
out Fiscal Independence
The losses that fiscal independence implies for international monetary policy coordination
are assessed on the basis of a numerical simulation of the model. To alleviate comparisons
and since the model is similar in structure to theirs, I adopt the parameters chosen by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002a). To be specific, I assume that σaw = σad = 0.01 and that
ν = 1. The value for θ is chosen to be θ = 7.66. This implies a monopolistic markup
over marginal costs of 15%. Two possible scenarios are considered: a low-trade scenario
(γ = 0.2) which corresponds to an import over GDP ratio of 10% and high-trade scenario
(γ = 0.6) which corresponds to an import over GDP ratio of 30%. The impacts of
different public policy arrangements are measured by their % change in consumption
that is required to compensate the representative household to be indifferent between
either two policy environments. ξ denotes the percentage compensation of consumption
so that U((1 + ξ)CA, LA) = U(CB, LB), where A and B are two different policies.
Moreover, the structure of the model allows an easy decomposition of this measure into
the two relevant components: effects of the ex ante policy interventions to the wage set-
ting (ξIW ) and effects of the ex post policy interventions to the consumption spending (ξIC ).
Table 2.2 reports the gains from international monetary policy coordination when national
fiscal authorities act independently. There are no gains from coordinating monetary policy
interventions to households’ optimal wage setting as Proposition 2.5 shows: The Fiscal
authorities dominate the cooperating monetary authorities by tying the nominal interest
rate to zero and implementing the competitive level of public policy interventions. In case
of ex post interventions, only asymmetric shocks lead to a divergence of policy goals. As
shown in Proposition 2.7, as long as risk-sharing matters, the unique Nash equilibrium
is in mixed strategies. Surprisingly, in the low-trade scenario, coordinating monetary
policy actually leads to welfare losses. For independently acting fiscal authorities forces
policymakers to mix their responses to asymmetric shocks, circumstances arise where the
compound ex post policy interventions are either less responsive than optimal or more
responsive than it would be nationally desirable. Welfare losses in expected utility by having
both these circumstances outweigh the gains from reacting at least sometimes optimally to
asymmetric shocks. Furthermore, these losses are increasing in the absolute deviation of
ρ from unity because thereby the consequences of policy disturbances on expected utility
become more pronounced. The same effect persists in the high-trade scenario. The welfare
implications are, however, smaller because the inefficiency arising from consumption risk
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Low-trade scenario (γ = 0.2) High-trade scenario (γ = 0.6)
Different values for ρ Different values for ρ
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8 ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8
Welfare Measure (compensating % change in consumption)
ξIW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ξIC -0.13 0 -0.061 -0.157 -0.228 0.004 0 0.004 -0.005 -0.028
ξ -0.13 0 -0.061 -0.157 -0.228 0.004 0 0.004 -0.005 -0.028
Table 2.2: Gains from monetary policy coordination when fiscal authorities operate
independently as compared to the case when both national monetary and fiscal policy
are conducted non-cooperatively.
sharing plays a less important role in case of higher trade integration. Recall that the
elasticity of substituting the Home tradable good for the Foreign tradable good is always
one. Hence, relative price movements can be better dealt with by households substituting
for the relatively cheaper tradable good the larger the share of tradable consumption goods
in the overall consumption basket is.
Welfare gains from fiscal policy coordination when monetary authorities already cooperate
are presented in Table 2.3. In contrast to the first exercise, there are gains from choosing
the ex ante intervention to households’ wage setting cooperatively. The figures in the first
row show that these gains from fiscal cooperation are substantial. They are decreasing in ρ
even though the inter-temporal inefficiency caused by the non-optimal policy intervention
is increasing simply because the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is decreasing
in ρ, too. Thus, consumption patterns are less sensible to disturbances to the optimal
wage-setting. The gains are, however, increasing in the degree of openness because the
national policymakers are more prone to manipulate the terms of trade ex ante as the
relative importance of the terms of trade is naturally increasing in Home as well as Foreign
shares of tradable goods in overall consumption. Corresponding to the results in the first
exercise, the gains from cooperation of the fiscal authorities’ ex post markets interventions
is increasing in ρ but decreasing for higher trade integration as consumption risk sharing
occurs stronger through trade itself.
In this numerical exercise, two result are worth being emphasized: First, the results show
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Low-trade scenario (γ = 0.2) High-trade scenario (γ = 0.6)
Different values for ρ Different values for ρ
ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8 ρ = .5 ρ = 1 ρ = 2 ρ = 4 ρ = 8
Welfare Measure (compensating % change in consumption)
ξIW 1.674 0.537 0.155 0.042 0.011 11.566 5.831 2.378 0.811 0.243
ξIW 0.151 0 0.062 0.158 0.229 0.007 0 0.006 0.019 0.037
ξ 1.827 0.537 0.217 0.200 0.240 11.574 5.831 2.384 0.830 0.280
Table 2.3: Gains from fiscal policy coordination when monetary authorities already
cooperate as compared to the case when monetary policy coordinate but fiscal
authorities operate independently.
that monetary policy cooperation may lead to welfare losses when independent fiscal pol-
icymakers follow national interests only. Second, welfare gains from international public
policy coordination - and in particular fiscal policy coordination when monetary authorities
already cooperate - are quite large. Both points are in sharp contrast to the existing litera-
ture on international monetary policy coordination: First gains from cooperation are fairly
small as they solely stem from ex post market interventions and exchange rate responses
to shocks (with the exception of Cooley and Quadrini (2003), Arseneau (2007) and Evers
(2007a)). Second, the crucial role of fiscal policy responses to monetary cooperation is fully
neglected.
2.6 Conclusion of Chapter 2
The goal of this paper has been to analyze the interplay of monetary and fiscal policy
domains in a world where countries are linked through trade. In particular, it is questioned
that one can analyze the gains and losses of international arrangements that promote the
coordination of either monetary or fiscal policy without taking into account the response of
the remaining independent and non-cooperatively conducted public policy to this arrange-
ment. This claim is addressed in a simple stochastic two-country sticky-wage model with a
cash-in-advance restriction. In this environment, monetary authorities can affect the terms
of trade by conducting a general short-run monetary policy using both the nominal interest
rate and the money supply. Fiscal authorities can also affect the terms of trade by using
distortionary taxes on labor income and consumption. It turns out that labor income taxes
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and nominal interest rates are perfectly substitutable national policy instruments when
policymakers affect workers’ optimal wage setting ex ante. The consumption tax and the
money supply are perfectly substitutable national policy instruments when policymakers
alter the consumption spending ex post. As a consequence, I find that international
monetary policy coordination requires fiscal policy coordination, too, in order to fully skim
off the gains from international policy coordination. Moreover, the numerical exercise
suggests that letting the fiscal authorities act independently when monetary authorities
cooperate might even lead to welfare losses.
Against this background, I adopt a critical stance on considering monetary policy coordi-
nation without taking into account the implications for fiscal policy conduct. The main
argument is that as long as national monetary and fiscal authorities share the same objec-
tives - in our case the respective residents’ welfare - they do also share the same incentives
to manipulate the terms of trade in their country’s favor. Hence, as both national authori-
ties do dispose of policy instruments to effectively alter the terms of trade, coordination of
monetary policy in order to overcome strategic incentives of self-oriented national monetary
policymakers - as it is argued in the literature - still leaves playground for fiscal policymakers
to exploit their own monopoly power. The numerical example demonstrates that gains from
monetary policy coordination are negligibly small or even negative (Table 2.2) even though
gains from policy coordination in general might be large (Table 2.2 + Table 2.3). Therefore,
the conclusion is that if one takes the game-theoretic arguments seriously - as one definitely
should - the optimum policy domain where international coordination is promising must
span both the monetary policy as well as the fiscal policy.
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Chapter 3
Federal Fiscal Transfers in
Monetary Unions: A NOEM
Approach
The creation of a monetary union, as is often proposed by its advocates, enhances trade
among member states since it reduces transaction costs and leads to higher economic, po-
litical and social integration. But creating a monetary union also means that its member
states sacrifice their monetary policy autonomy. Furthermore, the member states abandon
the flexibility of exchange rates that adjusts regionally asymmetric shocks among member
states.
Building on the seminal work by Mundell (1961), the literature beginning with Kenen (1969)
has argued that monetary unions must be embedded in adequate federal fiscal institutions
that provide insurance against asymmetric shocks among the member states. This also
forms the consensus in the debate over EMU. In a report, Delors (1989) argued that the
lack of exchange rate flexibility would cause tensions within the monetary union that may
even lead to a breakdown of the union if no such adjusting institution was installed. Delors
recommended binding limits on national budget deficits and the coordination of national
fiscal policies so as to establish a union-wide arrangement absorbing asymmetric shocks
among the member states. The latter recommendation, however, was daffed aside in the
Maastricht Treaty and only the limits on national budget deficits and public debts were
anchored in the Stability and Growth Pact. To emphasize his concern about the missing of
a fiscal arrangement dealing with asymmetric shocks, Feldstein (1997) claimed that
”...on balance, a European monetary union would be an economic liability.
The gains from reduced transformation costs would be small and might, when
looked at from the global point of view, be negative. At the same time, EMU
would increase cyclical instability, raising the cyclical unemployment rate.”
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It is even more astonishing that the Maastricht Treaty paid so little attention to an adjusting
arrangement as more than 20 years before the Delors Report, the so-called MacDougall
Report [1977], a study of the feasibility of EMU, already put forward the creation of a central
or federal fiscal arrangement that would automatically redistribute taxes or transfers among
the member states in order to absorb the effects of asymmetric shocks. In particular, it
suggested that a system of built-in stabilizers should work through a federal or central budget
that collects taxes from a prospering state and pays transfers to a state in recession. These
transfers could either be among national governments or directly among private sectors, ie.
households and firms.
The focus of this paper is to analyze federal fiscal transfers that are aimed to reduce eco-
nomic fluctuations caused by temporary asymmetric productivity and preference shocks.
We explore the properties of different transfer schemes with regard to their capability to
stabilize national consumption, production and employment. Specifically, we consider the
two types of transfers suggested by the MacDougall Report and which are implemented in
some existing federal states: Federal transfers among the households of different member
states and intergovernmental transfers that include payments between national fiscal au-
thorities only. The difference in how the two transfer schemes affect the allocation is key
to the analysis: Whereas federal transfers among households change the current income
of households directly and affect the allocation through choices made by the households,
intergovernmental transfers change national public consumption and the allocation through
the goods markets. Intergovernmental transfers affect households’ current income indirectly
through changes in goods and subsequently labor demand.
In case of preference shocks that shift the demand from goods produced in one region to
goods produced in another region, intergovernmental transfers simply shift back the demand
effect through a change in public consumption such that production and employment remain
unaltered. This implies no change in labor income and thus no fluctuations in consumption,
employment and welfare at all.
In contrast, if the member states are hit by asymmetric productivity shocks, changes in
consumer prices lead to a further income effect and changes in the real interest rates prompt
households to save. This comes in addition to the labor income effects caused by changes
in demand. In this case, neither transfer scheme stabilizes consumption and employment
fluctuations at the same time. A combination of federal transfers among households and
intergovernmental transfers, however, will do. Whereas the intergovernmental transfers
keep employment and thus labor income constant, the federal transfers among households
redistribute private savings and the income effect due to the change in consumer prices.
Consequently, both consumption and employment are stabilized. As a result, we find that
federal fiscal arrangements as suggested by the MacDougall Report indeed provide perfect
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insurance in the sense that fluctuations induced by asymmetric shocks can be completely
prevented.
In light of the many times expressed concerns about the lack of a federal fiscal stabiliza-
tion mechanism, it is surprising that researchers have rarely analyzed federal fiscal transfer
mechanisms within a theoretical framework. The few theoretical approaches to federal fiscal
institutions that employ federal transfers among states forming a monetary union are Klet-
zer and Buiter (1997), Kletzer (1999), and Kletzer and von Hagen (2001). The main part
of the literature on federal fiscal institutions stabilizing economic fluctuations in monetary
unions evolves around the empirical relevance of such institutions in existing unions. This
academic debate was initiated by the contributions of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1991) and
von Hagen (1992). They estimated the effects of federal fiscal transfer payments to offset
asymmetric shocks in the U.S to be between 10% and 40%. An overview on the subsequent
literature is provided by Kletzer and von Hagen (2001) and Me´litz and Zumer (2002).
Closest to our model is Kletzer and von Hagen (2001). They consider two regions forming
a monetary union within a dynamic general equilibrium framework with rigid wages. Each
region produces a final good for consumption using a set of intermediate input factors
produced with labor. The regions are exposed to asymmetric productivity shocks. Kletzer
and von Hagen show that asymmetric productivity shocks have no effects on consumption
and employment as long as the economic structures of the two member states are similar.
Only if the economic structures are sufficiently different, asymmetric productivity shocks
cause fluctuations. In that case, a redistributive federal transfer scheme can stabilize either
consumption, or production, or employment, but not two of them at the same time.
We extend their analysis in several aspects. First, we introduce preference shocks. This
allows us to study shifts in demand directly and to revisit Mundell’s original example.
Second, we stress the importance of trade as a means of cushioning asymmetric demand and
supply shocks. Specifically, we consider the degree of economic integration and structural
differences of the member states to gain further insights into effectiveness and functioning of
the different transfers. Third, we use welfare criteria to judge the insurance property of the
fiscal arrangements. Fourth, we show that a combination of the two federal fiscal transfers
will always provide perfect insurance.
Our model is set up in the tradition of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM)
and follows closely Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996)1. This allows us to embed the different
federal fiscal transfer schemes into a dynamic general equilibrium setting with nominal rigidi-
ties. The great convenience of this approach is that we can jointly analyze immediate and
1See also Lane (2001) and more recently Lane and Ganelli (2003) for excellent overviews.
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long-run consequences of federal fiscal arrangements on consumption, production, employ-
ment and the current account in depth. This enables us to gain insights into the functioning
and effectiveness of the different transfer schemes in response to asymmetric shocks. To
conform the model to our purposes, we extend the model by Obstfeld and Rogoff along two
lines. First, in our model, households provide different types of labor monopolistically. Final
goods are produced by an aggregation technology over all different domestic types of labor.
In this sense, technology shocks alter the aggregate labor productivity and subsequently
shift marginal costs of producing market goods. This is in stark contrast to Obstfeld and
Rogoff who model productivity as a preference parameter. As a consequence, since goods
markets are assumed to be competitive in our model, temporary productivity shocks affect
prices even though wages are rigid as it is emphasized in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). This
enriches the dynamics of the model immensely. The underlying view is that wages are much
more rigid than prices. Furthermore, it seems implausible that productivity shocks even
though only transitory in nature have no impacts on prices at all. Second, we introduce
tradable and non-tradable goods.2 Therefore, we can describe the demand shock initially
considered by Mundell (1961) as a shift of demand from tradable goods produced in one
state to tradable goods produced in the other state. This also allows us to take into account
how economic integration as measured by the fraction of tradable consumption goods affects
functioning and effectiveness of different transfer schemes.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we set up our model of
the monetary union. In Section 3.2, we consider the solution of the log-linearized model.
We portray the transmission of demand and supply shocks as well as changes in policies in
depth. In Section 3.3, we turn to the analysis of the different transfer schemes. We conclude
in Section 3.4.
3.1 The Model
We consider a monetary union that consists of two regions, referred to as ”home” (H) and
”foreign” (F ). Each region is populated by a continuum of households with measure one.
Each household within a region provides a specific type of labor which is used as an input
factor for the production of two goods, a tradable and a non-tradable good. Altogether we
have four different goods, two tradable and two non-tradable ones. We assume the goods
markets to be perfectly competitive, but labor is supplied monopolistically. Wages are sticky
and set one period in advance. The only asset households trade across regions is a nominal
bond. There are two local governments, one within each region, a federal government and
a central bank. Local governments collect lump-sum taxes from their inhabitants to finance
government expenditures. In addition, local governments receive or pay transfers within
2Hau (2000) extends the original model by Obstfeld and Rogoff for tradable and non-tradable goods.
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the federal budget. The federal government acts as a balance sheet for transfers among
households of the different regions and between the two local fiscal authorities.
The notation we stick to throughout this paper is as follows: Superscripts denote where
a variable belongs to, foreign variables are distinguished by an asterisk ∗, and union wide
aggregates by MU . Subscripts identify the characteristics of that variable, e.g. whether it’s
a non-tradable or the home tradable good. Households and their specific input factors are
denoted by i ∈ [0, 1].
3.1.1 Goods Production
The technologies to produce the tradable and the non-tradable goods are identical within
the region:
yj,s = as
(∫ 1
0
lj,s(i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
, (3.1)
where θ > 1, for j ∈ {H,N} being either the home tradable good H or home non-tradable
good N . The CES technology simply aggregates all different types of labor i within a region
which are substitutable at a constant elasticity θ. The aggregate productivity of labor as is
subject to shocks. Foreigners share the same aggregation technology over foreign types of
labor and with a different productivity level. Factor cost minimization implies
lj,s(i) =
1
as
(
ws(i)
Ws
)−θ
yj,s (3.2)
to be the optimal demand for labor input of quality i at wage ws(i) and an overall wage
level
Ws =
(∫ 1
0
ws(i)(1−θ)di
) 1
1−θ
. (3.3)
With perfectly competitive goods markets, the prices for home tradable and non-tradable
goods are
PH,s = PN,s =
Ws
as
, (3.4)
respectively. Total aggregate output of the home tradable good is YH,s and of the home
non-tradable good YN,s. For the foreign region the corresponding expressions apply.
3.1.2 Households
Households within the same region have identical preferences over consumption, real bal-
ances and labor effort. They are described by
Ut(i) =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
lnCs(i) + χln
(
Ms(i)
Ps
)
− 1
2
Ls(i)2
)
, (3.5)
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where 0 < β < 1, and χ > 0. The real consumption index for person i, Cs(i) is given by
Cs(i) =
(
γ
1
ρCT,s(i)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− γ) 1ρCN,s(i)
(ρ−1)
ρ
) ρ
(ρ−1)
, (3.6)
0 < γ < 1, and is identical for all persons within a region. Following our notation, CN,s(i)
denotes i’s consumption of the home non-tradable good. CT,s(i) is a real consumption index
over the two tradable goods CH,s(i) and CF,s(i) with
CT,s(i) =
(
α
1
ρCH,s(i)
ρ−1
ρ + (1− α) 1ρCF,s(i)
(ρ−1)
ρ
) ρ
(ρ−1)
, (3.7)
0 < α < 1. Foreign households have the same preferences over tradable goods but differ with
respect to their own non-tradable good. Individual optimization yields for any person i the
following composition of the home real consumption index between the tradable commodities
index and the non-tradable good
CT,s = γ
(
PT,s
Ps
)−ρ
Cs, and CN,s = (1− γ)
(
PN,s
Ps
)−ρ
Cs, (3.8)
and between home and foreign tradable commodities
CH,s = α
(
PH,s
PT,s
)−ρ
CT,s, and CF,s = (1− α)
(
PF,s
PT,s
)−ρ
CT,s. (3.9)
The parameters γ, α, and ρ will play a crucial role in our analysis. By our assumption of CES
consumption indices, γ determines together with the price ratio of tradable and non-tradable
goods the composition of tradable and non-tradable goods in the overall consumption basket.
In fact, as γ reaches zero, households demand only non-tradable goods and no trade in goods
will occur. As γ reaches unity, both foreign and home households prefer tradable goods only.
Since we assume that preferences over tradable-goods are identical for home and foreign
households, preferences coincide. Therefore, γ captures the difference in preferences. This
implies that γ also displays differences in price levels and real interest rates, too. On this
account we will interpret γ to indicate the degree of economic integration of the two member
states.3 The parameter α gives the consumption composition of the two tradable goods.
Since home and foreign households share identical tastes with respect to the composition
of the two tradable commodities, we can consider a shift of demand from one region to
the other. This is Mundell’s original case when he analyzed optimum currency areas. The
elasticity of substitution ρ determines in combination with γ and α how private households’
demand responds to changes in relative prices. In particular, in our setting ρ accounts for
the expenditure switching effect following changes in relative prices.
3In a common sense, economic integration suggests also factor mobility. In fact, following our assumption
of production processes, even though labor is completely mobile, it is only demanded domestically. Thus,
viewing γ as the degree of economic integration seems plausible.
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The corresponding home consumption-based price indices are
Ps =
(
γP
(1−ρ)
T,s + (1− γ)P (1−ρ)N,s
) 1
(1−ρ)
and PT,s =
(
αP
(1−ρ)
H,s + (1− α)P (1−ρ)F,s
) 1
(1−ρ)
. (3.10)
Home household i’s optimization problem is to maximize (3.5) subject to its budget con-
straint
Bs+1(i) +Ms(i) + PsCs(i)
≤ (1 + is)Bs(i) + ws(i)Ls(i) +M(s−1)(i) + Tloc,s + Thh,s, (3.11)
where is is the nominal interest rate, and subject to the labor demand for household i’s
specific variety of labor
ls(i) =
1
as
(
ws(i)
Ws
)−θ
(YH,s + YN,s) . (3.12)
The transfers in (3.11) consist of the usual net lump-sum transfer from the local fiscal
authority, Tloc,s, and the private transfer from foreign households to domestic households,
Thh,s (read ’household to household’), that is part of the federal fiscal arrangement.
Transfers are identical for all households within a region. Therefore we skip indices.
The optimality conditions are the standard consumption Euler equation
Cs+1(i) = Cs(i)β(1 + rs+1), (3.13)
optimal money demand
Ms(i)
Ps
= χCs(i)
1 + is+1
is+1
, (3.14)
and the optimal wage setting
ws(i) =
θ
θ − 1Ls(i)Cs(i)Ps. (3.15)
The nominal interest rate is given by
1 + is+1 = (1 + rs+1)
Ps+1
Ps
. (3.16)
Note that with a common currency the nominal interest rate is the same in both regions. Of
course, the real interest rates differ as purchasing power parity need not hold. Optimality
conditions for foreign households are accordingly.
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3.1.3 Local Governments and Federal Fiscal Arrangements
Local governments distribute lump-sum transfers to local households Tloc,s and purchase
government expenditures, Gs. Local governments only consume local non-tradable goods
and public consumption is purely dissipative.4 In addition, local governments receive or pay
intergovernmental transfers, Tgg,s (read ’government to government’), through the federal
budget and obtain payments from the central bank, Tcb,s. The local governments’ budget
constraints are
Tloc,s + PN,sGs = Tgg,s + Tcb,s
and T ∗loc,s + P
∗
N,sG
∗
s = T
∗
gg,s + T
∗
cb,s. (3.17)
The payments by the central bank are the seignorage revenues from issuing new money.
Consequently, the payments sum up to
Tcb,s + T ∗cb,s =
(
MMUs −MMUs−1
)
, (3.18)
where MMUs denotes the union wide money supplied by the common central bank. In our
model, the federal government serves only as a balance sheet. The two constraints for
transfers among private households across regions and for transfers between the two local
governments are
Thh,s + T ∗hh,s = 0 and Tgg,s + T
∗
gg,s = 0, (3.19)
respectively.
3.1.4 Market Clearing, Terms of Trade, and the Real Exchange Rate
All households within a region are identical. In particular, they have identical initial wealth
and thus they choose the same actions. As a consequence, per capita levels coincide with
national aggregate levels since each of two regions is of size one.
In equilibrium, the markets for tradable and non-tradable goods clear. For the home tradable
good we thus have that total production YT,s must meet the sum of total home demand for
the home tradable good, CH,s, and total foreign demand of the home tradable good, C∗H,s,
i.e.
YT,s = CH,s + C∗H,s. (3.20)
4In principle, national public consumption could have been assumed to be useful. However, we do with-
out this assumption as we will consider only the temporary deviations of allocations. Furthermore, since
we evaluate the stabilization property of different transfer schemes, we want to concentrate on effects on
consumption and employment only.
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We can substitute the optimal fraction of total consumption expenditures that is allotted
to consumption of the home tradable good in (3.8) and (3.9). Total home and foreign
production of tradable goods in terms of home and foreign total consumption levels are
YT,s = αγ
(
PH,s
Ps
)−ρ (
Cs +RER−ρs C
∗
s
)
and Y ∗T,s = (1− α)γ
(
PF,s
Ps
)−ρ (
Cs +RER−ρs C
∗
s
)
, (3.21)
respectively. The real exchange rate, RERs, is defined as the price of a foreign consumption
basket in terms of the home consumption basket, ie.
RERs =
(
Ps
P ∗s
)
. (3.22)
The terms of trade, ToTs, are defined as the price of home imports in terms of home exports,
ie. in money prices
ToTs =
(
PH,s
PF,s
)
=
(
a∗s
as
Ws
W ∗s
)
, and RERs = ToT (1−γ)s . (3.23)
The second equation in (3.23) stems from the definition of consumption-based price indices
and simply states that in case of no trade in goods, ie. if γ = 0, the real exchange rate and
the terms of trade must coincide, and if households consume tradables only (γ = 1), the
real exchange rate must be unity, since then preferences are identical and the law of one
price holds. This is another motive for interpreting γ as measure of economic integration.
Together with the market clearing conditions for non-tradable consumption goods, YN,s =
CN,s +Gs, we arrive at the total aggregate demand for home goods, namely
Ys = (1− γ(1− α))
(
PH,s
Ps
)−ρ
Cs + αγ
(
PH,s
Ps
)−ρ
RER−ρs C
∗
s +Gs, (3.24)
and for the total aggregate demand for foreign goods we get
Y ∗s = (1− α)γ
(
PF,s
Ps
)−ρ
Cs + (1− αγ)
(
PF,s
Ps
)−ρ
RER−ρs C
∗
s +G
∗
s. (3.25)
Written as above, the composition of total aggregate demand has a straightforward
interpretation. Take for example home aggregate demand. In (3.24) the first terms denotes
home private consumption. It is overall home private consumption evaluated at relative
prices of home goods
(
PH,s
Ps
)−ρ
Cs less the fraction γ(1 − α) private households demand
from abroad. In turn, the second term denotes the fraction of home goods in foreign
private consumption. The last term is domestic public consumption which is completely
home-biased.
The asset market clearing conditions for the bond and the money markets are
Bs +B∗s = 0, and Ms +M
∗
s =M
MU
s . (3.26)
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Together with home current account identity we get the global equilibrium
YMUs = C
MU
s +G
MU
s . (3.27)
It states that aggregate income within the union is equal to the union-wide aggregate public
and private consumption.
In order to analyze the effects of unanticipated temporary productivity and demand shocks,
we take log-linear approximations of the model around a completely symmetric steady
state. In this initial steady state we have B¯ = B¯∗ = 0, G¯ = G¯∗, a¯ = a¯∗, and α¯ = 12 . We
delegate all derivations to the appendix. Instead, we directly turn to the solution of the
log-linearized model.
3.2 Solution of the log-linearized Model
Our model exhibits nominal rigidities as households have to set their wages one period in
advance. As a consequence, when defining the equilibrium conditions, we have to distin-
guish between long-run equilibrium conditions, i.e. the long-run flexible wage equilibrium
conditions, and the short-run equilibrium conditions with fixed wages.
The long-run equilibrium is given by the per capita versions of the Euler condition (3.13),
optimal money demand (3.14), Fisher parity (3.16), optimal labor supply, i.e. the wage
setting equation (3.15), aggregate production Ys = asLs, aggregate demand (3.24), the
price level (3.10), all the foreign counterparts of these conditions, home budget constraint
(3.11) and the transversality condition, and market clearing for the nominal bonds and for
money (3.26).
In the short-run, however, households cannot adjust their wages to unanticipated shocks.
With preset nominal wages, employment will be completely determined by the domestic
labor demand. Thus, in the short-run, the equality of the marginal utility derived from
consuming additional income and the disutility from labor need not hold. Consequently,
the set of short-run equilibrium conditions is the same as the set of long-run equilibrium
conditions but without (3.15) and its foreign counterpart.
Since we consider unanticipated temporary shocks to productivity and to the preferences
for tradable consumption goods, changes in the long-run equilibrium result only from the
short-run current account imbalances. As households want to smooth their consumption
over time, they disperse the effects of the shocks over time. Consequently, the households
have to adjust their net foreign asset positions accordingly. It is instructive to begin the
analysis of the transmission of temporary shocks by looking at the impact of changes in the
net foreign asset positions on long-run consumption, production, and employment.
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3.2.1 Long-run implications of productivity and demand shocks
The aggregate long-run changes in the monetary union are the population weighted sum
of national changes for consumption, production and labor. By assuming the two regions
to be completely symmetric initially, the log-linearization around the symmetric steady
state implies locally that national deviations exactly offset each other, ie., we have that
ˆ¯CMU = ˆ¯YMU = ˆ¯LMU = 0.5 Consequently, domestic and foreign deviations are exactly of
opposite signs. We therefore discuss the effects on domestic variables only.
Consumption
The shift of home private steady state consumption to the new steady state level in response
to a shift in the net foreign assets reads
ˆ¯C =
1 + ρ(2− γ)
2 (ρ(2− γ)− (1− γ))δ
ˆ¯B = Λ ˆ¯C, ˆ¯B
ˆ¯B, (3.28)
where 0 < Λ ˆ¯C, ˆ¯B
6. An increase in home net foreign assets increases steady state income by
the annuity δ ˆ¯B. Higher permanent income leads to a higher consumption level. This, in
turn, causes higher wage claims and, subsequently, an increase in prices of domestic final
goods for two reasons: First, the opportunity cost of labor supply increases. Second, the
demand for labor rises due to the higher consumption level. The foreign households perceive
exactly the opposite effect. Consequently, the terms of trade rise and cause an expenditure
switching effect. Whether or not this expenditure switching will dampen the effect of higher
permanent income depends on the degree up to which consumption goods are substitutable.
Production and Employment
As the mechanism described above works through the overall goods demand and optimal
wage setting, the relation between consumption and production is
ˆ¯Y =
(1− γ)− ρ(2− γ)
1 + ρ(1− γ)
ˆ¯C = Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
ˆ¯C, (3.29)
with −1 ≤ Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C ≤ 0.
5On the notation: Long-run percentage deviations from the steady state levels are marked by ˆ¯X, short-
run percentage deviations by Xˆ. Deviations of variables that are zero in steady state are expressed in
terms of steady state consumption expenditures, eg. Bˆ = dB
P¯ C¯
. To alleviate the economic interpretation
of the transmission processes, we introduce notation for the constant terms that stem from the log-linear
approximations. Each constant is dubbed ΛXˆ,Yˆ and its two indices indicate the effect of a change in the
latter on the former. I.e. ΛXˆ,Yˆ is the constant for Xˆ = ΛXˆ,Yˆ Yˆ .
6We assume throughout the analysis that the elasticity of substitution between two goods suffices 1−γ
2−γ < ρ.
This is quite innocuous as empirical studies suggest and much less restrictive than the assumption in the
NOEM literature that 1 < ρ when consumption goods are supplied monopolistically to ensure well-behaved
demands.
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From these considerations we deduce that an increase in home per capita net foreign assets
leads to a change in production and employment by
ˆ¯Y = ˆ¯L = −δ
2
ˆ¯B. (3.30)
3.2.2 Short-run implications of productivity and demand shocks
Now, we consider the short-run implications of unanticipated temporary innovations of the
terms of trade, of the demand for tradable goods, of federal transfers among households,
and of intergovernmental transfers and portray the transmission process in detail. The
union-wide aggregates of consumption, production, and employment are invariant to fully
asymmetric shocks. They are only affected by a change in the union-wide money supply and
the proximate change in the nominal interest rate common to both regions. This reason leads
us to consider only completely asymmetric shocks that bear no aggregate effects since the
common component in shocks can be targeted by adjusting the union-wide money supply.
An immediate consequence is, as above, that foreign per capita variables change by exactly
the opposite magnitude.
Consumption
In order to ease the illustration of the impact of shocks on the consumption level, we separate
the direct equilibrium response induced by the change in exogenous variables from the
indirect equilibrium effects induced by the change in the consumption level itself. The short-
run implication of the domestic consumption level to the different exogenous innovations
can be expressed by7
Cˆ = ΛCˆ,DˆI
(
1
2
Λ
DˆI,T̂ oT
T̂ oT + ΛDˆI,αˆαˆ+ Tˆhh + Tˆgg
)
, (3.31)
0 < ΛCˆ,DˆI . In the equation above, the terms in brackets depict the change in income
due to direct equilibrium responses to exogenous innovations. We define this income as
’consumption-disposable-income’ (subscripted by DI) as it denotes the part of income that
is dedicated to consumption purchases only. It will be explored in more detail below.
ΛCˆ,DˆI captures the equilibrium feedback effect of a change in consumption on consumption-
disposable-income. It consists of the net income effect caused by the change in the con-
sumption level and the savings effect in response to a change in the consumption level today
as households smooth their consumption path.
7In the following expression we have already incorporated the assumption that national fiscal authorities
cannot adjust their national lump-sum taxes in the short-run, i.e. Tˆloc = Tˆ
∗
loc = 0, and that transfers within
the federal fiscal arrangement must net out, ie. Tˆk − Tˆ ∗k = 2Tˆk with k = {hh, gg}. Regarding concerns
about keeping national taxes temporarily fixed, this assumption serves only to distinguish the two different
transfer schemes since we want to concentrate on the role and effectiveness of different federal fiscal transfers.
Otherwise, intergovernmental transfers might be redistributed to households via regional lump-sum taxes
and is thus equivalent to federal transfers among households.
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(Innovations to the Terms of Trade) The response of contemporaneous home
consumption-disposable-income to changes in the terms of trade can be separated into a
net income effect and a savings effect:
Λ
DˆI,T̂ oT
= (1− ρ(2− γ)) γ − Λ
Sˆ,R̂ER
(1− γ). (3.32)
The first part in (3.32) denotes the net income effect induced by a change in relative prices.
It is the difference between the change in labor income and the change in consumption
prices. The non-tradable goods do not appear as the labor income effect is exactly offset by
the change in private and public expenditures for non-tradables which leaves labor demand
unchanged. Clearly, if no good is traded, the net income effect is zero. For the opposite case,
when all goods are traded, the net effect obviously depends on the elasticity of substitution
among home and foreign tradable goods. The second part in (3.32) depicts the change in
wealth, ie.savings, in response to the innovations to the terms of trade that alter the real
exchange rate, namely
Λ
Sˆ,R̂ER
= Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯C
γ
1 + (1− γ)Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
+
χ
1− β = Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯CΛ ˆ¯C,R̂ER + ΛMˆ,R̂ER, (3.33)
where 0 ≤ Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯CΛ ˆ¯C,R̂ER ≡ Λ ˆ¯B,R̂ER ≤ 1δ . Two effects are collected in (3.33): First, an
increase in the real exchange rate causes a differential of domestic and foreign real interest
rates that prompts the households to alter their net foreign assets. Second, a shift in the
real exchange rate and thus in the ratio of the two national price indices implies a change
in relative money holdings.
(Shift in Demand) Suppose that home and foreign households temporarily prefer home
tradable goods to foreign tradable goods. This shock simply shifts consumption-disposable-
income by the additional labor income ΛDˆI,αˆ = γ since the total production of home private
consumption goods increases by exactly that ratio of tradable goods.
(Federal Transfers among private households) Obviously, changes in federal transfers
among private households of the two member states of the union directly shift the disposable
income without deterioration since they directly enter private households’ budget.
(Intergovernmental Transfers) Intergovernmental transfers change relative public con-
sumption between the two regions as they cannot be directly redistributed to domestic
households through local lump-sum transfers. However, intergovernmental transfers shift
labor income between the regions indirectly by altering the demand for domestic and foreign
non-tradable goods. Note that the two transfers in (3.33) affect consumption-disposable-
income equally as we express all steady state deviations relative to steady state consumption
expenditures. Nevertheless, the two transfers differ with respect to their impact on produc-
tion and thus labor demand as we will see below.
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The important lesson to be learned here is that as both transfers, the federal transfers among
private households and the intergovernmental transfers, and the private wealth adjustments
in response to unanticipated changes in relative prices affect the consumption level equally
through consumption-disposable-income. Thus, to keep the consumption level unaltered,
transfers have to target the wealth adjustments in response to unexpected deviations of
the real exchange rate, Λ
Sˆ,R̂ER
(1 − γ), but not equilibrium net savings. Equilibrium net
savings also include adjustments in wealth due to changes in the consumption level in order
to smooth the consumption path over time.
Production and Employment
In the short-run, employment is completely determined by labor demand since wages are
preset. Labor demand itself is driven by two forces: It is increasing in domestic goods
demand and it is decreasing in labor productivity. Deviations of the employment level are
given by
Lˆ = Yˆ − aˆ. (3.34)
Total home production responds to shocks and policy innovations by
Yˆ =
1
2
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
T̂ oT + ΛYˆ ,αˆαˆ+ ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg Tˆgg + ΛYˆ , ˆThh Tˆhh. (3.35)
(Innovations to the Terms of Trade) Asymmetric productivity shocks affect output in the
short-run only through the effect of the shift in the terms of trades because output markets
are perfectly competitive and wages cannot be adjusted,
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
= Λ
Cˆ,T̂ oT
(1− γ)(1− g¯)− ρ(2− γ)γ(1− g¯)− g¯, (3.36)
where Λ
Cˆ,T̂ oT
= Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
Λ
DˆI,T̂ oT
. We encounter three effects in (3.36): First, as described
above, the innovations to the terms of trade shift domestic consumption-disposable-income
and thus overall domestic consumption by Λ
Cˆ,T̂ oT
. Consequently, the demand for domestic
non-tradable goods changes by its fraction of overall consumption expenditures. Second, the
shift in the terms of trade leads to an expenditure switching effect for the relatively cheaper
tradable good. This is the only effect on tradable goods demand since there is no aggregate
change in the demand for tradable goods in response to changes in aggregate consumption
expenditures as opposed to the case for non-tradable goods. Recall that foreign overall con-
sumption changes by exactly the opposite magnitude of domestic overall consumption. By
assuming that domestic and foreign households prefer domestic and foreign tradable goods
alike, the change in domestic demand for domestic tradable goods offsets the change in for-
eign demand for the domestic tradable good. What remains is the consumption expenditure
switching effect only as this effect is common to both domestic and foreign demand. As the
first two effects stem from the private households reaction, they have to be evaluated by the
initial steady state fraction of private consumption in output (1−g¯). The third effect depicts
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the change in national government consumption. Public consumption changes exactly by
its initial fraction of output, namely g¯, as national budgets must balance.
(Shift in Demand) The preference shocks shift home total production by
ΛYˆ ,αˆ =
(
γ + ΛCˆ,αˆ(1− γ)
)
(1− g¯). (3.37)
Clearly, since α¯γ denotes the fraction of the home tradable good in private consumption, an
increase in that fraction home and abroad changes total production directly by 2(1− g¯)α¯γ.
In addition, this creates a labor income effect which implies an increase in domestic non-
tradable goods consumption depicted by the second term in (3.37).
(Federal Transfers among private households) Federal transfers among private house-
holds affect production only through the change in private consumption,
ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh = ΛCˆ,DˆI(1− γ)(1− g¯). (3.38)
Federal transfers among private households lead to an increase only in the demand for
non-tradable goods. By the same token as the innovations to the terms of trade lead to
no impact of changes in consumption-disposable-income on net tradable goods demand,
federal transfers among households have no impact on the net tradable goods demand.
The net effect on tradable goods demand is zero because households in one region pay the
transfers that households within the other region receive. As a consequence, the effect of
federal transfers vanishes as we reach the full-trade scenario. If γ = 1, half of home private
consumption is produced at home, half of it is imported from abroad. But the same is true
for the foreign households. Since the transfers must balance, these opposing effects cancel
out. Federal ’household to household’ transfers cannot correct output.
(Intergovernmental Transfers) The important difference between federal transfers among
households and intergovernmental transfers is the direct effect of changing public consump-
tion on demand, namely (1− g¯):
ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg = ΛCˆ,DˆI(1− γ)(1− g¯) + (1− g¯). (3.39)
Since production is completely demand determined in the short-run, intergovernmental
transfers shift production and employment in the first instance. But as changes in produc-
tion and employment result in changes in labor income and thus consumption-disposable-
income, the effect of private consumption deviations comes in addition. This has two im-
mediate consequences. First, recall that both transfers are expressed as deviations relative
to the steady state consumption expenditures. It follows that intergovernmental transfers
require a smaller transfer volume to achieve the same correction in output and employment
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fluctuations. Second, in sharp contrast to federal transfers among private households, inter-
governmental transfers never lose bite to correct demand. Thus, even if we are in the full
trade scenario, intergovernmental transfers can still correct output and employment because
they directly affect demand.
Net Foreign Asset Positions
The adjustment of net foreign asset positions can be obtained from the adjustment in con-
sumption and production. The current account imbalances are solely motivated by the
changes of private households’ savings. To prevent us from repeating the effects, we skip
the discussion.
3.2.3 Welfare
We analyze the life-time welfare effects according to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and concen-
trate on the terms depending on consumption and employment. For simplicity we assume
that households only barely utilize liquidity services from holding real money balances and
take χ in (3.5) to be sufficiently small.8 In our analysis of the different federal fiscal ar-
rangements, we approximate home residents’ life-time utility as
dUR =
(
Cˆ − L¯2Lˆ
)
+
β
1− β
(
ˆ¯C − L¯2 ˆ¯L
)
. (3.40)
In order to see the welfare implications of stabilizing consumption and production, and thus
employment, we rewrite (3.40) as
dUR =
(
1 +
β
1− β
(
1− L¯2Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ
)
Cˆ − L¯2Lˆ. (3.41)
While current employment fluctuations affect life-time utility only contemporaneously on
consumption and employment, consumption fluctuations disturb residents’ welfare via three
channels: Besides the direct contemporaneous effect, the desire to smooth consumption over
time prompts a change of future consumption level and subsequently a change in employ-
ment. From (3.41) follows immediately that welfare fluctuations are stabilized and thus
perfect insurance is provided if and only if both consumption fluctuations and employment
fluctuations are deleted. Furthermore, since we only consider asymmetric shocks without ag-
gregate risk, CˆMU = YˆMU = LˆMU = 0, foreign welfare fluctuations follow dU∗,R = −dUR.
As a consequence, using a second-order approximation, the sum of national welfare devia-
tions reads
dUMU,R = dUR + dU∗,R = −
(
1 +
β
1− β
(
1− L¯2Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ
)
Cˆ2 − L¯2Lˆ2. (3.42)
8Obviously, if we had motivated money holding by a cash-in-advance constraint, this restriction would
have been obsolete. In the limit, if χ→ 0, we enter a cashless economy as recently employed in open economy
models by Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Benigno (2004).
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Thus, from a union-wide perspective it is indeed optimal to completely delete fluctuations
in consumption and employment resulting from unanticipated demand and productivity
shocks.9
3.3 Federal Fiscal Arrangements
We now turn to the policy analysis itself. The aim of this analysis is to compare different
arrangements of fiscal federal transfers whose function is to stabilize fluctuations of con-
sumption and employment within the member states of the monetary union. It is useful for
reasons of comparison to consider first the stabilization of demand shocks and to analyze
then stabilization of productivity shocks.
3.3.1 Stabilizing Demand Shocks
Demand shocks disturb the composition of private tradable goods consumption. They have
no impact on current prices because wages are fixed. Nevertheless, a shift in demand affects
overall consumption level since it changes income disposable on consumption by changing
labor income.
Stabilizing Consumption
As the two transfer schemes affect consumption-disposable-income in (3.31) equally, con-
sumption stabilization require identical transfer volumes
Tˆhh = Tˆgg = −γαˆ. (3.43)
A shift in demand towards home tradable goods increases home households’ labor income
by γαˆ. Both transfers simply redistribute this income effect. Nevertheless, the two transfer
schemes differ with respect to their effects on employment. The federal transfers among
households lead to fluctuations in employment by
LˆThh = (1− g¯)γαˆ. (3.44)
The federal transfers among households neglect the direct effect of changes in demand
due to the contemporaneously different composition of tradable goods consumption. Only
consumption-disposable-income has been redistributed and thus the overall consumption
level is stabilized.
9Note that it is in principle constrained optimal to delete consumption and employment fluctuations as
monopolistic distortions on labor markets still prevail. However, as it is standard in the New Keynesian
literature, this could be corrected by redistributing proportional labor income taxes lump-sum.
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Since the intergovernmental transfers work through goods markets, they redistribute income
by redistributing demand and earnings. As a consequence, we get
LˆTgg = 0. (3.45)
As opposed to the direct transfers among private households, the intergovernmental transfers
correct fluctuations through the change in demand for non-tradable goods. To correct
demand directly means to correct labor income and hence consumption-disposable-income.
Overall fluctuations are thus stabilized through transfers between national fiscal authorities.
As a result, the intergovernmental transfers provide both member states perfect insurance
against demand shocks in the monetary union.
Stabilizing Employment
Since the above also holds true for stabilizing consumption, it must be true for stabilizing
employment. We have that
Tˆgg = −γαˆ. (3.46)
Transfers among households are
Tˆhh = Tˆgg − (1− g¯)(1− γ)ΛCˆ,DˆI
γαˆ. (3.47)
Consequently, transfers among private households cannot stabilize both consumption and
production fluctuations at the same time. Moreover, these transfers face the problem that
for states to be strongly engaged in trade, the volume of the transfer may grow very large.
As direct transfers to households are always spent on domestic as well as on foreign tradable
goods, they flow back as additional demand. The implication is that by ever redistributing
the additional earnings, the transfers among households amplify the effect of demand shocks.
Production and employment cannot effectively be stabilized.10
Perfect Insurance through Federal Transfer Scheme
From the above we can directly deduce that intergovernmental transfers alone provide per-
fect insurance. We summarize these findings in our first result:
Proposition 3.1 In case of preference shocks that shift demand from the tradable good
produced in one region to the tradable good produced in the other region, transfers between
fiscal authorities can always stabilize fluctuations in consumption, output and employment at
the same time. Intergovernmental transfers thus eliminate welfare fluctuations and provide
perfect insurance.
10It is important to qualify this statement against the background of our assumption that wages are
temporarily fixed. The amplifying effect of federal transfers among households implies that the impact
of small demand shocks becomes too large so that both the assumption of fixed wages and thus demand
determined labor supply as well as the accuracy of linearization are no longer justifiable.
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3.3.2 Stabilizing Productivity Shocks
Let us next study the stabilization of productivity shocks. As we only consider completely
asymmetric productivity shocks, we set aˆ = −aˆ∗. Due to sticky wages, productivity shocks
alter marginal costs of producing tradable and nontradable goods and cause a shift in the
terms of trade by T̂ oT = −2aˆ.
Stabilizing Consumption
By the reason that the two transfers affect private consumption identically, they coincide in
volume if they target consumption fluctuations. We get
Tˆhh = Tˆgg =
(
(ρ(2− γ)− 1) γ + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER(1− γ)
)
(−aˆ). (3.48)
In order to stabilize the consumption level, both transfers correct the change in consumption-
disposable-income that is due to the shift in productivity and relative prices. In contrast
to demand shocks, however, transfers have to redistribute the income effect due to the
change in consumption prices and the savings response to changes in the real exchange rate,
too. This comes in addition to the labor income effect whose influence on consumption-
disposable-income works equivalent to the effect of a demand shock. To gain more insight
about what these transfers do to stabilize consumption fluctuations, it proves useful to look
at the two polar cases of full economic integration and no economic integration at all. In
case of full economic integration, when γ = 1, the consumer price levels in the two regions
coincide as preferences do. As a consequence, domestic and foreign households experience
the same incentive to adjust wealth in response to price level deviations because the real
interest rates coincide. In equilibrium, no direct adjustment to changes in prices occur.11
Furthermore, the income effect of consumer price deviations vanishes since the changes in
domestic and foreign prices offset each other. Transfers then redistribute only the changes in
labor income. In case of no economic integration, when γ = 0, a shift in the terms of trade
induces the households only to adjust current consumption. In equilibrium, there is no effect
on savings at all, neither on net foreign assets nor on money holding. The reason has to
be seen in two completely different effects: First, households do not adjust their net foreign
assets, and second, as no foreign assets are traded, and neither are goods, the balance of
payments implies that money holdings remain unchanged. Since the labor-leisure trade-off
11Changes in net foreign assets as well as changes in money holdings occur then in equilibrium only as to
smooth the consumption deviations that are induced by the labor income effect. In case of Cobb-Douglas
preferences over tradable goods, ie. ρ = 1, the deviation in consumption-disposable-income is zero because
the expenditure switching effect exactly offsets the labor income effect. No adjustments in savings are made
whatsoever the shock to the terms of trade is. Cole and Obstfeld (1991) were the first to make the point that
financial markets are redundant if preferences over goods are Cobb-Douglas. More recently, the redundancy
was employed in the context of NOEM for instance by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and more prominently by
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001).
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is not binding in the short-run, households have to accommodate their consumption exactly
to the change in prices.12 Consequently, stabilizing consumption then requires the transfers
to relieve the tension of money holdings caused by the balance of payments.
Recall from (3.32) that the sign of the savings response to changes in the real exchange rate
is always positive and that the sign of the net income effect depends on whether domestic
and foreign tradable goods are substitutes or complements in consumption.13 If tradable
goods are substitutes in consumption, a positive shock to domestic productivity that lowers
the terms of trade causes a positive net income effect. The increase in labor income due to
the expenditure switching of tradable goods and the gain of the consumption price effect is
larger than the loss in labor income due to the drop in labor demand directly caused by the
shock. Consequently, the first term in (3.48) is positive, too. Since the transfers redistribute
the effects on consumption-disposable-income, transfers are always negative if any trade in
goods occurs or zero otherwise. In contrast, if the two tradable goods are complements,
the surprising case might occur that the region hit by a positive productivity shock receives
transfers from the region hit by a negative shock. This becomes most obvious in the full
trade scenario where savings effects are shut off. Complementarity implies that domestic
households respond to the negative change in labor income by reducing consumption of both
domestic and foreign tradable goods. Foreign households respond to their positive change
in earnings by increasing consumption of both domestic and foreign tradable goods. As
a consequence, the expenditure switching to the domestic tradable good never offsets the
change in home income. Equivalently, the foreign net income effect is never negative. Thus,
to stabilize consumption the ’unlucky’ region that has perceived a negative productivity
shock has to pay the transfers. In summary we arrive at
Proposition 3.2 In case of productivity shocks, stabilizing consumption requires the two
transfer schemes to be the same size. Transfers are always negative for a region having
perceived a positive productivity shock if goods are substitutes. Transfers might be positive if
goods are complements and regions are close to full economic integration.
To see the difference between the two transfer schemes, we have to consider employment.
Employment changes under federal transfers among households by
LˆThh = (1− ρ(2− γ)γ) (1− g¯)(−aˆ). (3.49)
12Note that ΛCˆ,DˆIΛDˆI,T̂ oT |γ=0 = −1.
13Two goods are said to be substitutes in consumption if the marginal utility from consuming one good is
decreasing in consumption of the other good. The two goods are said to be complements if the marginal utility
is increasing. A sufficient condition for substitutability is that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. In our log-utility case it is the case if ρ > 1. If
ρ < 1, then the two goods are complements in consumption. See, e.g., Svensson (1985) and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001).
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As the federal transfers among private households correct only the shift in national con-
sumption levels, the immediate impact of productivity shocks on labor demand, namely the
expenditure switching effect and the change in public consumption on goods demand as well
as the direct effect of the productivity shock on labor demand itself remain.
The reaction of employment when the intergovernmental transfers are implemented can be
stated as
LˆTgg =
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1− γ)(1− g¯)(−aˆ). (3.50)
Since the transfers are the same size, the resulting employment fluctuations differ exactly
by the direct transfer induced shift in public expenditures evaluated in terms of private
consumption. The direct shift in public expenditures, however, has two effects: First,
as it was the case when stabilizing demand shocks, it completely offsets the direct labor
demand effects. Second, it induces a new source of employment fluctuations, namely the
redistributed price income effect and the savings response to changes in the real interest
rate. The ranking of employment fluctuations implied by the two transfers is ambiguous.
In particular, in case of trade autarky, ie. no economic integration at all, households would
like to adjust money holdings but the balance of payments prevents money flows. Transfers
that stabilize consumption fluctuations compensate for the desired flows in money holdings.
But since intergovernmental transfers have to correct the desired money flows through a
change in labor income, this additional element in national public demand for non-tradable
goods leads to an additional fluctuation in employment. Thus, intergovernmental transfers
lead to larger employment fluctuations than federal transfers among private households. In
the full trade scenario, households do not adjust wealth in response to the change in the real
exchange rate. The only resulting effects on employment are the direct effects of expenditure
switching, of national public consumption, and of labor productivity. But these direct labor
demand effects are exactly the effects targeted by the intergovernmental transfers so that
no further change in consumption-disposable-income remains. As a result, and reminiscent
of demand shocks, employment is fully stabilized.
Proposition 3.3 In case of productivity shocks, stabilizing consumption fluctuations im-
plies for employment, that transfers between national fiscal authorities dominate federal
transfers among private households if | 1 − ρ(2 − γ)γ |>
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1 − γ). They lead
to smaller fluctuations in employment and in welfare.
The intuition behind this finding is straightforward: Since federal transfers among private
households are incapable to capture the direct labor demand effect, | 1 − ρ(2 − γ)γ |, that
leads to fluctuations in employment, it is the income effect due to changes in consumer
prices and the savings response to changes in the real interest rate,
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1 − γ),
which (in case of intergovernmental transfers) come as an additional source of employment
fluctuation. Thus, intergovernmental transfers dominate transfers among private households
86 Federal Fiscal Transfers in Monetary Unions: A NOEM Approach
as long as the direct labor demand fluctuations are sufficiently high. Note that if the two
regions are relatively closely integrated and the price income and savings effect vanish, the
condition in the proposition above is satisfied.
Stabilizing Employment
We now turn to the analysis of employment stabilization. The transfers among private
households to stabilize employment are
Tˆhh = −
ΛYˆ , ˆToT + 1
ΛCˆ,DˆI(1− γ)(1− g¯)
(−aˆ). (3.51)
In contrast, transfers between the national fiscal authorities look
Tˆgg = −
ΛYˆ , ˆToT + 1(
ΛCˆ,DˆI(1− γ) + 1
)
(1− g¯)
(−aˆ). (3.52)
Both transfers have to offset the effect of productivity shocks on private consumption lev-
els, the expenditure switching effect and the change in national government consumption
as described in (3.36). Furthermore, they have to correct the direct impact of the shift on
labor productivity. Comparing the two transfer schemes yields that they are of equal sign,
but intergovernmental transfers are always smaller than federal transfers among private
households. From (3.31) we know that both transfers affect consumption equally. Neverthe-
less, whether intergovernmental transfers lead to less fluctuations in consumption is again
ambiguous. For federal transfers among households we get
CˆTˆhh =
ρ(2− γ)γ − 1
(1− γ) (−aˆ). (3.53)
As federal transfers redistribute consumption-disposable-income by more than the change in
the national consumption level in order to offset the direct impacts of productivity shocks
on labor demand, an additional source of consumption fluctuations needs to be created.
When the two regions are in trade autarky and no substitution effect matters at all, fluc-
tuations in public consumption following the change in domestic goods prices and the shift
in labor productivity are the only source of private consumption deviations. In the full
trade scenario, we encounter the effect equivalent to demand shocks where transfers among
private households cannot stabilize output and employment. By the expenditure switching
effect, each unit of payment received will be spent proportionately on both domestic and
foreign goods. Since production is completely demand determined, stabilization cannot be
achieved.
Intergovernmental transfers induce consumption to fluctuate by
CˆTˆgg = − (1− Φ)ΛCˆ,DˆI
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1− γ)(−aˆ), (3.54)
where Φ is a constant, 0 < Φ < 1.14 In order to stabilize labor demand fluctuations,
14It is defined as Φ =
Λ
Cˆ,DˆI
(1−γ)
Λ
Cˆ,DˆI
(1−γ)+1 .
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intergovernmental transfers redistribute the direct effects on labor demand as well as the
change in national consumption level induced by the change in consumption-disposable-
income. As intergovernmental transfers directly shift labor demand, these direct effects
are perfectly offset. What remains as consumption fluctuations is the additional shift in
labor income in order to also offset the change in national consumption caused by the
price income effect and the savings response to changes in the real interest rate. It is
important to recognize that the magnitude of consumption fluctuations depends on the net
equilibrium effects of savings and the price income effect. Whereas the emphasis in case
of consumption stabilization lies completely on the response of the change in consumption-
disposable-income, it is of course equilibrium net effect that determine the change in the
consumption level itself.
Proposition 3.4 In case of productivity shocks, stabilizing employment fluctuations implies
that transfers between national fiscal authorities are always of lower volume than transfers
among private households. Regarding consumption fluctuations, transfers between the na-
tional fiscal authorities dominate transfers among private households if | ρ(2 − γ)γ − 1 |
>Φ
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1− γ). They lead to smaller fluctuations in consumption and in welfare.
To gain more intuition, let us again discuss the two extremes of economic integration. In
trade autarky, there are no savings. As we know from the discussion about the impacts of
terms of trade innovations on production, a productivity shock in autarky leads to an equal
increase in production. The fall in prices leads households and national fiscal authorities
to adjust their consumption by exactly the same magnitude. But since labor productivity
prompts a one-to-one decrease in labor demand in addition to the goods demand effect,
employment doesn’t change. As a consequence, transfers are needless. In the full trade
scenario, there are neither savings on account of deviations in relative prices and the real
interest rate nor an income effect due to changes in consumption prices. The transfers have
to redistribute changes in labor demand due to changes in goods demand in addition to the
shift in labor productivity only. Intergovernmental transfers do so directly via the goods
markets. Because consumption-disposable-income is altered by changes in labor income,
intergovernmental transfer also implicitly stabilize consumption fluctuations. This case is
again reminiscent of the intergovernmental transfer stabilizing demand shocks.
Perfect Insurance through Federal Transfer Scheme
By now the differences in working and effectiveness of the two transfer schemes have be-
come clear. As we can deduce from the change in utility in (3.41), a transfer scheme that
stabilizes consumption and employment also stabilizes welfare. In this sense this transfer
scheme provides perfect insurance. Because neither transfer can fully stabilize consumption,
production and employment at the same time, none of the two transfers generally provides
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perfect insurance alone. The differences between the two transfers, however, indicates that
a combination of both will do.
Proposition 3.5 In case of productivity shocks, we can find a combination of transfers
between the fiscal authorities and among private households such that consumption and
employment fluctuations are fully stabilized. Furthermore, fluctuations in welfare are ex-
tinguished and perfect insurance is provided.
The combined use of transfers to stabilize welfare fluctuations require that intergovernmental
transfers correct the direct labor demand effect induced by the expenditure switching, the
change in national public demand by balancing national budgets, and the shift in labor
productivity, namely
Tˆgg = (ρ(2− γ)γ − 1) (−aˆ), (3.55)
whereas the direct transfers among households correct the shift in consumption-disposable-
income caused by the savings response to changes in the real interest rate and changes in
consumer prices, ie.
Tˆhh = −ΛDˆI,T̂ oT (−aˆ)− Tˆgg =
(
Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER + 1
)
(1− γ)(−aˆ). (3.56)
The insight of how the combination of federal transfers among households and intergov-
ernmental transfers works is as follows: In combination, the sum of the two transfers must
delete any change in consumption-disposable-income. This implies that the consumption
level is stabilized. The division of transfers depend on the different working in the goods
markets. Since the two transfers jointly correct deviations of the demand for non-tradable
goods induced by changes in consumption-disposable-income, the direct impact of intergov-
ernmental transfers on goods markets enables the correction of the fluctuations of labor
demand resulting from the expenditure switching effects and the change in national gov-
ernment consumption as well as the direct shift of labor demand caused by the change in
labor productivity. What thus remains to be redistributed by the federal transfers among
households is the change in savings and the income effect due to the change in consumer
prices.
3.4 Conclusion of Chapter 3
The aim of this paper was to study the role of federal fiscal transfers as stabilizers in mone-
tary unions. In particular, we considered two different transfer schemes already proposed by
the MacDougall Report on the feasibility of EMU: A direct transfer among the households
within different member states and an indirect transfer that involves payments between
national fiscal authorities.
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The properties of the two transfers differ with respect to their transmission. While direct
transfers among private households enter households’ budget directly and thus affect the
allocation through the households’ optimal choices, intergovernmental transfers affect allo-
cations through the non-tradable goods markets. This implies a very important distinction
between the effectiveness of the two transfers.
For the analysis of different federal transfer schemes we set up a dynamic general equilibrium
model with preset nominal wages. The monetary union is exposed to unanticipated tem-
porary asymmetric shocks. Specifically, we analyzed technology shocks that alter aggregate
national labor productivity and subsequently prices as well as preference shocks that shift
the demand from tradable goods produced in one region to tradable goods produced in the
other region. This allowed us to revisit the example Mundell used in his seminal work.
The key insight of our analysis is that economic fluctuations can be best targeted by the
type of transfer that directly affects the source of these fluctuations. To be more precise,
consider first a shift in demand. Prices remain unaltered because wages are preset. The
only disturbance thus stems from the shift in production and thereby labor income. As
we have seen, channelling back the shift in demand through intergovernmental transfers
that directly affect goods demand leads to perfect insurance. On the contrary, technology
shocks lead to changes in labor productivity and subsequently alter prices and thereby the
terms of trade. Now we encounter two effects. First, a change in productivity and the
terms of trade leads to a labor income effect. Thus, similarly to the preference shock, labor
demand is directly affected and can be targeted by the intergovernmental transfer. Second,
a change in prices and thus in the real interest rates leads to changes in savings and to a
consumer price effect that both change consumption-disposable-income and following pri-
vate goods demand. Since federal transfers among households redistribute directly through
private budgets, they are more suited to stabilize fluctuations than intergovernmental trans-
fers. In fact, none of the two transfers alone can stabilize national fluctuations induced by
productivity shocks. An adequate combination of federal transfers among households and
intergovernmental transfers, however, deletes fluctuations in employment and consumption.
Welfare fluctuations are completely avoided and in this sense the combination of the two
transfers provide perfect insurance against asymmetric productivity shocks to both member
states.
Our results give a clear notion of the desirability of a federal fiscal arrangement consisting of
federal transfers among private households and intergovernmental transfers among national
fiscal authorities as proposed in the MacDougall Report since it can stabilize economic
impacts of asymmetric shocks. As such, this federal insurance scheme reduces fluctuations
and in particular cyclical unemployment within the member states. As a consequence, a
federal fiscal insurance arrangement definitely remedies potential tensions among member
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states.
Concluding Remarks
In the academic literature on international coordination of macroeconomic policies, two
striking observations can be made: First, the paradigm in the literature on monetary
policy coordination is that gains from coordination are fairly small. Monetary policy is
considered to be concerned with the stabilization of macroeconomic fluctuations only.
Gains from policy coordination arise then from the inability of a certain exchange rate
system to react appropriately to asymmetric shocks or from preventing countries from the
use of stabilization policies to strategically manipulate the terms of trade. Second, the
analysis of international monetary policy coordination and the analysis of fiscal policy
coordination in strategic setups are effectively uncoupled. That is, the question of how the
international coordination of only a part of national macroeconomic policies does change
the strategic behavior of the independently conducted remaining part of national policies
has been largely ignored.
This dissertation contributes to these observations and comes up with two important
results: First, in Chapter 1 I demonstrate that gains from international monetary policy
cooperation can be substantial when policymakers jointly prevent structural inefficiencies
in the supply of labor and hence production arising from strategic considerations rather
than coordinate the stabilization of exogenously driven fluctuations. I demonstrate that
the welfare gains from stabilizing macroeconomic fluctuations are generically quite limited
because they are of second-order whereas the gains from preventing strategically motivated
conflicts over inflation targets are of first-order. The second contribution presented in
Chapter 2 is that international policy coordination requires to include both monetary as
well as fiscal policy because both sides dispose of effective policy instruments that enable
the strategic manipulation of the country’s terms of trade. Hence, the coordination of
only one part of national macroeconomic policies through an international agreement
or institutional framework still leaves room for national authorities to still unilaterally
manipulate the terms of trade by means of other uncoordinated policy instruments. As a
result, the first two chapters yield a clear proposition: Gains from policy coordination can
be substantial as they are of first-order, but policy coordination must in principle include
all instruments that can be used by national authorities to unilaterally manipulate the
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country’s terms of trade. In Chapter 3, I analyze the properties of a specific form of policy
coordination: National monetary policies are merged within a monetary union and national
fiscal policies are coordinated by means of a federal fiscal transfer scheme. By giving up the
exchange rate flexibility, the member countries of the monetary union sacrifice an effective
policy instrument that can be used to switch expenditures between member countries in
order to offset economic shocks that have adverse impacts on these countries. The built-in
fiscal transfer system collects taxes from some member countries and pays transfers to
other member countries in order to alleviate the economic consequences of adverse shocks.
The key result of Chapter 3 is that an appropriate chosen system of federal fiscal transfers
indeed provides perfect insurance.
The relevance of these results can be best highlighted in the context of the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). According to the analysis in Chapter 1, gains from
the convergence of the member countries’ national inflation targets down to a common
inflation target spelled out by the European Central Bank of about 2 % are of first-order.
As the analysis predicts, losses implied by the supposed increase in the fluctuation of
macroeconomic variables due to the lack of national monetary policy instruments as well as
the exchange rate flexibility are rather of second-order. Consequently, given that national
fiscal stances didn’t respond in a strategic manner to the formation of EMU itself, there is
a - theoretical - prospect of substantial gains to the member countries that even might be
larger than the suspected losses of giving up the independent national monetary policy.
To ensure that member countries really seize the gains from forming the monetary union,
however, the EMU also requires the coordination of a presumably wide range of fiscal
policies which might in principle be used to strategically manipulate the individual
country’s terms of trade. Actually, there is already a special form of national fiscal policy
coordination established within the EMU. Europes fiscal rules are well known, but they
solely focus on national budgetary deficits and public debts. The Maastricht Treaty (as
implemented by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)) requires the member countries to
keep budget deficit below 3 percent of GDP and the government debt to not exceed 60
percent of GDP. The results of Chapter 2 indicate the requirement of the coordination of
other fiscal policy instruments including labor income taxes as well as taxes on consumption
expenditures, too. Whereas the result of strategic shifts of national fiscal policy conduct in
response to the formation of the EMU itself is rather new, the policy implications are not.
In fact, in his report, Delors (1989) recommended not only the binding limits on national
budget deficits and public debts but also the coordination of national fiscal policies. In
contrast to the strategic aspects raised in Chapter 2, his concern revolved around the lack
of exchange rate flexibility which would cause tensions within the monetary union that may
even lead to a breakdown of the union if no adequate federal fiscal institutions provide the
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member states of the EMU with insurance against asymmetric shocks among the member
states. As demonstrated in Chapter 3, a built-in system of federal fiscal transfers among
member states is indeed able to perfectly insure the member states against adverse shocks.
The results in Chapters 2 and 3 put Delors’ recommendation into a new light as they make
a good case for the coordination of national fiscal policy conduct going beyond the SGP.
Nevertheless, with regard to the EMU, this thesis only takes a first step in the direction of
the analysis of the need for more fiscal policy coordination in Europe. On the one hand,
the results in Chapter 3 suggest that in the European context an important role could be
attributed to a system of federal fiscal transfers. In particular, two important questions are
worth to be answered: First, in addition to its capability to provide perfect insurance to the
member states, does there exist an additional role of federal fiscal transfers to effectively
correct incentives of national fiscal authorities to behave strategically? Second, and more
relevant against the background of the ongoing controversy over the pros and cons of SGP,
does an adequate system of federal fiscal transfers render the deficit rules redundant? On the
other hand, future research must identify the empirical importance of the strategic conduct
of national fiscal policies in the EMU. In particular, the central empirical question is whether
Europe has indeed experienced a shift in national fiscal policy conduct as theoretical results
in Chapter 2 predict. As the propositions made in this thesis would call for major political
changes in Europe, it is indispensable to thoroughly determine the empirical relevance of the
underlying game-theoretic arguments. Moreover, the theoretical postulation of a European
federal fiscal transfer mechanism necessitates the quantitative assessment of different transfer
schemes. These empirical and quantitative assessments only can form the basis of proper
recommendation of federal fiscal policy coordination in Europe through an appropriately
designed federal fiscal transfer scheme for the EMU.
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Appendix
A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Model Specification
Technology and Production The technologies to produce the tradable and the non-
tradable goods are identical within the region:
Yj,s = As
(∫ 1
0
Lij,s
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
, (A.1)
where θ > 1, for j ∈ {HT,HN}. The aggregate productivity of labor As is subject to
shocks. Foreigners share the same aggregation technology but with a different productivity
level. Factor cost minimization implies
Lij,s =
1
As
(
W is
Ws
)−θ
Yj,s (A.2)
to be the optimal demand for labor input of quality i at wage W is and an overall wage level
Ws =
(∫ 1
0
W is
(1−θ)
di
) 1
1−θ
. (A.3)
The associated aggregate demand for a specific type of labor is
Lis =
(
W iH,s
WH,s
)−θ
Ls, (A.4)
where Ls is Home aggregate demand for labor. By perfectly competitive goods markets the
prices for Home tradable and non-tradable goods are
PH,s = PN,s =
Ws
As
. (A.5)
Total aggregate output of the Home tradable good is YHT,s and of the Home non-tradable
good YHN,s. For the Foreign region the corresponding expressions apply.
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Households The household’s problem is to maximize its expected lifetime utility
U it = Et
∑∞
s=t β
s−tuis, where (A.6)
uis =
(
Cis
1−ρ−1
1−ρ − 1νLis
ν
)
with Cis =
CiT,s
γ
CiHN,s
1−γ
γγ(1−γ)(1−γ) , and C
i
T,s = 2C
i
HT,s
1
2CiFT,s
1
2 ,
and 0 < β < 1, ρ > 0, ν ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, by deciding over bond and cash holdings,
consumption, and their monopolistic wages subject to the period asset market constraint
M is +B
i
s ≤ Wis +Xis ∀s ≥ t, (A.7a)
the period cash constraints
PsC
i
s ≤ M is ∀s ≥ t, (A.7b)
the law of motion for nominal wealth
Wis+1 = M
i
s +RsB
i
s − PsCis +W isLis + T is ∀s ≥ t, (A.7c)
and subject to the demand for their specific type of labor
Lis =
(
W is
Ws
)−θ
Ls ∀s ≥ t. (A.7d)
Optimal Decisions Individual optimization yields for any person i the following compo-
sition of the Home real consumption index between the tradable commodities index and the
non-tradable good
CT,s = γ
(
PT,s
Ps
)−1
Cs, and CHN,s = (1− γ)
(
PH,s
Ps
)−1
Cs, (A.8)
and between Home and Foreign tradable commodities
CHT,s =
1
2
(
PH,s
PT,s
)−1
CT,s, and CFT,s =
1
2
(
PF,s
PT,s
)−1
CT,s. (A.9)
The corresponding Home consumption-based price indices are
Ps = P
γ
T,sP
(1−γ)
HN,s and PT,s = P
1
2
H,sP
1
2
F,s. (A.10)
Next, let κ and ι denote the Lagrange-multipliers on the asset market constraint (A.7a) and
the cash constraint (A.7b), respectively. Then the optimality conditions for all states and
all periods s read
ιs + βEsκs+1 =
uCis
Ps
(A.11)
for the optimal consumption,
κs = ιs + βEsκs+1 (A.12)
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for optimal cash holdings, and
κs = βRsEsκs+1 (A.13)
for optimal bond holdings. Furthermore, by the complementary slackness of the cash con-
straints, condition (A.7b) is binding if ιs > 0. Making use of the optimality conditions for
consumption and cash holdings which must hold in all dates and for all states yields
κs =
uCis
Ps
and κs+1 =
uCis+1
Ps+1
. (A.14)
As a result, optimal bond holdings condition then implies the standard Euler equation,
namely
1
Rs
= βEs
((
Cs+1
Cs
)−ρ Ps(1 + tC,s)
Ps+1(1 + tC,s+1)
)
. (A.15)
Note that the nominal interest rate relates to optimal cash holdings via the opportunity
costs of holding an interest free asset. To be more precise, optimal cash holdings (A.12)
together with optimal bond holdings imply
ιs
κs
= 1− 1
Rs
. (A.16)
Thus, ιs > 0 holds true if and only if Rs > 1. In the following, the assumption is made that
Rs > 1 but reaches 1 arbitrarily close (compare also Adao et al. (2003)). In the main text it
is therefore still written as Rs = 1. As a consequence, consumption is implicitly determined
by household’s cash holdings.
The optimal wage is constrained to be set one period in advance, ie. the money wage in
period s is determined by
Es−1
[
uLisL
i
s +
θ − 1
θ
W isL
i
sβEsκs+1
]
= 0. (A.17)
The condition on optimal bond holdings (A.13) and (A.14) yield
Es−1
[
uLisL
i
s +
θ − 1
θ
1
Rs
W isL
i
suCis
Ps
]
= 0. (A.18)
Solving for the preset nominal wage level then results in the condition as stated in the main
text.
Market Clearing and Ex Post Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the markets for tradable and non-tradable goods must clear. For the Home
tradable good we thus have that total production YH,s must meet the sum of total Home
demand for the Home tradable good, CH,s, and total Foreign demand of the Home tradable
good, C∗H,s, i.e.
YHT,s = CHT,s + C∗HT,s and Y
∗
FT,s = CFT,s + C
∗
FT,s. (A.19)
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We can substitute the optimal fraction of total consumption expenditures that is allotted to
consumption of the Home tradable good in (A.8) and (A.9). Total Home and Foreign pro-
duction of tradable goods in terms of overall Home and Foreign tradable goods consumption
are
PH,sYHT,s =
1
2
PT,sCT,s +
1
2
PT,sC
∗
T,s and P
∗
F,sY
∗
FT,s =
1
2
PT,sCT,s +
1
2
PT,sC
∗
T,s,(A.20)
respectively. Thus, the ratio of domestic and Foreign sale revenues is
PH,sYHT,s = PF,sYFT,s. (A.21)
Put differently, nominal trade must always be balanced. Observe that in equilibrium with
identical households no net trade in bonds can occur, ie.
Bis = B
j
s = 0 and B
i∗
s = B
j∗
s = 0 ∀s, i, j, i 6= j. (A.22)
Thus, all nominal wealth is in cash holdings, ie. Ws = Ms−1 and W∗s = M∗s−1. Using the
aggregate version of the law of motion for wealth an plugging in the government’s budget
constraints, one ends up with PsCs = WsLs = PH,sYs which is equivalent to PT,sCT,s +
PH,sCHN,s = PH,s(YHT,s + YHN,s). Together with the market clearing for domestic non-
tradables, PT,sCT,s = PH,sYH,s, and its Foreign equivalent yields PT,sCT,s = P ∗T,sC
∗
T,s. Since
the law of one price holds for Home and Foreign tradable goods, PPP holds for Home and
Foreign tradable goods baskets. Hence,
CT,s = C∗T,s (A.23)
If one expresses overall consumption expenditures in terms of tradable consumption, ie.
Zs = PsPT,sCs, we can use the optimal division of tradable and non-tradable consumption
goods to find
Zs =
PsCs
PT,s
= CHT,s +
PH,s
PT,s
CHN,s =
(
1 +
PH,sCHN,s
PT,sCHT,s
)
CHT,s. (A.24)
Recall that CHN,sCHT,s =
(1−γ)
γ
PT,s
PH,s
. Thus the overall consumption expenditure expressed in
terms of tradable goods is
Zs =
PsCs
PT,s
=
(
1 +
(1− γ)
γ
)
CT,s =
1
γ
CT,s. (A.25)
The Foreign counterpart is Z∗s =
P ∗s
P ∗T,s
C∗s =
1
γC
∗
T,s. Then, together with (A.23), the equilib-
rium ratio of overall consumption expenditures in terms of tradable is unity, ie.
Zs = Z∗s . (A.26)
In order to identify the periods nominal exchange rate, one only needs to take the ratio of
Home and Foreign nominal consumption spending (cash-in-advance constraint):
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Ms
M∗s
=
PsCs
P ∗C∗
=
Zs
Z∗s
PT,s
EP ∗T,s
Es = Es. (A.27)
Zs can now be solved for by the product of Home and Foreign aggregate consumption
spending. By the definition of the price indices and the equilibrium goods prices it follows
that Zs =
Aw,s
Ww,s
Mw,s. As it turns out to be more convenient to express the equilibrium
allocation in terms of the terms of trade ToTs rather than the nominal exchange rate, we
summarize the results as follows
Zs =
Aw,s
Ww,s
Mw,s and ToTs =
(
Wd,s
Ad,sMd,s
)2
. (A.28)
With the levels of Zs and Es the equilibrium is uniquely determined. It easy to compute
the country specific levels of consumption, output and labor by means of the definition of
Zs and the aggregate budget constraints. This is left to the reader. The resulting allocation
is summarized in Table 1 in the main text. Note that equilibrium as determined by the
two equations in (A.28) is true irrespective of whether wages are flexible or not. In case of
flexible wages, however, the equilibrium wages can be directly plugged in and this results
to the expression in the main text. Easiest to calculate the flexible wage equilibrium levels
of Zs and ToTs is to use the equations (A.32) and (A.33) in the following section where
the explicit equilibrium distribution is derived. Note that when wage are flexible, the two
conditions have to hold contemporaneously for all instances. The expectations operators
drop out. The explicit calculation is left to the reader
A.2 The Explicit Distribution of the Equilibrium Allocation
In this section, the explicit distribution of the equilibrium allocation is calculated. First,
I calculate the expected log-levels of Z and ToT . The second step is to calculate the
endogenous variance and covariance terms. Thereafter, I develop the expression of the
objectives, ie. Home and Foreign expected period utilities, in terms of the closed-form
solution. The derivations are carried out for the case of sticky wages only because the case
of flexible wages is actually implicitly covered in that derivation. Because the single steps
should be clear by then, the explicit calculation of the equilibrium distribution in case of
flexible wages is left to the reader.
Calculating E(z) and E(tot)
Home and Foreign equilibrium preset wages can be used to calculate the expected log-levels
of Z and ToT in terms of expected levels of exogenous variables and in terms of endogenous
and exogenous variances and covariances. Home and Foreign optimal preset wages are set
according to
W =
θ
θ − 1R
E (Lν)
E
(
L
PCρ
) and W ∗ = θ
θ − 1R
∗ E (L∗
ν)
E
(
L∗
P ∗C∗ρ
) , (A.29)
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where it is already used that w.l.o.g. R and R∗ are non-stochastic. Aggregate labor demand
can be written as
L =
1
A
(YH + YN ) =
Y
A
. (A.30)
The aggregate output level Y determines also the national aggregate budget constraint
PC = PHY . Plugging the equilibrium output Y = ZToT−
1
2 into the equilibrium wage level
yields
W =
θ
θ − 1R
E
((
Y
A
)ν)
E
(
Y
A
PCρ
) = θ
θ − 1R
E
((
ZToT−
1
2
A
)ν)
E
(
Z(1−ρ)ToT−
1
2
(1−γ)(1−ρ) 1
W
) . (A.31)
Home equilibrium wage setting then implies
1 =
θ
θ − 1R
E
((
1
AZToT
− 1
2
)ν)
E
(
Z(1−ρ)ToT−
1
2
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
) . (A.32)
The Foreign equilibrium wages setting reads
1 =
θ
θ − 1R
∗ E
((
1
A∗ZToT
1
2
)ν)
E
(
Z(1−ρ)ToT
1
2
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
) , (A.33)
where Z∗ = Z has already been used. Effectively, there are thus two equations in two
unknowns, Z and ToT . By the joint log-normal distribution of the equilibrium allocation,
E(z) = µz and E(tot) = µtot can be derived by using (A.32) and (A.33) and explicitly
solving for the log expressions of the expected values.15 After some algebra, the Home and
Foreign wage setting in logs yield for E(z) = µz and E(tot) = µtot in matrix notation
(
−X 12Y
−X − 12Y
)(
E(z)
E(tot)
)
=
(
K
K∗
)
. (A.34)
15As a reminder: Suppose that the variable Y is log-normally distributed, ie. Y ∼ logN (µy, σ2). This
means that the log of Y , log Y = y is logY ≡ y ∼ N (µy, σ2) with EY = eµ+σ
2
2 . Moreover, if X and Y are
jointly log-normal, ie. (
X
Y
)
∼ logN
((
µx
µy
)
,
(
σ2x σxy
σyx σ
2
y
))
,
where by symmetry σxy = σyx. We then have that
EXY = e(µx+µy)+
1
2 (σ
2
x+σ
2
y+2σxy)
= eµx+
1
2σ
2
xeµy+
1
2σ
2
yeσxy
= EXEY eσxy .
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where X = ν − (1− ρ), Y = ν − (1− ρ)(1− γ), and where
K = r + ln
θ
θ − 1 − E(aw)
+
ν2
2
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
+
1
2
[(
ν2 − (1− ρ)2)σ2z + 14 (ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ)2)σ2tot
]
−1
2
(
ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ))σz,tot − ν22 [2 (σz,aw + σz,ad)− (σtot,aw + σtot,ad)] ,
and
K∗ = r∗ + ln
θ
θ − 1 − E(aw)
+
ν2
2
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
+
1
2
[(
ν2 − (1− ρ)2)σ2z + 14 (ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ)2)σ2tot
]
+
1
2
(
ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ))σz,tot − ν22 [2 (σz,aw − σz,ad) + (σtot,aw − σtot,ad)] .
By Cramer’s Rule, one gets
E(z) = − 1
2X (K +K
∗) and E(tot) =
1
Y (K −K
∗) .
It is easily verified that
(K +K∗) = (r + r∗) + 2 log θθ−1 + ν
2
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
+
(
ν2 − (1− ρ)2)σ2z
+14
(
ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ)2)σ2tot − ν2 (2σz,aw − σtot,ad) ,
and
(K −K∗) = (r − r∗)− (ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ))σz,tot − ν2 (2σz,ad − σtot,aw) ,
where the assumption that E(aw) = 0 has already been exploited. Note that this assumption
is of no other purpose or importance than to simplify the algebra. Hence, plugging (K+K∗)
and (K −K∗) into the solutions to E(z) and E(tot) yields
Ez = − 1X
(
rw + ln
θ
θ − 1 + Σz
)
, (A.35)
where
Σz =
1
2
(ν2 − (1− ρ)2)σ2z +
1
8
(ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ)2)σ2tot (A.36)
−ν
2
2
(2σz,aw − σtot,ad) +
ν2
2
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
, (A.37)
and
Etot =
2
Y (iWd − Σtot) (A.38)
with
Σtot =
1
2
(ν2 − (1− ρ)2(1− γ))σz,tot + ν
2
2
(2σz,ad − σtot,aw) . (A.39)
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Calculating the endogenous variance and covariance terms
Next, the endogenous variance and covariance terms are derived. As wages are predeter-
mined, the period equilibrium allocation can only be altered by changes in productivity and
money supply:
zˆ ≡ z − E(z) = aˆw + mˆw and ˆtot ≡ tot− E(tot) = −2 (aˆd + mˆd) . (A.40)
The national money supply feedback rules are given by
mˆ = µaw aˆw + µad aˆd and mˆ
∗ = µ∗aw aˆw − µ∗ad aˆd. (A.41)
In terms of world average and difference components, the feedback rules can be stated as
mˆw = µw,aw aˆw + µd,ad aˆd and mˆd = µd,aw aˆw + µw,ad aˆd, (A.42)
where
µw,aw =
1
2
(
µaw + µ
∗
aw
)
, µd,aw =
1
2
(
µaw − µ∗aw
)
,
µw,ad =
1
2
(
µad + µ
∗
ad
)
, and µd,ad =
1
2
(
µad − µ∗ad
)
.
Solving for σ2z , σ
2
tot, and σz,tot The two equations in (A.40) can be rewritten in matrix
notation as zˆ
ˆtot
 =
 aˆw + mˆw
−2 (aˆd + mˆd)
 =
 (1 + µw,aw) µd,ad
−2µd,aw −2(1 + µw,ad)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Λ
 aˆw
aˆd
 (A.43)
Consequently, σ2z σz,tot
σtot,z σ
2
tot
 = EΛ
 aˆw
aˆd
 aˆw
aˆd
′ Λ′ = Λ
 σ2ad 0
0 σ2aw
Λ′
As a result, one gets
σ2z = (1 + µw,aw)
2σ2aw + µd,ad
2σ2ad (A.44)
σ2tot = 4µd,aw
2σ2aw + 4(1 + µw,ad)
2σ2ad (A.45)
σtot,z = −2(1 + µw,aw)µd,awσ2aw − 2µd,ad(1 + µw,ad)σ2ad (A.46)
Moreover, it also follows that σz,aw
σz,ad
 =
 (1 + µw,aw)σ2aw
µd,adσ
2
ad
 and
 σtot,aw
σtot,ad
 =
 −2µd,awσ2aw
−2(1 + µw,ad)σ2ad
(A.47)
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The Objectives in Closed Form
First note that from the optimal wage setting condition together with the budget constraint
it directly follows that
ELν = E
θ − 1
θ
1
R
C(1−ρ) and EL∗ν = E
θ − 1
θ
1
R∗
C∗(1−ρ). (A.48)
Therefore, Home and Foreign expected period utility can be expressed by
Eu =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
(θ − 1)
νθ
1
R
)
EC1−ρ and Eu∗ =
(
1
(1− ρ) −
(θ − 1)
νθ
1
R∗
)
EC∗1−ρ,
respectively. Since C = ZToT−
1
2
(1−γ) and C∗ = ZToT
1
2
(1−γ) are log-normal,
EC1−ρ = (1− ρ)
(
E(z)− 1
2
(1− γ)E(tot)
)
+
(1− ρ)2
2
(
σ2z +
1
4
(1− γ)2σ2tot − (1− γ)σz,tot
)
EC∗1−ρ = (1− ρ)
(
E(z) +
1
2
(1− γ)E(tot)
)
+
(1− ρ)2
2
(
σ2z +
1
4
(1− γ)2σ2tot + (1− γ)σz,tot
)
Consequently, plugging the solutions for E(z) and E(tot) into the two equations above allows
to express Home expected utility after some algebra as
Eu = u¯ (Rw, Rd) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(µw,aw , µd,aw , µw,ad , µd,ad)
}
, (A.49)
where
u¯ (Rw, Rd) =
(
1
(1−ρ) − θ−1θν
(
1
RwRd
))(
θ−1
θ
1
Rw
) (1−ρ)
X
R
− (1−γ)(1−ρ)Y
d
and
Ω(µw,aw , µd,aw , µw,ad , µd,ad) = −Xσ2z − Z4 σ2tot + (1−γ)Y X 2σz,tot + ν(2σz,aw − σtot,ad)
+ν(1−γ)Y X (2σz,ad − σtot,aw) + νX
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
.
Foreign expected utility reads
Eu∗ = u¯∗ (Rw, Rd) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(iCw,aw , iCd,aw , iCd,aw , iCd,ad)
}
, (A.50)
where
u¯∗ (Rw, Rd) =
(
1
(1−ρ) − θ−1θν
(
Rd
Rw
))(
θ−1
θ
1
Rw
) (1−ρ)
X
R
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
d
and
Ω∗(µw,aw , µd,aw , µw,ad , µd,ad) = −Xσ2z − Z4 σ2tot − (1−γ)Y X 2σz,tot + ν(2σz,aw − σtot,ad)
−ν(1−γ)Y X (2σz,ad − σtot,aw) + νX
(
σ2aw + σ
2
ad
)
.
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Proof of Proposition 1
For clarification, the terms first and second order are understood to refer to a Taylor polyno-
mial of first and second order. In principle, a formal proof could be given here with the exact
derivation of the second order approximation to the solution of the model and the welfare
function. The proof of Proposition 1, however, is trivial by the separation of expected utility
into the components that are non-stochastic and the components depending on variances
and covariances as in equations (A.49 and A.50) and in the main text. In particular, note
that the log-linear distribution of the model implies that the second order approximations
to the log-linear model is exact because the equilibrium and the welfare function in logs
are 2nd order polynomials. Moreover, the second order terms are clearly the variance and
covariance terms of the equilibrium. Consequently, an approximation of the equilibrium and
the welfare function up to first order leaves out the second order variance and covariance
terms completely and hence the terms describing uncertainty are lost.
A.3 Optimal Monetary Policy Coordination
When Home and Foreign policymakers coordinate optimally on both ex-post and ex-ante
monetary policy, they do so as to maximize the sum of Home and Foreign expected utilities,
ie. Eu+ Eu∗, over {R,µaw , µad} and {R∗, µ∗aw , µ∗ad}, respectively. In an alternative expres-
sion, Home and Foreign authorities jointly set {Rw, Rd}, {µw,aw , µd,aw}, and {µw,ad , µd,ad}
in order to maximize the joint welfare.
Proof of Proposition 2
There are two first order conditions for setting {Rw, Rd}, namely
du¯ (Rw, Rd)
dRw
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
+
du¯∗ (Rw, Rd)
dRw
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
= 0, and (A.51)
du¯ (Rw, Rd)
dRd
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
+
du¯∗ (Rw, Rd)
dRd
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
= 0, (A.52)
respectively. In choosing the optimal nominal interest rates Rw and Rd, policymakers take
into account that the net nominal interest rates must be non-negative, ie. Rw ≥ 1 and
Rd ≥ 1
Symmetry: (R∗Opt = ROpt) Multiplying the FOC to Rw (equation (A.51)) by Rw and
dividing through
(
θ−1
θ
1
Rw
) (1−ρ)
X yields
0 =
[
θ−1
θν
(
1
RwRd
)
− (1−ρ)X
(
1
(1−ρ) − θ−1θν
(
1
RwRd
))]
× R−
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
d exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
+
[
θ−1
θν
(
Rd
Rw
)
− (1−ρ)X
(
1
(1−ρ) − θ−1θν
(
Rd
Rw
))]
× R
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
d exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
.
(A.53)
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A similar manipulation to the first order condition to Rd (equation (A.52)), ie. multiplying
by Rd and dividing through
(
θ−1
θ
1
Rw
) (1−ρ)
X , yields
0 =
[
θ−1
θν
(
1
RwRd
)
− (1−ρ)(1−γ)Y
(
1
(1−ρ) − θ−1θν
(
1
RwRd
))]
× R−
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
d exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
.
−
[
θ−1
θν
(
Rd
Rw
)
− (1−ρ)(1−γ)Y
(
1
(1−ρ) − θ−1θν
(
Rd
Rw
))]
× R
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
d exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
(A.54)
Thus, equations (A.53) and (A.54) denote two equations in the two unknowns Rw
and Rd. By taking ratios of the two conditions, one gets rid of the factors
R
− (1−γ)(1−ρ)Y
d exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
and R
(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Y
d exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
and arrives at
θ−1
θν +
(1−ρ)(θ−1)
Xθν − 1X
(
1
RwRd
)
θ−1
θν +
(1−ρ)(θ−1)(1−γ)
Yθν − (1−γ)Y
(
1
RwRd
) = θ−1θν + (1−ρ)(θ−1)Xθν − 1X
(
Rd
Rw
)
θ−1
θν +
(1−ρ)(θ−1)(1−γ)
Yθν − (1−γ)Y
(
Rd
Rw
) . (A.55)
After some algebra one can solve for Rd and it becomes obvious that the first order conditions in
(A.51) and (A.52) are satisfied if and only if Rd = 1, or equivalently R∗Opt = ROpt, and γ > 0. For
γ = 0, the two countries are fully separated and coordination makes no sense at all as the jointly
optimal outcome must necessarily coincide with individually optimal interest rate policy.
Optimal Policy Intervention: (ROpt and R∗Opt) If one plugged the symmetry result into
one of the two FOCs, it would follow that ROpt = θ−1θ . This, however, violates the non-negativity
constraint of the net nominal interest rates. It is easy to demonstrate that the two FOCs are negative
for R > θ−1θ . If the second order conditions hold, the objectives are indeed maximized for
ROpt = 1. (A.56)
Second Order Conditions The verification of the second order conditions for ROpt and R∗Opt
to be optimal is straightforward and left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 3
The two first order conditions for setting {µw,ak , µd,ak} for k = w, d, ie. in case of both the aggregate
and the asymmetric shocks, are
0 = ν(1−ρ)2X u¯ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
dΩ(·)
dµw,ak
+ ν(1−ρ)2X u¯
∗ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
dΩ∗(·)
dµw,ak
,(A.57)
and 0 = ν(1−ρ)2X u¯ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
dΩ(·)
dµd,ak
+ ν(1−ρ)2X u¯
∗ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
dΩ∗(·)
dµd,ak
(A.58)
for k = w, d, respectively. Note that ν(1−ρ)2X u¯ and
ν(1−ρ)
2X u¯
∗ are strictly positive and by Proposition 1
they must be identical. Reordering the two FOCs yields
0 = dΩ(·)dµw,ak
+ dΩ
∗(·)
dµw,ak
exp
{
−ν(1−ρ)2X (Ω(·)− Ω∗(·))
}
, (A.59)
and 0 = dΩ(·)dµd,ak
+ dΩ
∗(·)
dµd,ak
exp
{
−ν(1−ρ)2X (Ω(·)− Ω∗(·))
}
, (A.60)
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for k = w, d. Next, define −ν(1−ρ)2X (Ω(·)− Ω∗(·)) as ∆ and express it in terms of policy coefficients,
ie.
∆ ≡ −ν(1− ρ)
2X (Ω(·)− Ω
∗(·)) (A.61)
= −ν(1− ρ)(1− γ)Y
{
(ν −X (1 + µw,aw))µd,awσ2aw + (ν −X (1 + µw,ad))µd,adσ2ad
}
.
By the additive structure, ∆ can be split into the components referring to the aggregate shock and
the asymmetric shock, respectively. Consequently,
∆ = ∆aw +∆ad , (A.62)
where ∆aw = −
ν(1− ρ)(1− γ)
Y (ν −X (1 + µw,aw))µd,awσ
2
aw ,
and ∆ad = −
ν(1− ρ)(1− γ)
Y (ν −X (1 + µw,ad))µd,adσ
2
ad
.
It is important to observe that ∆ fully captures the difference between Home and Foreign util-
ity. Moreover, for the two components ∆aw and ∆ad the difference in utility is zero only if either
(ν −X (1 + iCw,ak)) = 0 or µd,ak = 0 for k = w, d.16 For expositional convenience I define the term
(ν −X (1 + µw,ak)) as A(µw,ak), ie. for k = w, d
A(µw,ak) ≡ (ν −X (1 + µw,ak)) . (A.63)
Proof of Proposition 3: Aggregate Shocks
The two first order conditions for the optimal response to aggregate productivity shocks are
0 = 2
(
A(µw,aw)−
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,aw
)
+ 2
(
A(µw,aw) +
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,aw
)
exp{∆aw} (A.64)
for µw,aw and
0 = 2
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,aw)−Zµd,aw
)
− 2
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,aw) + Zµd,aw
)
exp{∆aw} (A.65)
for µd,aw , respectively.
Symmetry: (µOptaw = µ∗
Opt
aw ) The proof that the optimal solution entails symmetry is
carried out in two steps: First, it is demonstrated that µd,aw = 0 is indeed a solution to the
problem. Second, it is shown that this solution is unique. Rearranging the two FOCs in
(A.64) and (A.65) yields
A(µw,aw) (1 + exp{∆aw}) =
(1− γ)
Y X
2 (1− exp{∆aw})µd,aw (A.66)
for µw,aw and
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,aw) (1− exp{∆aw}) = Z (1 + exp{∆aw})µd,aw (A.67)
16Note that for ρ = 1, ie. in case of log-utility, the term (1− ρ) doesn’t appear in (A.64) and (A.65) and
the same logic goes through.
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for µd,aw , respectively. Recall that ∆aw is zero only if A(µw,aw) = 0 or µd,aw = 0.
Consequently, equation (A.67) is indeed solved by µd,aw = 0. Plugging this into the
rearranged FOC to µw,aw (A.66) implies that A(µw,aw) = (ν −X (1 + µw,aw)) = 0. Hence,
µd,aw = 0 is part of a valid solution to the maximization problem.
The uniqueness of this solution is proven by showing that µd,aw 6= 0 contradicts the FOCs.
This is undertaken is two intermediary steps for ρ > 1 and ρ ≤ 1.
(i) ρ > 1: Suppose that there exist another solution to the FOCs and µd,aw 6= 0 and γ < 1.17
From equation (A.67) follows that A(µw,aw) 6= 0 and hence ∆aw 6= 0. The two rearranged
FOCs in (A.67)and (A.66) imply for the sign of µd,aw , ∆aw , and A(µw,aw) that
sgn{(1− exp{∆aw})} = sgn{A(µw,aw)µd,aw} (A.68)
and sgn{µd,aw} = sgn{A(µw,aw) (1− exp{∆aw})}. (A.69)
Note that sgn{1 − exp{∆aw}} = − sgn{∆aw}. Consequently, the only combinations that
satisfy the two first order conditions are ∆aw < 0 and sgn{µd,aw} = sgn{A(µw,aw)} or
∆aw > 0 and sgn{µd,aw} 6= sgn{A(µw,aw)}. However, by the definition of ∆aw , this is
only consistent with ρ ≤ 1. Hence, for all ρ > 1, there exists only a unique symmetric
equilibrium with µd,aw = 0.
(ii) ρ ≤ 1: The next step is to show that µd,aw 6= 0 is inconsistent for ρ ≤ 1, too. First, look
at the case sgn{µd,aw} = sgn{A(µw,aw)}. Let µd,aw and A(µw,aw)) be both positive. Then
the two FOCs to holds imply that
0 >
(
A(µw,aw)−
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,aw
)
and 0 <
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,aw)−Zµd,aw
)
.
The two conditions are, however mutually exclusive for 1 ≥ ρ. In particular, the two
condition require that A(µw,aw )µd,aw <
(1−γ)X 2
Y and
A(µw,aw )
µd,aw
> YZ(1−γ)X . For 1 ≥ ρ, YZ(1−γ)X ≥
(1−γ)X 2
Y and therefore both conditions cannot be satisfied at the same time. For µd,aw and
A(µw,aw) both negative, the same conditions apply.
However, sgn{µd,aw} 6= sgn{A(µw,aw)} is incompatible with the two FOCs and 1 ≥ ρ, too.
17When γ < 1 since γ = 1 trivially implies µd,aw = 0 by equation (A.67).
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Let µd,aw be positive and A(µw,aw) negative. Then the two FOCs to hold implies that
0 >
(
A(µw,aw) +
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,aw
)
and 0 <
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,aw) + Zµd,aw
)
.
Again, the two conditions are mutually exclusive for 1 ≥ ρ. In particular, the two condition
require that A(µw,aw )µd,aw > −
(1−γ)X 2
Y and
A(µw,aw )
µd,aw
< − YZ(1−γ)X . Because for 1 ≥ ρ it is true
that − YZ(1−γ)X ≤ − (1−γ)X
2
Y and the ratio
A(µw,aw )
µd,aw
< 0, it again follows that both conditions
cannot be satisfied at the same time. For µd,aw negative and A(µw,aw) positive, the same
conditions apply. As a result, it follows that the only solution that satisfies the FOCs must
entail symmetry. Hence, the solution is also unique.
Optimal Policies: (µOptaw and µ∗
Opt
aw ) As a result, since by µ
Opt
d,aw
= 0 it must be true that
A(µOptw,aw) =
(
ν −X (1 + µOptw,aw)
)
= 0 it follows that
µOptaw = µ
∗Opt
aw =
(1− ρ)
X . (A.70)
Second Order Conditions It is easily verified that the second-order conditions are satis-
fied. Consequently, the solution to the first-order conditions will depict the global optimum
to the maximization problem.
Proof of Proposition 3: Asymmetric Shocks
In case of asymmetric shocks, the proof goes in almost the same way. The two first order
conditions are
0 = 2
(
ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)−
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,ad
)
+ 2
(
ν −Z(1 + µw,ad) +
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,ad
)
exp{∆ad}
(A.71)
for µw,ad and
0 = 2
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,ad)−Xµd,ad
)
− 2
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,ad)) + Xµd,ad
)
exp{∆ad} (A.72)
for µd,ad , respectively.
Symmetry: (µOptad = µ
∗Opt
ad
) The proof that the optimal policy response to asymmetric
shocks is unique and entails symmetry is carried out again in two steps: First it is shown
that µd,ad = 0 indeed is a solution to the FOCs. Second, it is demonstrated that µd,ad 6= 0
is not compatible with the FOCs. Rearranging the two FOCs in (A.71) and (A.72) yields
(ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)) (1 + exp{∆ad}) =
(1− γ)
Y X (1− exp{∆ad})µd,ad (A.73)
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for µw,ad and
(1− γ)
Y X (ν −X (1 + µw,ad)) (1− exp{∆ad}) = (1 + exp{∆ad})µd,ad (A.74)
for µd,ad , respectively. Recall that ∆ad is zero only if A(µw,ad) = 0 or µd,ad = 0. Conse-
quently, equation (A.74) is indeed solved by µd,ad = 0. Plugging this into the rearranged
FOC to µw,ad (A.73) implies that (ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)) = 0. Hence, µd,ad = 0 is part of a
valid solution to the maximization problem.
The uniqueness of this solution is proven again by showing that µd,ad 6= 0 contradicts the
FOCs. This is done in two intermediary steps for ρ > 1 and ρ ≤ 1. Suppose to the contrary
that there exist another solution to the FOCs and µd,ad 6= 0 and γ < 1.18 From equation
(A.74) follows that A(µw,ad) 6= 0 and hence ∆ad 6= 0. The two rearranged FOCs in (A.74)
and (A.73) imply for the signs of µd,aw , ∆aw , A(µw,ad), and (ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)) that
sgn{(ν −Z(1 + µw,ad))} = sgn{(1− exp{∆ad})µd,ad} (A.75)
and sgn{µd,ad} = sgn{A(µw,ad) (1− exp{∆ad})}. (A.76)
Note that sgn{1− exp{∆ad}} = − sgn{∆ad} and moreover that
ν −Z(1 + µw,ad) > 0 ⇒ A(µw,ad) > 0 (A.77)
and A(µw,ad) < 0 ⇒ ν −Z(1 + µw,ad) < 0. (A.78)
(i) ρ > 1: It is easily shown that the condition A.76 is satisfied if either ∆ad > 0 and
sgn{µd,ad} 6= sgn{A(µw,ad)} or ∆ad < 0 and sgn{µd,ad} = sgn{A(µw,ad)}. By the definition
of ∆ad follows that this condition is always violated for ρ > 1.
(ii) ρ ≤ 1: When µd,aw is positive as is ν − Z(1 + µw,aw) and hence A(µw,ad) is positive,
too, the two FOCs to need to satisfy
0 >
(
ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)−
(1− γ)
Y X
2µd,ad
)
(A.79)
and 0 <
(
(1− γ)
Y XA(µw,ad)−Zµd,ad
)
. (A.80)
The two conditions are mutually exclusive for 1 ≥ ρ. In particular, the two condition require
that Y
(1−γ)X 2 (ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)) < µd,ad and (1−γ)Y (ν −X (1 + µw,ad)) > µd,aw . If Y(1−γ)X 2
(ν −Z(1 + µw,ad)) ≤ (1−γ)Y A(µw,ad), the two conditions above are mutually exclusive. This
condition can be restated as Y
(1−γ)X 2 ≤
(ν−Z(1+µw,ad ))
A(µw,ad )
. Importantly, this condition is always
18Again, γ = 1 trivially implies µd,ad = 0 by equation (A.74).
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satisfied. To see this, take the ratio of the two rearranged FOCs in (A.73) and (A.74) to
eliminate µd,ad . This results to
Y
(1− γ)X 2
(1− exp{∆ad})
(1 + exp{∆ad})
=
(ν −Z(1 + µw,ad))
A(µw,ad)
. (A.81)
Because 1−exp{∆ad}1+exp{∆ad}
< 1 for ∆ad 6= 0, the two FOCs cannot be simultaneously satisfied. The
same exercise leads to the identical conditions when µd,aw is negative as is ν−Z(1+µw,aw)
and hence A(µw,ad).
The other case is depicted by alternating signs, ie. µd,ad is positive but ν − X (1 + µw,ad)
and hence ν − Z(1 + µw,ad) are negative. Again, it can be shown that the conditions for
the two FOCs to hold simultaneously are violated. This is, however, left to the reader since
by now the way to prove should be clear. As a result, it follows that the only solution that
satisfies the FOCs must entail symmetry. Hence, the solution is also unique.
Optimal Policies: (µOptad and µ
∗Opt
ad
) Consequently, since by µOptd,ad = 0 it must be true
that
(
ν −Z(1 + µOptCw,ad)
)
= 0 it follows that
µOptad = µ
∗Opt
ad
=
(1− ρ)(1− γ)2
Z . (A.82)
Second Order Conditions The second-order conditions are satisfied independent of the
values of µw,ad and µd,ad . Consequently, the solution to the first-order conditions will depict
the global optimum to the maximization problem.
A.4 Non-cooperative Monetary Policy: Nash
Proof of Proposition 4
When Home and Foreign authorities set the nominal interest rate independently, they choose
{R,R∗} so as to maximize their respective residents’ expected welfare. The two first order
conditions are
du¯ (R,R∗)
dR
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
= 0, and (A.83)
du¯ (R,R)
dR∗
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
= 0, (A.84)
respectively. Taking the explicit derivatives and dividing the FOC to R (equation (A.83))
through exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
,
(
θ−1
θ
1
Rw
) (1−ρ)
X , and R
− (1−γ)(1−ρ)Y
d yields
0 = θ−1θν
(
1
R2
)− (1−ρ)2X ( 1(1−ρ) − θ−1θν 1R) 1R − (1−ρ)(1−γ)2Y ( 1(1−ρ) − θ−1θν 1R) 1R .
(A.85)
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A similar manipulation to the FOC to R∗ (equation (A.84)) yields
0 = θ−1θν
(
1
R∗2
)− (1−ρ)2X ( 1(1−ρ) − θ−1θν 1R∗) 1R∗ − (1−ρ)(1−γ)2Y ( 1(1−ρ) − θ−1θν 1R∗) 1R∗ .
(A.86)
Existence of Symmetric Equilibria only: (RNash = R∗Nash) The two FOCs in (A.85)
and (A.86) are linear in R and R∗, respectively, and they are both independent of the other countries
action. Because the two conditions are identical, it follows immediately that Home and Foreign
authorities take the same action. Hence, R∗Nash = RNash.
Nash Policy Intervention: (RNash and R∗Nash) Solving the two equations (A.85) and
(A.86) results to
RNash = R∗Nash =
θ − 1
θ
(
1 +
γX
Y + (1− γ)X
)
. (A.87)
Second Order Conditions The verification of the second order conditions for RNash and
R∗Nash is straightforward and left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 5
The two first order conditions when national authorities set their policy feedback coefficients to
shocks non-cooperatively, i.e. {µak , µ∗ak} for k = w, d are
0 = ν(1−ρ)2X u¯ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
dΩ(·)
dµak
, (A.88)
and 0 = ν(1−ρ)2X u¯
∗ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
dΩ∗(·)
dµ∗ak
(A.89)
for k = w, d, respectively. First note that ν(1−ρ)2X u¯ and
ν(1−ρ)
2X u¯
∗ are strictly positive and they are by
Proposition 4 identical. Furthermore, exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
and exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
are strictly positive,
too. Hence, the problem reduces to find the maximand of Ω(·) and Ω∗(·).
Proof of Proposition 5: Aggregate Shocks
Home and Foreign first order conditions to the policy rule setting-game in case of aggregate produc-
tivity shocks read
0 = A(µw,aw)
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
−
(
Z + (1− γ)Y X
2
)
µd,aw (A.90)
for µaw and
0 = A(µw,aw)
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
+
(
Z + (1− γ)Y X
2
)
µd,aw (A.91)
for µ∗aw , respectively.
Existence of Symmetric Equilibria only: (µNashaw = µ
∗Nash
aw ) Taking the difference of
the two FOCs (A.90) and (A.91) yields
0 = −
(
Z + (1− γ)Y X
2
)
µd,aw . (A.92)
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Consequently, because
(
Z + (1−γ)Y X 2
)
> 0 it follows that equation (A.92) requires µNashd,aw =
0 and hence a symmetric equilibrium.
Nash Policy Intervention to Aggregate Shocks: (µNashaw and µ
∗Nash
aw ) Making use
of the symmetry, conditions (A.90) and (A.91) directly imply that A(µw,aw) = 0 because(
1 + (1−γ)Y X
)
> 0. As a result,
µNashaw = µ
∗Nash
aw =
(1− ρ)
X . (A.93)
Second Order Conditions The second-order conditions for the solution to be the max-
imum are satisfied and the verification is left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 5: Asymmetric Shocks
Home and Foreign first order conditions to the policy rule setting-game in case of asymmetric
productivity shocks read
0 = ν
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
−
(
Z + (1− γ)Y X
2
)
(1 + µw,ad)−X
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
µd,ad (A.94)
for µad and
0 = ν
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
−
(
Z + (1− γ)Y X
2
)
(1 + µw,ad) + X
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
µd,ad (A.95)
for µ∗ad , respectively.
Existence of Symmetric Equilibria only: (µNashad = µ
∗Nash
ad
) Taking the difference of
the two FOCs (A.94) and (A.95) yields
0 = −X
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
µd,ad . (A.96)
Consequently, because X
(
1 + (1−γ)Y X
)
> 0 it follows that equation (A.96) requires µNashd,ad =
0 and hence a symmetric equilibrium.
Nash Policy Intervention to Asymmetric Shocks: (µNashad and µ
∗Nash
ad
) Making use
of the symmetry, conditions (A.94) and (A.95) imply that
ν
(
1 +
(1− γ)
Y X
)
=
(
Z + (1− γ)Y X
2
)
(1 + µw,ad) . (A.97)
Solving for µw,ad then results to
µNashad = µ
∗Nash
ad
= (1− ρ)(1− γ)
( X + (1− γ)Y
ZY + (1− γ)X 2
)
. (A.98)
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Second Order Conditions The second-order conditions for the solution to be the max-
imum are satisfied and the verification is left to the reader.
B Appendix to Chapter 2
The model in Chapter 2 builds on the model in Chapter 1. In particular, the structure of
the two models is identical. The only difference between the two models is the introduction
of fiscal policy. As a consequence, the setup, the optimality conditions and the equilibrium
determination is equivalent to the model in Chapter 1. Moreover, by Lemma 1 and 2, it
immediately follows that one can simply substitute policy variables of the version in Chapter
1 for the compound expression in Chapter 2. To be specific, substitute the nominal interest
rates R and R∗ for the ex ante compound policy terms IW and I∗W . For the logs of the ex post
compound public interventions follows that iˆC and iˆ∗C correspond to mˆ and mˆ
∗. The world
average and difference components of Home and Foreign compound public interventions
can easily be derived from national Home and Foreign money supply and consumption tax
feedback rules. The compound national public policy rules are given by
iˆC = iC,aw aˆw + iC,ad aˆd and iˆ
∗
C = i
∗
C,aw aˆw − i∗C,ad aˆd, (B.1)
where iC,aw = µaw − τaw , i∗C,aw = µ∗aw − τ∗aw , iC,ad = µad − τad , and i∗C,ad = µ∗ad − τ∗ad . In
terms of world average and difference components, the feedback rules can be stated as
iˆCw = iCw,aw aˆw + iCd,ad aˆd and iˆCd = iCd,aw aˆw + iCw,ad aˆd, (B.2)
where
iCw,aw =
1
2
(
(µaw + µ
∗
aw)− (τaw + τ∗aw)
)
, iCd,aw =
1
2
(
(µaw − µ∗aw)− (τaw − τ∗aw)
)
,
iCw,ad =
1
2
(
(µad + µ
∗
ad
)− (τad + τ∗ad)
)
, and iCd,ad =
1
2
(
(µad − µ∗ad)− (τad − τ∗ad)
)
.
From these definitions, the corresponding terms of Chapter 1 should be self-explaining.
Therefore, the proofs of the first four Propositions are identical to the proofs of the last four
Propositions in Chapter 1.
B.1 Optimal Public Policy Coordination
When Home and Foreign policymakers optimally coordinate on both ex-post and ex-ante
fiscal and monetary policy interventions, they do so as to maximize the sum of Home and
Foreign expected utilities, ie. Eu + Eu∗, over {IW , iCaw , iCad} and {I∗W , i∗Caw , i∗Cad}, respec-
tively. In an alternative expression, Home and Foreign authorities jointly set {IWw , IWd},
{iCw,aw , iCd,aw}, and {iCw,ad , iCd,ad} in order to maximize the joint welfare.
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Proof of Proposition 1
There are two first order conditions for setting {IWw , IWd}, namely
du¯ (IWw , IWd)
dIWw
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
+
du¯∗ (IWw , IWd)
dIWw
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
= 0, and (B.3)
du¯ (IWw , IWd)
dIWd
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
+
du¯∗ (IWw , IWd)
dIWd
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
= 0, (B.4)
respectively. For the subsequent proof of symmetry ( I∗W
Opt = IOptW ), the optimal policy
interventions IOptW and I
∗
W
Opt, and the SOCs, see proof of Proposition 1.2..
Proof of Proposition 2
The two first order conditions for setting {iCw,ak , iCd,ak} for k = w, d, ie. in case of both the
aggregate and the asymmetric shocks, are
0 =
ν(1− ρ)
2X u¯ (·) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
dΩ(·)
diCw,ak
+
ν(1− ρ)
2X u¯
∗ (·) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
dΩ∗(·)
diCw,ak
, (B.5)
0 =
ν(1− ρ)
2X u¯ (·) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
dΩ(·)
diCd,ak
+
ν(1− ρ)
2X u¯
∗ (·) exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
dΩ∗(·)
diCd,ak
, (B.6)
for k = w, d, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 2: Aggregate Shocks
See proof of Proposition 1.3.
Proof of Proposition 2: Asymmetric Shocks
See proof of Proposition 1.3.
B.2 Non-cooperative Public Policy: Nash
Proof of Proposition 3
When Home and Foreign authorities set the ex-ante policy intervention to the wage setting
independently, they choose {IW , I∗W } so as to maximize their respective residents’ expected
welfare. The two first order conditions are
du¯ (IW , I∗W )
dIW
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
= 0, and (B.7)
du¯ (IW , IW )
dI∗W
exp
{
ν(1− ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
= 0, (B.8)
respectively. For the subsequent proof of symmetry ( INashW = I
∗
W
Nash), the optimal policy
interventions INashW and I
∗
W
Nash, and the SOCs, see proof of Proposition 1.4..
Appendix to Chapter 2 115
Proof of Proposition 4
The two first order conditions when national authorities set their policy feedback coefficients
to shocks non-cooperatively, i.e. {iC,ak , iC∗,ak} for k = w, d are
0 = ν(1−ρ)2X u¯ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω(·)
}
dΩ(·)
diC,ak
, (B.9)
and 0 = ν(1−ρ)2X u¯
∗ (·) exp
{
ν(1−ρ)
2X Ω
∗(·)
}
dΩ∗(·)
di∗C,ak
(B.10)
for k = w, d, respectively.
Proof of Proposition 4: Aggregate Shocks
See proof of Proposition 1.5.
Proof of Proposition 4: Asymmetric Shocks
See proof of Proposition 1.5.
B.3 Monetary Cooperation and Fiscal Independence
When national monetary authorities coordinate their policies but national fiscal authorities
stay independent, the game-theoretic setup is described by a game of three players: one
coordinating ”global” monetary authority that seeks to maximize the sum of Home and
Foreign welfare and two independent fiscal authorities that seek to maximize the respective
residents’ welfare.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5 is proven in two steps. First, the only pure strategy equilibrium is derived.
Second, it is argued that there cannot be any other equilibrium in mixed strategies so that
the pure strategy equilibrium is unique.
The Only Pure Strategy Equilibrium In case of the ex ante wage setting intervention,
recall from Definition 2 that
IW =
1 + tC
1− tW R and I
∗
W =
1 + t∗C
1− t∗W
R∗. (B.11)
For notational convenience define the part of Home and Foreign fiscal policy as T = 1+tC1−tW
and T ∗ = 1+t
∗
C
1−t∗W . Then, in terms of world and difference components of policy interventions,
ie. IWw and IWd , the compound policy variables are
IWw = TwRw and IWd = TdRw. (B.12)
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Home and Foreign monetary authorities jointly decide over {Rw, Rd} to maximize Eu+Eu∗.
Monetary authorities are, of course, constrained to set the net nominal interest rates to be
non-negative, ie. for the gross nominal interest rate R ≥ 1 and R∗ ≥ 1. The Home fiscal
authority sets T so as to maximize Eu and the Foreign authority sets T ∗ so as to maximize
Eu∗. Importantly, considering pure strategy equilibria only, the first order conditions of the
monetary authorities to this problem coincide with the first order condition to the problem of
optimal public policy (B.3) and (B.4) except for the multiplicatively added derivative of the
compound policy interaction with respect to the nominal interest rates, ie. dIWwdRw in equation
(B.3) and
dIWd
dRd
in equation (B.4), respectively. As a consequence, the optimality conditions
derived in the proof of Proposition 1 carry over. In particular, this implies for the Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies that monetary authorities want to implement the optimal
level of public policy intervention IOptW = I
∗Opt
W =
θ−1
θ in both countries. For the national
fiscal policy authorities, taking as given the monetary policy interventions, the first order
conditions coincide with the first order conditions to the problem of non-cooperatively set
public policies in the proof of Proposition 3 except for the multiplicatively added derivative
of the compound policy interaction with respect to the national fiscal policy terms, ie. dIWwdΠ
in equation (B.7) and
dIWd
dΠ∗ in equation (B.8), respectively. Again, the characterization of the
optimality conditions carry over and hence national fiscal policymakers seek to implement
the Nash levels of compound national interventions INashW = I
∗Nash
W =
θ−1
θ
(
1 + γXY+(1−γ)X
)
.
Hence, as an implication of Lemma 2, the pure strategy equilibrium is given by the reduced
problem depicted by the choice of the level of compound policy intervention. The symmetry
results in Proposition 1 and 3 reduces the problem further to two condition in two unknowns.
For the Home policy choices, monetary authority’s best response to a given fiscal policy
intervention T is
RT =
θ − 1
θ
if T <
θ − 1
θ
, and R = 1 if T ≥ θ − 1
θ
, (B.13)
where the kink in the best response stems from the requirement that the nominal interest
rate cannot be less than one. The Home fiscal authority’s best response to a given nominal
interest rate is
TR =
θ − 1
θ
(
1 +
γX
Y + (1− γ)X
)
. (B.14)
Since
(
1 + γXY+(1−γ)X
)
≥ 1, there is only one fixed point which determines the Nash equilib-
rium, namely T = θ−1θ
(
1 + γXY+(1−γ)X
)
and R = 1.
Uniqueness of the Equilibrium To see that the pure strategy equilibrium is unique,
suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Then it must
hold true that given the monetary authorities are randomizing over their nominal interest
rate, fiscal authorities must be indifferent between choosing any pure strategy over which
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they actually randomize (compare eg. Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Proposition 8.D.1). As the
monetary authorities are, however, constrained to set the net nominal interest rate non-
negatively, fiscal authorities will find it better to set fiscal interventions at level strictly
larger than θ−1θ as their best responses dictate. This, in turn, leads to the pure strategy
best response of setting R = R∗ = 1. As a result, there exists no mixed strategy equilibrium
and the pure strategy equilibrium is unique.
Second Order Conditions Easy to verify and again left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 6
In case of aggregate shocks, the compound policy interventions to the consumption spending
are given by
iC,aw = µaw − τaw and i∗C,aw = µ∗aw − τ∗aw . (B.15)
The policy interventions are defined in terms of world aggregate and difference components
as
iCw,aw = µw,aw − τw,aw and iCd,aw = µd,aw − τd,aw . (B.16)
By the identical reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 5, the first order conditions of the
monetary authorities for choosing µw,aw and µd,aw are fully characterized by the optimality
conditions in the proof of Proposition 2 (Aggregate Shocks). The first order conditions of the
national fiscal authorities are characterized by the conditions in the proof of Proposition 4
(Aggregate Shocks). In particular, monetary authorities seek to implement iOptC,aw = i
∗Opt
C,aw
=
(1−ρ)
X . The national fiscal authorities, however, seek to implement i
Nash
C,aw
= i∗NashC,aw =
(1−ρ)
X
which takes the identical target level of intervention. Consequently, for the compound
national public policy intervention to aggregate shocks iC,aw , the two equations determining
µaw and τaw coincide. As a result, all combinations of µaw and τaw such that
µaw − τaw =
(1− ρ)
X (B.17)
constitute Nash equilibria. The sole problem of policymaking reduces to a coordination
game between national monetary and fiscal policy conduct.
Second Order Conditions
Easy to verify and again left to the reader.
Proof of Proposition 7
The proof of Proposition 7 evolves in two steps: First, it is demonstrated that there exist
only equilibria in pure strategies if ρ = 1 or γ ∈ {0, 1}. This is done in straight analogy to
the proofs in the proofs of Propositions 5 and 6. The second step is to show that there is a
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unique equilibrium in mixed strategies if ρ 6= 1 or 0 < γ < 1. In case of asymmetric shocks,
the compound policy interventions to the consumption spending are given by
iC,ad = µad − τad and i∗C,ad = µ∗ad − τ∗ad . (B.18)
The policy interventions are defined in terms of world aggregate and difference components
as
iCw,ad = µw,ad − τw,ad and iCd,ad = µd,ad − τd,ad . (B.19)
The Equilibrium in Pure Strategies The first order conditions of the monetary au-
thorities for choosing µw,ad and µd,ad are fully characterized by the optimality condi-
tions in the proof of Proposition 2 (Asymmetric Shocks). The first order conditions of
the national fiscal authorities are characterized by the conditions in the proof of Propo-
sition 4 (Asymmetric Shocks). In particular, monetary authorities seek to implement
iOptC,ad = i
∗Opt
C,ad
= (1−ρ)(1−γ)
2
Z . The national fiscal authorities, however, seek to implement
iNashC,ad = i
∗Nash
C,ad
= (1− ρ)(1− γ)
( X+(1−γ)Y
ZY+(1−γ)X 2
)
. These are two conditions in two unknowns
that determine in the pure strategy equilibrium the level of Home and Foreign compound
public policy intervention, respectively. For a given fiscal policy parameter τad , the best
response of Home money supply in pure strategies is to set
µad = τad +
(1− ρ)(1− γ)2
Z . (B.20)
For a given money supply coefficient µad , the best response of Home fiscal policy in pure
strategies is
τad = µad − (1− ρ)(1− γ)
( X + (1− γ)Y
ZY + (1− γ)X 2
)
. (B.21)
As a first result, there exists only a pure strategy fixed point if either ρ = 1 or if γ = 0 or
γ = 1. In this case, the condition coincide and there exists a continuum of equilibria. All
that remains is a coordination problem between the monetary and the fiscal authorities.
The Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies The proof that there exists a Nash equilibrium
even in case of ρ 6= 1 or 0 < γ < 1 follows the standard fixed point argument (See Mas-Colell
et al. (1995) Proposition 8.D.3). In particular, one has to show that first the strategy sets
of all policy authorities are non-empty, convex, and a compact subset of R1. The first two
conditions are trivially given. Compactness can be achieved by deleting strategies which
are actually not rationalizable. For example, the bounds of the sets are chosen by the
two cases when either monetary or fiscal policymakers myopically set their desired levels
and the best responses of the respective other authorities to these levels. To be specific,
suppose the monetary authorities set µad = i
Opt
C,ad
and µ∗ad = i
∗Opt
C,ad
. The best responses
of the independent fiscal authorities according to equation (B.21) are τad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad
and τ∗ad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad . In turn, suppose next that independent fiscal authorities simply set
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coefficient to their desired levels, ie. τad = −iNashC,ad and τ∗ad = −i∗NashC,ad . Monetary authorities’
best responses are according to equation (B.20) µad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad and µ∗ad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad .
Consequently, µad , µ
∗
ad
∈ [iOptC,ad , i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad ] and τad , τ∗ad ∈ [iNashC,ad , i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad ]. The second
set of conditions deals with the objectives. In particular, they must be continuous in all
arguments and they must be concave in each single policy action. Continuity is trivially
given and concavity reduces to checking whether the second order conditions are satisfied,
too. This is the case and corresponds to the checks above. Hence, there exists a Nash
equilibrium in the game with coordinating monetary authorities and independently acting
fiscal authorities.
Continuum of Equilibria in Mixed Strategy with Unique Policy Outcome Next,
the following two claims are proven: First, if there exist any mixed strategy equilibrium
in this policy setting game, then there must be continuum of mixed strategies leading to
the same equilibrium distribution over the policy outcomes. Second, There exist no other
mixed strategy equilibrium that entails a different distribution over the policy outcomes
and hence different expected welfare.
To prove the first claim is fairly easy. The important insight is that due to Lemma 1
monetary and fiscal policy actions are perfect substitutes. Hence, the combination of
national monetary and fiscal policy is indeterminate as to yield a certain level of the
compound policy intervention. To be more precise, suppose that the two pure strategies
µ˜ad and τ˜ad are played with positive probability. Then it must be true that µ˜ad + k and
τ˜ad + k for any k ∈ R1 is also valid for this equilibrium. Consequently, the two sets (for
Home monetary and fiscal) of pure strategies that are played with positive probability
are determined up to a jointly additive component. The result is that as there exist an
equilibrium in the policy setting game, there must be a continuum of equilibria leading to
the same probability distribution over the compound policy interventions and hence the
same expected welfare.
The proof of the second claim that there exist no other mixed strategy equilibrium that
entails a different policy outcome and hence different expected welfare is only slightly more
involved and builds on the first claim. The crucial part is to see that given a mixed strategy
equilibrium, the equilibrium distribution over the pure strategies played must be unique.
In particular, recall that in any mixed strategy equilibrium in a simultaneous move game it
holds true that players must be indifferent between choosing any of the pure strategies that
are played with positive probability (Compare again Mas-Colell et al. (1995) Proposition
8.D.1). Moreover, recall that for all pure strategies played by their opponents, monetary and
fiscal authorities have a unique best response. As a consequence, in order to leave any player
indifferent between choosing any pure strategy that is played with positive probability, the
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strict concavity of the objectives and the uniqueness of the best responses imply that the
probability distribution must be unique as there cannot be any degree of freedom to alter
the distribution. Suppose this were not true. Suppose Home monetary authority changes
the probability distribution and puts more weight on, say, µ˜ad . The uniqueness of the best
response and concavity of the fiscal authorities objective implies that the fiscal authority
can no longer be indifferent as it wants to put more weight on the best response to µ˜ad , say
τ˜ad . Hence, the fiscal authorities best response would be to play τ˜ad with probability one.
As a result, the equilibrium probability distribution for a given mixed strategy equilibrium
is unique.
To see that there can be no other mixed strategy equilibrium that entails a different policy
outcome, suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium with different expected
payoffs. Due to the first claim it must be true that there also exists a continuum of mixed
strategy equilibria that entail the identical probability distribution over the compound policy
outcomes and hence expected payoffs. Therefore, given the compact strategy space, any pure
strategy can be played with positive probability in both sets of mixed strategy equilibria
leading to different expected payoffs. Because given any opponent’s pure strategy that is
played with positive probability in equilibrium the players best response is unique, the level
of compound policy interventions must be the same in both sets of equilibria. Consequently,
the difference in the expected payoffs can only be due to different equilibrium probability
distributions. As demonstrated above, however, the probability distribution is unique given
the set of pure strategies played with positive probability. As a result, there exists a unique
distribution over policy outcomes and hence the expected welfare of the continuum of mixed
strategy equilibria is unique, too.
Implementation in the Numerical Example In this Section, I briefly explain how
the mixed strategy equilibrium is calculated. As a simplification, the strategy space is
convexified via a two-point distribution over the specific boundaries as defined above. To
be more precise, Home and Foreign monetary authorities set
µad = i
Opt
C,ad
µ∗ad = i
Opt
C,ad
with probability
α
α∗
and
µad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad
iOptC,ad − iNashC,ad
with probability
1− α.
1− α∗.
Consequently, there are 22 different realizations of world aggregate and difference components of
monetary policy interventions to asymmetric shocks. Similarly, for independently acting fiscal au-
thorities one gets
τad = −iNashC,ad
τ∗ad = −iNashC,ad
with probability
β
β∗
and
τad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad
τ∗ad = i
Opt
C,ad
− iNashC,ad
with probability
1− β.
1− β∗.
As a consequence, there are 22 different realizations of the world and different components
of fiscal policy coefficients, too. There are thus 24 combinations of monetary and fiscal
policy coefficients for iCw,ad and iCd,ad . As a consequence, there are 16 realizations of the
C. Appendix to Chapter 3 121
compound public policy interventions to asymmetric shocks which can be each associated
to the probability over the respective actions. Hence, there are in principle 16 different
realization of policy rules that entail 16 different terms of expected utility. Because all
authorities are expected-utility-maximizer, they maximize the sum of the value of their
respective objective weighted by the probability of the realization of the compound policy
interaction with respect to the authorities own probability of playing the strategy. This
leads to four first order conditions. For the numerical example, they are implemented in
MatLab where I use the routine by Broydn to find the root of this problem.
C Appendix to Chapter 3
In this technical appendix all the results and equations for the analysis of federal fiscal
transfer arrangements are derived. The appendix is structured naturally as it begins with
repeating the equilibrium conditions and the definitions and calculating the log-linearization
of these conditions. The next step is to take union-wide aggregates and regional differences
of all variables and express the equilibrium conditions in these terms. By Aoki’s method
we then can solve for the long run and short responses of regional variables to asymmetric
demand and supply shocks. Using the solution of the equilibrium responses to asymmetric
demand and supply shocks allows us to determine the transfers and their consequences
in the policy analysis. We conclude this appendix by showing how the welfare can be
approximated.
C.1 Summarizing the Equilibrium Conditions
The long-run equilibrium for given regional and federal public policies is determined by
the per capita versions of the Euler condition (C.1), optimal money demand (C.2), Fisher
parity (C.4), optimal labor supply, i.e. the wage setting equation (C.3), aggregate production
Ys = asLs, aggregate demand (C.8), the price level (C.6, C.7), all the foreign counterparts
of these conditions, home intertemporal budget constraint (C.11) and the transversality
condition, and market clearing for the nominal bonds and for money (C.10).
In the short-run, however, households cannot adjust their wages to unanticipated shocks.
With preset nominal wages, employment will be completely determined by the domestic
labor demand. Thus in the short-run the optimal labor supply that equates marginal utility
derived from consuming additional earnings to disutility from labor need not hold. Con-
sequently, the set of short-run equilibrium conditions is the same as the set of long-run
equilibrium conditions but without (C.3) and its foreign counterpart.
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Consumption Euler equation:
Cs+1 = Csβ(1 + rs+1) and C∗s+1 = C
∗
sβ(1 + r
∗
s+1); (C.1)
Optimal money demand
Ms
Ps
= χCs
1 + is+1
is+1
and
M∗s
P ∗s
= χC∗s
1 + is+1
is+1
; (C.2)
Optimal wage setting
Ws =
θ
θ − 1LsCsPs and W
∗
s =
θ
θ − 1L
∗
sC
∗
sP
∗
s ; (C.3)
Nominal interest:
1 + is+1 = (1 + rs+1)
Ps+1
Ps
= (1 + r∗s+1)
P ∗s+1
P ∗s
; (C.4)
Labor demand:
Ls =
1
as
Ys and L∗s =
1
a∗s
Y ∗s ; (C.5)
Goods prices:
PH,s = PN,s =
Ws
as
and P ∗F,s = P
∗
N,s =
W ∗s
a∗s
; (C.6)
Consumption-based price indices:
Ps =
(
γP
(1−ρ)
T,s + (1− γ)P (1−ρ)N,s
) 1
(1−ρ)
, PT,s =
(
αP
(1−ρ)
H,s + (1− α)P (1−ρ)F,s
) 1
(1−ρ)
,
P ∗s =
(
γP ∗T,s
(1−ρ) + (1− γ)P ∗N,s(1−ρ)
) 1
(1−ρ)
, and P ∗T,s = PT,s; (C.7)
Total aggregate goods demand:
Ys = (1− γ(1− α))ToT−ρ(1−α)γs Cs + αγToT−ρ(1−α)γs RER−ρs C∗s +Gs,
and Y ∗s = (1− α)γToT−ρ(1−(1−α))sγs Cs + (1− αγ)ToT−ρ(1−(1−α))γs RER−ρs C∗s +G∗s.(C.8)
Terms of trade and real exchange rate:
ToTs =
(
PH,s
PF,s
)
=
(
a∗s
as
Ws
W ∗s
)
, and RERs =
(
Ps
P ∗s
)
= ToT (1−γ)s ; (C.9)
Bonds and money market market clearing conditions:
Bs +B∗s = 0, and Ms +M
∗
s =M
MU
s ; (C.10)
Budget constraint:
Bs+1 +Ms + PsCs ≤ (1 + is)Bs +M(s−1) + PH,sYs + Tloc,s + Thh,s,
and B∗s+1 +M∗s + P ∗sC∗s ≤ (1 + is)B∗s +M∗(s−1) + P ∗F,sY ∗s + T ∗loc,s + T ∗hh,s ∀s ≥ t.
(C.11)
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Local governments’ budget constraints:
Tloc,s + PN,sGs = Tgg,s + Tcb,sand T ∗loc,s + P
∗
N,sG
∗
s = T
∗
gg,s + T
∗
cb,s; (C.12)
Payments by the central bank:
Tcb,s + T ∗cb,s =
(
MMUs −MMUs−1
)
; (C.13)
Federal government’s budget:
Thh,s + T ∗hh,s = 0 and Tgg,s + T
∗
gg,s = 0, (C.14)
respectively.
The Symmetric Steady State
There exists a closed form solution to a steady state if home and foreign households have the
same initial wealth level. This implies first zero net foreign assets and second that α = 12 .
In this steady state regions are identical with respect to their per capita production, labor
supply and money holdings. If we furthermore assume that steady state local government
expenditures are equal, the regions also have identical per capita consumption, wage and
price levels. We denote the steady state levels with overbars. So we have B¯ = B¯∗ = 0,
G¯ = G¯∗, a¯ = a¯∗, and α¯ = 12 . The steady state levels are
(Consumption) C¯ = C¯∗ = Y¯ − G¯ = Y¯ ∗ − G¯∗ = (1− g¯)Y¯
(Production) Y¯ = Y¯ ∗ = a¯
(
θ − 1
θ
) 1
2
(Labor) L¯ = L¯∗ =
1
a¯
Y¯ =
1
a¯∗
Y¯ ∗
(Money holding) M¯ = M¯∗ =
M¯U
2
(Wages) W¯ = W¯ ∗ =
(
θ − 1
θ
) 1
2 (1− β)
2χ
M¯U
(Prices Levels) P¯ = P¯ ∗ =
(
θ − 1
θ
) 1
2 (1− β)
2χ
M¯U
C.2 The Log-linearized Equilibrium Conditions
Now we approximate the equilibrium conditions linearly and express them in terms of log-
deviations around the symmetric steady state. Log-deviations are denoted in a standard
way by dXX = Xˆ. Deviations of variables that are zero in steady state are expressed in terms
of steady state consumption expenditures, eg. Bˆ = dB
P¯ C¯
.
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Consumption Euler equation:
Cˆs+1 = Cˆs + (1− β)rˆs+1 and Cˆ∗s+1 = Cˆ∗s + (1− β)rˆ∗s+1 (C.15)
Optimal money demand:
Mˆs − Pˆs = Cˆs − β(1−β)
(
Pˆs+1 − Pˆs
)
− βrˆt+1
and Mˆ∗s − Pˆ ∗s = Cˆ∗s − β(1−β)
(
Pˆ ∗s+1 − Pˆ ∗s
)
− βrˆ∗t+1 (C.16)
Optimal wage setting:
Wˆs = Lˆs + Cˆs + Pˆs and Wˆ ∗s = Lˆ
∗
s + Cˆ
∗
s + Pˆ
∗
s (C.17)
Nominal interest rate:
iˆs+1 = rˆs+1 +
1
(1− β)(Pˆs+1 − Pˆs) = rˆ
∗
s+1 +
1
(1− β)(Pˆ
∗
s+1 − Pˆ ∗s ) (C.18)
Labor demand:
Lˆs = −aˆs + Yˆs and Lˆ∗s = −aˆ∗s + Yˆ ∗s (C.19)
Goods prices:
PˆH,s = PˆN,s = Wˆs − aˆs and Pˆ ∗F,s = Pˆ ∗N,s = Wˆ ∗s − aˆ∗s (C.20)
Consumption-based price indices:
Pˆs = PˆH,s − γ2 T̂ oT and Pˆ
∗
s = Pˆ
∗
F,s +
γ
2
T̂ oT (C.21)
Total aggregate goods demand
Yˆs =
(
1− γ2
)
(1− g¯)
(
Cˆs − ργ2 T̂ oT s
)
+γ2 (1− g¯∗)
(
Cˆ∗s − ρ(1− γ2 )T̂ oT s
)
+γ2 (2− g¯ − g¯∗)αˆs + g¯Gˆs (C.22)
and for foreigners
Yˆ ∗s =
γ
2 (1− g¯)
(
Cˆs + ρ(1− γ2 )T̂ oT s
)
(
1− γ2
)
(1− g¯∗)
(
Cˆ∗s + ρ
γ
2 T̂ oT s
)
−γ2 (2− g¯ − g¯∗)αˆs + g¯∗Gˆ∗s (C.23)
Terms of trade and real exchange rate:
T̂ oT s = PˆH,s − PˆF,s, and ˆRERs = (1− γ)T̂ oT s. (C.24)
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Bonds and money market market clearing conditions:
Bˆs + Bˆ∗s = 0, and Mˆs + Mˆ
∗
s = Mˆ
MU
s . (C.25)
Budget constraints:
dBs+1 + M¯Mˆs + P¯ C¯
(
Pˆs + Cˆs
)
= P¯H Y¯s
(
PˆH,s + Yˆs
)
+ T¯locTˆloc,s + dThh,s
Where we already used that B¯ = 0 and Mˆs−1 = 0. Expressing the deviations in terms of
the consumption expenditures in the initial steady state, P¯ C¯, we get
Bˆs+1 + Cˆs =
(
1
1−g¯
)(
PˆH,s + Yˆs
)
− Pˆs − χ1−β Mˆs + T¯locTˆloc,s + Tˆhh,s
and Bˆ∗s+1 + Cˆ∗s =
(
1
1−g¯∗
)(
Pˆ ∗F,s + Yˆ
∗
s
)
− Pˆ ∗s − χ1−β Mˆ∗s + T¯ ∗locTˆ ∗loc,s + Tˆ ∗hh,s (C.26)
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Local governments’ budget constraints:
T¯locTˆloc,s + P¯N G¯
(
PˆN,s + Gˆs
)
= dTgg,s + dTcb,s
Following the expression of initially zero values in terms of steady state consumption ex-
penditures and noting that T¯loc
P¯ C¯
= P¯N G¯
P¯ C¯
= g¯1−g¯ we end up with
g¯
1−g¯ Tˆloc,s +
g¯
1−g¯
(
PˆN,s + Gˆs
)
= Tˆgg,s + Tˆcb,s
and g¯1−g¯ Tˆ
∗
loc,s +
g¯
1−g¯
(
Pˆ ∗N,s + Gˆs
)
= Tˆgg,s + Tˆcb,s. (C.27)
Seignorage revenues from issuing new money
dTcb,s+dT ∗cb,s = M¯
MUMˆMUs ⇔ Tˆcb,s+ Tˆ ∗cb,s =
M¯MU
P¯ C¯
MˆMUs =
2χ
1− β Mˆ
MU
s , (C.28)
since in the initial symmetric steady state P¯ C¯ = P¯ ∗C¯∗ and M¯ = M¯∗ = M¯
MU
2 .
The federal fiscal transfers among private households across regions and the transfers be-
tween the two local governments follow
Tˆhh,s + Tˆ ∗hh,s = 0 and Tˆgg,s + Tˆ
∗
gg,s = 0, (C.29)
respectively.
C.3 Aggregates and Country Differences of the Log-linearized Equilib-
rium Conditions
Using the method put forward by Aoki and nicely employed in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995,
1996), the next step is to take the differences of the steady state deviations. Recall that
using Aoki’s method means to express individual levels in terms of expressions of union-
wide meanings, namely aggregate and relative terms. For instance x = 12
(
xMU +∆x
)
and
x∗ = 12
(
xMU −∆x), where xMU = x+ x∗ and ∆x = x− x∗.
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Taking Country Differences of the Log-linearized Equilibrium Conditions
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Consumption Euler equation:
∆Cˆs+1 = ∆Cˆs + (1− β)∆rˆs+1); (C.30)
Optimal money demand:
∆Mˆs − R̂ERs = ∆Cˆs − β(1− β)
(
R̂ERs+1 − R̂ERs
)
− β∆rˆt+1; (C.31)
Optimal wage setting:
∆Wˆs = ∆Lˆs +∆Cˆs + R̂ERs; (C.32)
Note, that since is+1 = i∗s+1, the above and its foreign counterpart imply
∆rˆs+1 =
1
(1− β)(R̂ERs − R̂ERs+1). (C.33)
Labor demand:
∆Lˆs = −∆aˆs +∆Yˆs; (C.34)
Total aggregate goods demand:
∆Yˆs = (1− γ)(1− g¯)∆Cˆs − ρ(2− γ)γ(1− g¯)T̂ oT s + 2(1− g¯)γαˆs + g¯∆Gˆs; (C.35)
Goods prices: The difference of goods price is, of course, simply the terms of trade, ie.
T̂ oT s =
(
∆Wˆs −∆aˆs
)
; (C.36)
Bonds and money market clearing conditions:
∆Bˆs = 2Bˆs, and ∆Mˆs = 2
(
Mˆs − MˆMUs
)
; (C.37)
Budget constraints:
∆Bˆs+1 +∆Cˆs =
(
1
1− g¯
)(
T̂ oT s +∆Yˆs
)
− R̂ERs − χ1− β∆Mˆs +
g¯
1− g¯∆Tˆloc,s +∆Tˆhh,s
(C.38)
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Governments’ budget constraints:
g¯
1− g¯∆Tˆloc,s +
g¯
1− g¯
(
T̂ oT s +∆Gˆs
)
= ∆Tˆgg,s +∆Tˆcb,s. (C.39)
Central bank payments:
dTcb,s+dT ∗cb,s = M¯
MUMMUs ⇔ Tˆcb,s+ Tˆ ∗cb,s =
M¯MU
P¯ C¯
MMUs =
2χ
1− βM
MU
s , (C.40)
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since in the initial symmetric steady state P¯ C¯ = P¯ ∗C¯∗ and M¯ = M¯∗ = M¯
MU
2 . Consequently,
∆Tˆcb,s = 0.
Since the federal fiscal transfers must net out, we have
∆Tˆhh,s = 2Tˆhh,s and ∆Tˆgg,s = 2Tˆgg,s, (C.41)
respectively.
Aggregate Levels of the Log-linearized Equilibrium Conditions
Since the two regions are of equal size and symmetric in the initial steady state, aggregate
levels are the equally weighted sum of national levels.
Private Sector and Market Clearing
Consumption Euler equation:
CˆMUs+1 = Cˆ
MU
s + (1− β)rˆMUs+1 ; (C.42)
Optimal money demand:
MˆMUs − PˆMUs = CˆMUs −
β
(1− β)
(
PˆMUs+1 − PˆMUs
)
− βrˆMUt+1 ; (C.43)
Optimal wage setting:
WˆMUs = Lˆ
MU
s + Cˆ
MU
s + Pˆ
MU
s ; (C.44)
Labor demand:
LˆMUs = −aˆMUs + YˆMUs ; (C.45)
Total aggregate goods demand:
YˆMUs = (1− g¯)CˆMUs + g¯GˆMUs ; (C.46)
Goods prices and consumption-based price indices:
PˆH,s + Pˆ ∗F,s = Pˆ
MU
N,s =
(
WˆMUs − aˆMUs
)
and PˆMUs = Pˆ
MU
N,s ; (C.47)
Bonds and money market clearing conditions:
BˆMUs = 0 and Mˆs + Mˆ
∗
s = 2Mˆ
MU
s (C.48)
Flow budget constraints:
CˆMUs =
(
1
1− g¯
)(
PˆMUN,s + Yˆ
MU
s
)
− PˆMUs −
2χ
1− β Mˆ
MU
s +
g¯
1− g¯ Tˆ
MU
loc,s + Tˆ
MU
hh,s
(C.49)
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Local governments’ budget constraints:
g¯
1− g¯ Tˆ
MU
loc,s +
g¯
1− g¯
(
PˆMUN,s + Gˆ
MU
s
)
= TˆMUgg,s + Tˆ
MU
cb,s . (C.50)
Payments by central bank:
TˆMUcb,s =
2χ
1− β Mˆ
MU
s , (C.51)
The transfers among private households across regions and for transfers between the two
local governments must net out:
TˆMUhh,s = 0 and Tˆ
MU
gg,s = 0, (C.52)
respectively.
C.4 Comparing Steady States
The long run deviations implied by the temporary shocks are expressed by ˆ¯x. To alleviate
the economic interpretation of the transmission processes, we introduce the following
notation for the constant terms that stem from the log-linear approximations: Each
constant is dubbed Λxˆ,yˆ and its two indices indicate the effect of a change in the latter on
the former, ie. Λˆ¯x,ˆ¯y is the constant for ˆ¯x = Λˆ¯x,ˆ¯y ˆ¯y.
The long run new steady state allocation is determined by the long-run budget constraint,
where actually the transversality condition has been imposed, total aggregate goods
demand, the optimal labor supply determined by the optimal wage setting, and the
long-run change in national public expenditures.
Relative deviations in the long-run budget constraints:
∆ ˆ¯C = 2δ ˆ¯B +
1
1− g¯∆Yˆ +
(
1
1− g¯ − (1− γ)
)
T̂ oT +∆ ˆ¯Tloc; (C.53)
Relative deviations in long-run total goods demand:
∆ ˆ¯Y = (1− γ)(1− g¯)∆ ˆ¯C − ρ(2− γ)γ(1− g¯)T̂ oT + g¯∆ ˆ¯G; (C.54)
Relative deviations in long-run optimal wage setting:
∆ ˆ¯W = ∆ˆ¯L+∆ ˆ¯C + R̂ER;
The long-run change in labor demand is simply the change in goods demand, ie. ∆ˆ¯L = ∆ˆ¯Y .
We can thus rewrite the optimal wage setting equation above using the long-run change in
the terms of trade T̂ oT = ∆ ˆ¯W and thus R̂ER = (1− γ)∆ ˆ¯W as
γT̂ oT = ∆ˆ¯Y +∆ ˆ¯C. (C.55)
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The long-run change in local governments’ budget constraints are
∆ ˆ¯Tloc =
−g¯
1− g¯
(
T̂ oT +∆ ˆ¯G
)
(C.56)
Substituting the government’s budget constraint in the intertemporal budget constraints
yields
∆ ˆ¯C = 2δ ˆ¯B +∆Yˆ + γT̂ oT .
The assumption is that in the long-run, the share of government expenditures in aggregate
domestic output reaches again the share it had in the initial steady state, ie. g¯ = G¯0
Y¯0
= G¯1
Y¯1
,
where subscripted indices denote the initial (0) and new (1) steady state. Thus, ∆ ˆ¯Y = ∆ ˆ¯G.
The relation between relative national consumption and relative national production is given
by aggregate goods demand (C.54) and wage setting (C.55), namely
∆ ˆ¯Y =
(1− γ)− ρ(2− γ)
1 + ρ(2− γ) ∆
ˆ¯C = Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C∆
ˆ¯C. (C.57)
From the long-run intertemporal budget constraints follow directly the new long-run relation
between the relative net foreign asset positions and the relative changes in consumption
levels,
∆ ˆ¯C =
1 + ρ(2− γ)
ρ(2− γ)− (1− γ)δ
ˆ¯B = 2Λ ˆ¯C, ˆ¯B
ˆ¯B, (C.58)
and consequently ∆ ˆ¯Y = ∆ˆ¯L = −δ ˆ¯B.
Aggregate Levels
The aggregate long-run deviation in goods demand is ˆ¯YMU = (1− g¯) ˆ¯CMU + g¯ ˆ¯GMU . Recall
the assumption that in the long-run the share of government expenditures in output is
adjusted to g¯. Consequently,
ˆ¯YMU = ˆ¯CMU = ˆ¯GMU . (C.59)
Optimal labor supply gives the aggregate wage setting
ˆ¯WMU = ˆ¯LMU + ˆ¯CMU + ˆ¯PMU .
With ˆ¯PMU = ˆ¯PMUN =
ˆ¯WMU and the long-run change in aggregate labor demand ˆ¯LMU =
ˆ¯YMU we get that
ˆ¯YMU = − ˆ¯CMU , (C.60)
which, however, contradicts the long-run change in aggregate goods demand in sign. Thus
ˆ¯YMU = ˆ¯LMU = ˆ¯CMU = ˆ¯GMU = 0. (C.61)
For wages and prices we get
ˆ¯WMU = ˆ¯PMU = ˆ¯MMU . (C.62)
130 Appendix to Chapter 3
Regional Levels
Now we can determine the regional deviations by using the aggregates and differences in
changes of the variables. Recall that x = 12
(
xMU +∆x
)
and x∗ = 12
(
xMU −∆x).
ˆ¯C = Λ ˆ¯C, ˆ¯B
ˆ¯B, (C.63)
and consequently
ˆ¯C = Λ ˆ¯C, ˆ¯Y
ˆ¯Y and ˆ¯Y = ˆ¯L = −δ
2
ˆ¯B (C.64)
C.5 Short-run equilibrium responses
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), we separate the short-run equilibrium conditions
into two equations, one determining the IS schedule (GG-schedule), and the LM-schedule,
ie. the money market equilibrium (MM-schedule). Recall that in our setting as wages are
preset, the new steady state after an unanticipated shock is reached the period thereafter.
In particular, we can set the log-deviations of tomorrow’s variables as the new steady state
responses,, ie. ∆cˆs+1 = ∆ˆ¯x.
The MM-schedule
The difference in the short-run consumption Euler equations reads
∆ ˆ¯C = ∆Cˆ + (1− β)∆rˆ.
Since changes in the nominal interest rates are identical for home and foreign private house-
holds, (C.33) implies
∆rˆ =
1
(1− β)(R̂ER− R̂ER),
and thus
∆ ˆ¯C = ∆Cˆ + (R̂ER− R̂ER). (C.65)
The optimal money demand today is
∆Mˆ = ∆Cˆ + R̂ER− β(1−β)
(
R̂ER− R̂ER
)
− β∆rˆ
= ∆Cˆ + R̂ER. (C.66)
Using the same relation for the long-run change in relative money holdings, ie. ∆ ˆ¯M =
∆ ˆ¯C + R̂ER and subtracting (C.66), we get
∆ ˆ¯M −∆Mˆ = ∆ ˆ¯C −∆Cˆ + R̂ER− R̂ER
= (R̂ER− R̂ER) + R̂ER− R̂ER
= 0.
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The second equations uses (C.65). The intuition is straightforward: Households directly
adjust their relative money holdings to the new steady state ratio. This is the equivalent in
the monetary union with an integrated money market to the direct jump of the exchange
rate in the Obstfeld and Rogoff Redux setup. Combining optimal money holding in the new
steady state with the short-run Euler equation using the identity above we get
∆Mˆ = ∆ ˆ¯C + R̂ER. (C.67)
The GG-schedule
Again, the first step is to recognize that from the next period on the economy is in the new
steady state. In particular, households adjust their net foreign assets immediately to the
new steady state levels. Thus, for the relative deviations of the short-run budget constraints
∆ ˆ¯B +∆Cˆ =
(
1
1− g¯
)(
T̂ oT +∆Yˆ
)
− R̂ER− χ
1− β∆Mˆ + T¯loc∆Tˆloc +∆Tˆhh
(C.68)
we use the new steady state relation between net foreign assets and consumption in (C.58)
and get a relationship that depends on contemporaneous ratios and the new steady state
consumption ratio. We now take an intermediate step to derive an expression of ∆ ˆ¯C in
terms of short-run deviations only.
Recall the alternative expression of the consumption Euler equation (C.65), namely ∆ ˆ¯C =
∆Cˆ + (R̂ER− R̂ER). The only term we have to get rid of is R̂ER which is determined by
the new steady state wage levels, ie. R̂ER = (1− γ)T̂ oT = (1− γ)∆ ˆ¯W . Since the long-run
ratio of wage levels is determined by (C.55),
γT̂ oT = ∆ˆ¯Y +∆ ˆ¯C =
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
∆ ˆ¯C.
Using this equation in (C.65) we end up with
∆ ˆ¯C = ∆Cˆ + R̂ER− (1−γ)γ
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
∆ ˆ¯C
⇔
(
1 + (1−γ)γ
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
))
∆ ˆ¯C = ∆Cˆ + R̂ER
⇔ ∆ ˆ¯C = γ(
1+(1−γ)Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)∆Cˆ + γ(
1+(1−γ)Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)R̂ER
⇔ ∆ ˆ¯C = Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ∆Cˆ + Λ ˆ¯C, ˆRERR̂ER (C.69)
The notation in (C.69) is particularly useful as it shows the decomposed effects of short-run
deviations in the endogenous choice of current consumption and the exogenous component
of the change in the real exchange rate on the the long-run relative consumption levels.
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We can use (C.69), (C.65) and the MM-schedule (C.67) to express (C.68) as(
Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯CΛ ˆ¯C,Cˆ +
χ
1−β + 1
)
∆Cˆ = (C.70)(
1
1−g¯
)(
T̂ oT +∆Yˆ
)
−
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯CΛ ˆ¯C,R̂ER +
χ
1−β
)
R̂ER+ T¯loc∆Tˆloc +∆Tˆhh
The last step is to substitute for output fluctuations: It is here where we incorporated the
assumption that national fiscal authorities cannot adjust their national lump-sum taxes in
the short-run, i.e. Tˆloc = Tˆ ∗loc = 0. As already mentioned in the text, this assumption serves
only to distinguish the two different transfer schemes since we want to concentrate on the role
and effectiveness of different federal fiscal transfers. Otherwise, intergovernmental transfers
might be redistributed to households via regional lump-sum taxes and is thus equivalent to
federal transfers among households. This can easily be seen if one simply plugs (C.39) into
households’ budget constraint (C.68).
Thus, using (C.39) together with (C.40) and (C.41) and plugging into the the equation of
differences in log-deviations of total aggregate national demands (C.35) we get
∆Yˆ = (1− γ)(1− g¯)∆Cˆ − (ρ(2− γ)γ(1− g¯) + g¯) T̂ oT + 2(1− g¯)γαˆ+ (1− g¯)2Tˆgg.(C.71)
Substituting into (C.71) yields
(
Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯CΛ ˆ¯C,Cˆ +
χ
1−β + (1− (1− γ))
)
∆Cˆ
= − (ρ(2− γ)γ − 1) T̂ oT −
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ¯CΛ ˆ¯C,R̂ER +
χ
1−β
)
R̂ER+ 2γαˆ+ 2Tˆgg + 2Tˆhh
⇔
(
ΛSˆ,Cˆ + (1− (1− γ))
)
∆Cˆ (C.72)
=
(
(1− ρ(2− γ)γ)−
(
1 + ΛSˆ, ˆRER
)
(1− γ)
)
T̂ oT + 2γαˆ+ 2Tˆgg + 2Tˆhh
Using our notation this can then be rewritten as
∆Cˆ = Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
{
(
(1− ρ(2− γ)γ)−
(
1 + ΛSˆ, ˆRER
)
(1− γ)
)
T̂ oT + 2γαˆ+ 2Tˆgg + 2Tˆhh}
= Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(
Λ
D̂I,T̂ oT
T̂ oT + γ2αˆ+ 2Tˆgg + 2Tˆhh
)
. (C.73)
Plugging the relative log-deviations of consumption levels into the relative log-deviations of
production (C.71) yields
∆Yˆ =
(
(1− γ)(1− g¯)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
Λ
D̂I,T̂ oT
− (ρ(2− γ)γ(1− g¯) + g¯)
)
T̂ oT
+
(
(1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
+ 1
)
(1− g¯)γ2αˆ
+(1− γ)(1− g¯)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
2Tˆhh
+
(
(1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
+ 1
)
(1− g¯)2Tˆgg
⇔ ∆Yˆ = Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
T̂ oT + ΛYˆ ,αˆ2αˆ+ ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg2Tˆgg + ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh2Tˆhh. (C.74)
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The change in net foreign assets is simply calculated by using (C.68) and substituting for
∆Cˆ, ∆Yˆ , and for ∆Mˆ . However, it should already be clear that it it simply the adjustment
to the changes in future consumption as households smooth consumption pattern over time
and by the change in the real exchange rate induced by the Euler equation, namely
2 ˆ¯B = Λ ˆ¯B,Cˆ∆Cˆ + Λ ˆ¯B, ˆ̂RER
(1− γ)T̂ oT . (C.75)
Finally, recall that changes in labor demand are simply given by ∆Lˆ = −∆aˆ+∆Yˆ .
Aggregate Levels
From aggregate consumption Euler equations follow that
ˆ¯CMU = CˆMU + (1− β)rˆMU ⇔ rˆMU = −1
(1− β) Cˆ
MU . (C.76)
Using this for the optimal aggregate money demand implies
MˆMU = CˆMU + 1(1−β) Pˆ
MU − β(1−β) ˆ¯PMU − βrˆMU
= CˆMU + 1(1−β) Pˆ
MU − β(1−β) ˆ¯MMU − β(1−β) CˆMU
⇔ CˆMU = MˆMU + aˆMU . (C.77)
With GˆMUs =
1−g¯
g¯ Tˆ
MU
cb +aˆ
MU = 1−g¯g¯
2χ
1−β Mˆ
MU+aˆMU , the short run aggregate goods demand
deviations are
YˆMU = (1− g¯)
(
MˆMU + aˆMU
)
+ (1− g¯) 2χ1−β MˆMU + g¯aˆMU
⇔ YˆMU = (1− g¯)
(
1 + 2χ1−β
)
MˆMU + aˆMU . (C.78)
Aggregate short-run labor demand fluctuations are then given by
LˆMU = −aˆMU + YˆMU = (1− g¯)
(
1 +
2χ
1− β
)
MˆMU . (C.79)
Regional Levels
The regional short-run deviations are then for consumption
Cˆ = Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(
1
2
Λ
D̂I,T̂ oT
T̂ oT + γαˆ+ Tˆgg + Tˆhh
)
+
1
2
(
MˆMU + aˆMU
)
, (C.80)
production
Yˆ =
1
2
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
T̂ oT + ΛYˆ ,αˆαˆ+ ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg Tˆgg + ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh Tˆhh +
1
2
(
(1− g¯)
(
1 +
2χ
1− β
)
MˆMU + aˆMU
)
,
(C.81)
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employment
Lˆ =
1
2
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
T̂ oT −∆aˆ+ ΛYˆ ,αˆαˆ+ ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg Tˆgg + ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh Tˆhh +
(1− g¯)
2
(
1 +
2χ
1− β
)
MˆMU ,
(C.82)
and net foreign assets
ˆ¯B = Λ ˆ¯B,Cˆ∆Cˆ + Λ ˆ¯B,R̂ER(1− γ)T̂ oT . (C.83)
C.6 Policy Analysis: Calculating the Transfers
Let us now turn to derivations of first the different transfers and second the implications of
the macroeconomic variables not targeted. We will, as outlined in the paper, concentrate
on consumption and employment only. For the welfare approximation, see the last section
of the appendix. Furthermore, aggregate deviations are not considered. In particular, we
concentrate on completely asymmetric productivity shocks only and set aˆMU = 0. Conse-
quently, we also set MˆMU = 0 as the aim of the analysis to study stabilization properties
of federal fiscal transfer arrangements.
Demand Shocks
Demand shocks disturb the composition of private tradable goods consumption. They have
no impact on current prices because wages are fixed. Nevertheless, a shift in demand
affects overall consumption level since it changes income disposable on consumption through
changes in labor income.
Stabilizing Consumption
Stabilizing consumption simply means that we set Cˆ = 0. As the two transfer schemes
affect consumption-disposable-income in (C.80) equally, consumption stabilization leads to
identical transfer volumes
Tˆhh = Tˆgg = −γαˆ. (C.84)
Plugging the transfers into the short run equilibrium response of employment (C.82) we get
for federal transfers among private households
LˆThh = ΛYˆ ,αˆαˆ− ΛYˆ ,Tˆhhγαˆ = (1− g¯)γαˆ, (C.85)
and for the intergovernmental transfers
LˆTgg = ΛYˆ ,αˆαˆ− ΛYˆ ,Tˆggγαˆ = 0 (C.86)
as the remaining employment fluctuations.
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Stabilizing Employment
Employment fluctuations are stabilized if Lˆ = 0. We thus get that intergovernmental
transfers are
Tˆgg = −
ΛYˆ ,αˆ
ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg
αˆ = −γαˆ. (C.87)
Obviously, consumption fluctuations are also completely deleted as can be deduced from
above.
The federal transfers among private households are
Tˆhh = −
ΛYˆ ,αˆ
ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh
αˆ = Tˆgg − (1− g¯)(1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
γαˆ. (C.88)
The consumption fluctuations when these transfers are imposed are
Cˆ = Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(
γαˆ−
(
γαˆ+
(1− g¯)
(1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
))
=
−Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(1− g¯)
(1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
. (C.89)
Productivity Shocks
Let us next study the stabilization of productivity shocks. As we only consider completely
asymmetric productivity shocks, we set aˆ = −aˆ∗. Due to sticky wages, productivity shocks
alter marginal costs of producing tradable and nontradable goods and cause a shift in the
terms of trade by T̂ oT = −2aˆ.
Stabilizing Consumption
By the reason that the two transfers affect private consumption identically, they coincide in
volume if they target consumption fluctuations. For setting Cˆ = 0 we get
Tˆhh = Tˆgg =
(
(1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER)(1− γ)− (1− ρ(2− γ)γ)
)
(−aˆ). (C.90)
Plugging the transfers into the equation determining short run employment changes (C.82)
yields for federal transfers among the privates
LˆThh = −
(
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
+ 1
)
(−aˆ) + Tˆhh = (1− ρ(2− γ)γ) (1− g¯)(−aˆ), (C.91)
and for the intergovernmental transfers
LˆTgg = −
(
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
+ 1
)
(−aˆ) + Tˆgg =
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1− γ)(1− g¯)(−aˆ), (C.92)
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Stabilizing Employment
When we look at employment stabilization, ie. Lˆ = 0, the transfers among private house-
holds are
Tˆhh = −
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
+ 1
ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh
aˆ = −
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
+ 1
Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(1− γ)(1− g¯)(−aˆ). (C.93)
Consumption then fluctuates by
CˆTˆhh = ΛCˆ,D̂I
(
−Λ
D̂I,T̂ oT
aˆ+ Tˆhh
)
=
ρ(2− γ)γ − 1
(1− γ) (−aˆ). (C.94)
In contrast, transfers between the national fiscal authorities look
Tˆgg = −
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
+ 1
ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg
aˆ = −
Λ
Yˆ ,T̂ oT
+ 1(
Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(1− γ) + 1
)
(1− g¯)
(−aˆ) (C.95)
which leads consumption to fluctuate by
CˆTˆgg = ΛCˆ,D̂I
(
−Λ
D̂I,T̂ oT
aˆ+ Tˆgg
)
= − (1− Φ)Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(
1 + Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER
)
(1− γ)(−aˆ), (C.96)
where Φ is a constant and defined as Φ =
Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(1−γ)
Λ
Cˆ,D̂I
(1−γ)+1 , 0 < Φ < 1.
Perfect Insurance through Federal Transfer Scheme
In order to stabilize consumption, the sum of the two transfer has to offset the change in
consumption-disposable-income, ie(
Tˆhh + Tˆgg
)
= −
(
(1− ρ(2− γ)γ)−
(
1 + ΛSˆ, ˆRER
)
(1− γ)
)
(−aˆ). (C.97)
Employment stabilization determines the combination of the federal transfer among pri-
vate households and the intergovernmental transfers. Employment fluctuations in (C.82)
rewritten yields
Lˆ =
(
(1− ρ(2− γ)γ) + (1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,T̂ oT
)
(1− g¯)(−aˆ) + ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh
(
Tˆhh + Tˆgg
)
+ (1− g¯)Tˆgg,
(C.98)
where we have use the fact that ΛYˆ ,Tˆgg−ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh = (1− g¯). Since the sum of the two transfers
delete consumption fluctuations, () implies
Lˆ = 0 =
(
(1− ρ(2− γ)γ) + (1− γ)Λ
Cˆ,T̂ oT
)
(1− g¯)(−aˆ) + ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh
(
Tˆhh + Tˆgg
)
+ (1− g¯)Tˆgg
= (1− ρ(2− γ)γ)(1− g¯)(−aˆ) + (1− g¯)Tˆgg, (C.99)
since Λ
Cˆ,T̂ oT
(1−γ)(1−g¯)(−aˆ)+ΛYˆ ,Tˆhh
(
Tˆhh + Tˆgg
)
= 0. Thus, the combined use of transfers
to stabilize welfare fluctuations imply that intergovernmental transfer keeps employment
constant
Tˆgg = (ρ(2− γ)γ − 1) (−aˆ), (C.100)
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whereas the direct transfers among households correct the shift in consumption-disposable-
income, ie.
Tˆhh = −ΛD̂I,T̂ oT (−aˆ)− Tˆgg =
(
Λ ˆ¯S,R̂ER + 1
)
(1− γ)(−aˆ). (C.101)
C.7 Approximating Welfare
In this section, we derive the approximation of home and foreign welfare and show that the
optimal reaction to union-wide aggregate welfare indeed is to delete short-run consumption
and employment fluctuations. Clearly, as both regions are inhabited by a unit mass of
identical households, regional welfare is simply expressed by the life-time utility.
Recall the part home and foreign life-time utility are
URt =
∑∞
s=t β
s−t (lnCs − 12L2s)
and U∗,Rt =
∑∞
s=t β
s−t (lnC∗s − 12L∗s2) . (C.102)
The second-order Taylor expansion for home utility around the initial steady state implies
URt = U
R
0 +
∑∞
s=t β
s−t
(
Cˆs − 12 L¯2Lˆs − 12
(
Cˆ2s − 12 L¯2Lˆ2s
))
. (C.103)
Recall that the new steady state is reached after one period. Thus, for s ≥ t + 1 we have
that Cˆs = ˆ¯C and Lˆs = ˆ¯L. Consequently, welfare is approximated up to second-order by
UR = U¯R+
(
Cˆ − L¯2Lˆ
)
+
β
1− β
(
ˆ¯C − L¯2 ˆ¯L
)
+
(
Cˆ2 − L¯2Lˆ2
)
+
β
1− β
(
ˆ¯C2 − L¯2 ˆ¯L2
)
. (C.104)
Using the long-run relationship between consumption and employment in (C.64), ˆ¯L = ˆ¯Y =
Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
ˆ¯C, with Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C = Λ
−1
ˆ¯C, ˆ¯Y
, and the relationship between long-run and short-run consump-
tion, ˆ¯C = Λ ˆ¯C,CˆCˆ, derived in (C.69), we rewrite (C.104) and its foreign counterpart as
UR = U¯R +
(
1 +
β
1− β
(
1− L¯2Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ
)(
Cˆ − 1
2
Cˆ2
)
− L¯2
(
Lˆ+
1
2
Lˆ2
)
,(C.105)
U∗,R = U¯∗,R +
(
1 +
β
1− β
(
1− L¯2Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ
)(
Cˆ∗ +
1
2
Cˆ∗
2
)
− L¯2
(
Lˆ∗ − 1
2
Lˆ∗
2
)
.(C.106)
Regional Welfare
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996), we take first-order approximations for regional
welfare. Thus, we get for the deviations of welfare, dUR = UR − U¯R
dUR =
(
1 +
β
1− β
(
1− L¯2Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ
)
Cˆ − L¯2Lˆ and dU∗R = −dUR. (C.107)
The second box results from looking at completely asymmetric shocks and using log-
linearized equilibrium conditions. Recall that Cˆ = −Cˆ∗ and Lˆ = −Lˆ∗.
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Union-wide Welfare
The union-wide welfare is simply the sum of regional welfare, ie. UMU,R = U∗,R+UR. The
fact that up to first-order dU∗,R = −dUR means that a simple first-order Taylor approxi-
mation leads to dUMU,R = dU∗,R − dUR = 0. Consequently, union-wide welfare must be
expressed by using the sum of regional welfare approximated up to second-order. It follows
from (C.106) and Cˆ∗2 = Cˆ2 and Lˆ∗2 = Lˆ2 that
dUMU,R = −
(
1 +
β
1− β
(
1− L¯2Λ ˆ¯Y, ˆ¯C
)
Λ ˆ¯C,Cˆ
)
Cˆ2 − L¯2Lˆ2. (C.108)
Clearly, dUMU,R is maximized for Cˆ = Lˆ = 0. However, this does not imply that UMU,R
is maximized as monopolistic distortions on labor markets prevail which leads U¯MU,R to
be suboptimal. However, as it is standard in the New Keynesian literature, this could
be corrected by redistributing proportional labor income taxes lump-sum. Compare, eg.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2002a).
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